NATO in Rusija

Ko anti-ekstremistična enota policije pomaga ekstremistom s pravo ideologijo. Ali ruski vsakdan.

https://meduza.io/en/news/2017/11/09/ra...

The radical movement “SERB,” which has been implicated in multiple attacks on Russian oppositionists, was overseen by the Russian Interior Ministry’s Anti-Extremism Unit, a former SERB activist told the television network Dozhd. According to Oleg Chursin, the group’s supervisor was Major Alexey Okopny, an officer in the Interior Ministry’s “Center E.”

SERB leader Igor Beketov (better known as “Gosha Tarasevich”) allegedly “often mentioned Okopny,” and said the movement sometimes received “operational bonuses” from Center E, with which it coordinated its actions, “how to behave,” “what to do,” and “how violent” its members could be.

Samuel je 9. nov 2017 ob 14:30 izjavil:

Brane22 je 9. nov 2017 ob 14:16 izjavil:

Ali ko bo amerom zmanjkalo interesa da bi plačevali in pritiskali "demokratične" režime.

Kako pa pritiskajo recimo Belorusijo in Kitajsko?

Kitajska je prva drzava na turneji, pri kater ameriski petelincek drzi gobec, da morajo kupovati od amerike or els. Verjetno ti ne ves da je amerika posodila svetu toliko $ da lahko skoraj svet z istim dnarjem pokupi vse te ameriske korporacije... potem tudi vrednost dolarja, postane relativni pojem...

Pac-Man je 9. nov 2017 ob 15:46 izjavil:

Odlično berem. In še bolje gledam.

Slika pove 1000 besed. Tu jih imaš 25 na sekundo.

Slabo bereš. Lahko se izmikaš odgovoru ti priporočam.

gozdar1 je 9. nov 2017 ob 16:04 izjavil:

D3m je 9. nov 2017 ob 06:45 izjavil:

Evo vam bota. Gozdar1.

Očitno se je zaradi besed v mojem postu samodejno aktiviral bot.

Saj vemo da si twin brother od smrekar1.

Mr.B je 10. nov 2017 ob 08:36 izjavil:

Samuel,
To je uradno stalisce kitajske http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/04/01/...

No, če si prebral tole iz linka, potem veš, zakaj Kitajska ne bo nikoli priznala samostojno ruske priključitve Krima (poleg tega, da bi takšno priznanje spodbudilo osamosvojitvene želje marsikaterih pokrajin znotraj Kitajske).

"Russian actions in Crimea seem reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s support for Mongolia’s independence bid in 1945, which helped the territory separate from China. "

Kitajska je poleg Mongolije izgubila obsežna ozmelja Kamčatke ter severno in proti zahodu. Gre dobesedno za sto tisoče kvadratnih kilometrov, ki jih je Kitajska izgubila ne tako dolgo nazaj zaradi Rusije/Sovjetske Zveze. Zadnji oborožen kitajsko-sovjetski spopad glede meje, se je zgodil leta 1969.

Brane22 je 10. nov 2017 ob 12:14 izjavil:

In iz istega razloga ne priznavajo recimo Kosova.
Ampak ti jih seveda omenjaš le v ukrajinskem kontekstu...

Torej ima tudi Kosovo nekaj z Mongolijo, al kaj??????????????????????????

Pusti ga. Saj ne ve o čem piše.

Samuel je 10. nov 2017 ob 12:32 izjavil:

Aha, napad je najboljša obramba, ane. Ker shizfren mongul si ti, ej model? A si mogoče dvojček po zodiaku?
Po tvoje ZDA vplivajo na vse države, da ne priznajo veljavnost krimskega referenduma. Seveda to ni tako.

Seveda je. Samo če spremljaš, kaj se je dogajalo s priznavanjem Kosova, ti to jasno pokaže.

Imaš premnogo intervjuev folka, ki je bil v tem na srpski strani in ki ni imel problema govoriti o tem.

Samuel je 10. nov 2017 ob 12:06 izjavil:

Mr.B je 10. nov 2017 ob 08:36 izjavil:

Samuel,
To je uradno stalisce kitajske http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/04/01/...

No, če si prebral tole iz linka, potem veš, zakaj Kitajska ne bo nikoli priznala samostojno ruske priključitve Krima (poleg tega, da bi takšno priznanje spodbudilo osamosvojitvene želje marsikaterih pokrajin znotraj Kitajske).

"Russian actions in Crimea seem reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s support for Mongolia’s independence bid in 1945, which helped the territory separate from China. "

Kitajska je poleg Mongolije izgubila obsežna ozmelja Kamčatke ter severno in proti zahodu. Gre dobesedno za sto tisoče kvadratnih kilometrov, ki jih je Kitajska izgubila ne tako dolgo nazaj zaradi Rusije/Sovjetske Zveze. Zadnji oborožen kitajsko-sovjetski spopad glede meje, se je zgodil leta 1969.

Kitajska NE bo Priznala krima ker :******** No dej povej.
Kitajska je priznala Kosove, ker je lahko : ******************* No dej povje.
V čem je razlika obeh , glede na stanje v kitajski. Dej no sej znaš

Kitajska AFAIK ni priznala Kosova.
Ko sem govoril o priznanju, sem mislil nasploh - države pač.

Ko se je o ameriškem pritisku govorilo v Srbiji, je mislim da Jeremić moral pojasniti laični javnosti par stvari. In takrat je laikom odprl oči.

Države v vsem iščejo svoje interese. Kakšne, je odvisno od države in njenega mednarodnega položaja.
Če si majhen, je interes preživeti. Takrat "prijateljski" obisk supersile na "pogovor" spreminja stvari radikalno.

Če si velik, so tvoji interesi glasnejši in ne zbežiš od vsake sence.

Na vprašanje, kako in kaj misli Kitajska okrog Kosova in kaj lahko pri tem Srbija naredi, da jo lahko knjiži pod zaveznike, je bil odgovor enostaven:

"Vi niste razumeli. Mi Kosova ne bomo priznali. Tudi če ga vi priznate jutri."

Samuel je 10. nov 2017 ob 12:57 izjavil:

Saj vam je vse Brane odgovoril. Nič ne sledite temi??

Brane22 je 9. nov 2017 ob 14:16 izjavil:

Ali ko bo amerom zmanjkalo interesa da bi plačevali in pritiskali "demokratične" režime.

Kosovo je za Kitajsko druga zgodba kot Krim. Krim je odločitev ljudstva da se preko referenduma pridruži drugi državi. Pa se lahko na glavo obračate in nakladate svoje amerofilske ruske histerije o invaziji na evropo.
Skladno s tem je tudi pogled kitajske v nasproju z njenimi gopolitičnimi interesi, kaj šele da bi kakšen otok, rekel pa nate fakiča kitajci, smo se demokratično odcepili. No medtem, pa se izvaja politično nasilje v Kataloniji in vprašanje kaj skriva. Bi poiskali Kitajski odgovor na stanje v kataloniji...


Tole je kitajski odgovorna kosovo, tekst je zanimiv v primerjavi s Krimskim: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosov...

China reacts with full understanding to the challenges and threats Russia has faced in connection with the Ukrainian issue and supports Moscow's approach to its settlement.

International reactions to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation @ Wikipedia

http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_c...

Putinizem = oligarhi + mafija + obveščevalne službe. Vse z roko v roki. Zakoni so za zlorabo.

In spet - follow tha money.

https://www.theatlantic.com/internation...

Doooolgo ampak dobro, za ostale pa upam, da bodo prsti zdržali scrolling :)

Among the wealthy sophisticates who came and went from their seaside villas on the Spanish island of Mallorca, there was something that didn’t quite fit about the Russian who lived in a neoclassical mansion on the Avenida Portals Vells.

...

It wasn’t long before police began to wonder about Gennady Petrov. He and his family were clearly Russian, but their passports were Greek. They seemed to have a lot of money, and to spend it in unusual ways. A real estate agent reported that Petrov had paid a contractor to build a tunnel down to the sea from another home he had owned in the area. Then there was an incident involving two Russians who were arrested as they prowled outside an upscale shopping center. The suspects wouldn’t talk, even after the police found a bomb in their car. But detectives eventually determined that the men were hoodlums who had flown in from Frankfurt to track another Russian—a businessman who was apparently involved in a dispute with Petrov.

The authorities soon discovered that Petrov was indeed a former boxer—and reputedly a high-ranking figure in one of Russia’s most powerful criminal organizations, the Tambovskaya. In Spain alone, he had amassed at least $50 million in properties and businesses. Beyond his island refuge, he was said to control a global network of legitimate and illicit activities, ranging from jewelry stores and extortion rings to the gray-market sale of Soviet MiG-29 fighter jets. But even the scope of Petrov’s enterprises did not prepare Spanish investigators for what they heard when they began to listen in on his telephone calls.

At one point, Petrov called a senior justice official in Moscow to complain that a Russian shipyard had fallen behind on construction of a new yacht Petrov had ordered. According to a confidential Spanish report of the conversation, the Russian official promised to go see the shipbuilder with some of “his boys,” and show him “a lot of affection.”

...

In hundreds of telephone calls intercepted during the year before Petrov’s arrest in 2008, Spanish investigators listened as the mob boss chatted with powerful businessmen, notorious criminals and high-level officials in the government of Vladimir Putin. During one trip to Russia, Petrov called his son to say he had just met with a man who turned out to be the Russian defense minister—and to report that they had sorted out a land deal, the sale of some airplanes, and a scheme to invest in Russian energy companies.

...

Rather than simply bribing police officials to facilitate their activities, bosses like Petrov have established themselves as business partners, money launderers, and investment scouts for high-ranking officials who have amassed sizable fortunes themselves, Western security officials say.

...

In isolated cases, the mafias are also believed to have been used as instruments of Russian state power—running guns for the security services, killing enemies, or carrying out political skullduggery.

...

Interviews with more than 20 Western law-enforcement and intelligence officials—including Spanish investigators who spoke publicly and in detail about the Russian cases for the first time—as well as a review of thousands of pages of court files and investigative documents, show the interplay of gangsters, spies, magnates, and politicians in Russian power networks at home and abroad. The mafias’ ties to the Russian government, and particularly to the security services, have led Spanish officials to fear for their national security as well as law and order. “If you are someone important in the mafia in Russia, you don’t work on your own,” said Juan Rueda, a former Spanish police commander who led many of the investigations. Another senior police official added, “There is always the shadow of intelligence services behind them.”

...

Among the first investigators to grasp the Russian threat in the 1990s was Rueda, a low-key commander in the small organized-crime unit of the national police. (...) “It was not easy,” Rueda recalled. “They were killing, kidnapping and looting—but in Russia. In the beginning, we made a lot of mistakes. We spent time looking for drug connections but couldn’t find them.”

But in March 2003, Rueda caught a break. Investigators of the paramilitary Civil Guard learned from a Russian informant that Zakhar Kalashov, a Georgian boss who had suspected ties to Russian intelligence and operated near the southeastern port city of Alicante, was preparing to celebrate his 50th birthday in grand style, flying in a large party of guests from Moscow on a private jet. On the appointed day, plainclothes officers watched limousines wind down a coastal road to a secluded hotel with burbling fountains on a bluff above the beach.

...

Like the 1957 Apalachin summit in upstate New York, a gathering of mafia dons that revealed the coordination among seemingly rival crime families from around the United States, the birthday party made it strikingly clear to the Spaniards that they were up against formidable enemies who were willing to work together.

...

By then, mobsters had already begun to entrench themselves in Catalonia. (...) Suspected underworld figures also surfaced as representatives of a major Russian oil company, Lukoil, that was proposing to join with a Spanish firm to open 150 gasoline stations in the area. The deal ultimately fell through, but information from Spanish and Russian law enforcement cited in court documents suggested that organized crime figures with ties to both Lukoil and the Russian spy agencies planned to use the deal to launder illicit funds.

...

Nor could the Spanish police count on any real cooperation from the authorities in Russia. In some instances, investigators and prosecutors came to believe that their Russian counterparts were actually leaking information about the Spanish cases to the mafia suspects and trying to undermine their prosecutions. At one point, Rueda got into a shouting match with a diplomatic attaché from Russia’s Federal Security Service, the FSB, and ordered him out of police headquarters. “He hated me with a passion,” Rueda recalled. “They wanted to know, to participate, but we didn’t let them because we couldn’t trust them.”

...

In June 2005, the police finally launched raids on homes and businesses from Marbella to Barcelona. They froze some 800 bank accounts, seized properties and detained 28 suspects—Russians, Georgians, Ukrainians, and Spaniards. But the big fish got away.

...

If the fugitives were intimidated, Rueda saw little sign of it. Law-enforcement officials in Georgia told him that Oniani was threatening to kill Spanish investigators. But in the spring of 2006, Rueda heard about another birthday party. This time the guest of honor was to be Vyacheslav (the Little Japanese) Ivankov, a feisty mobster who had cut a swath through New York City in the early 1990s, reportedly living in a Trump Tower apartment and dressing like a Russian John Gotti.

...

As the celebrants departed the party at a luxury hotel, the Emirati police arrested Kalashov on a Spanish warrant. Extradited back to Madrid, he was eventually convicted of money laundering and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, in what was one of the most important convictions overseas of a gangster from the former Soviet Union. (...) In 2012, the FBI passed along a formal warning that the mafia was prepared to spend a million dollars to bribe a Spanish official for Kalashov’s release, a confidential FBI document indicates.

Still seeking Russian help, the prosecutors turned in June of 2006 to Alexander Litvinenko, a gregarious former FSB officer who was living in exile in London.

...

Meeting in London with Spanish anti-mafia prosecutor José Grinda, Litvinenko argued that Russia’s mafias, like its oligarchs, were almost organically entwined with the state. The patronage system under which both operated had roots in an alliance that Putin and other KGB veterans had established with underworld figures in St. Petersburg, early in Putin’s political career, Litvinenko said. The partnership had evolved as Putin consolidated his power and the Russian criminals expanded their reach. “Litvinenko’s theory was that Putin and the intelligence services have taken over, manipulated and absorbed the criminal groups,” Grinda said in an interview. Grinda, a bearded workaholic with a dry sense of humor, persuaded Litvinenko to testify against the mobsters in Spain. But only months later, the would-be star witness died an agonizing, almost public death, having been poisoned with radioactive material slipped into his tea at a London hotel by two men believed to have been hired by the FSB.

...

The Spanish investigators still had a big Russian target before them in Gennady Petrov, the hulking ex-boxer based on Mallorca. What they had found in shared files of European intelligence and law-enforcement agencies was more than enough to get their attention: Petrov had started out as part of a crew of former athletes in the Tambovskaya, the St. Petersburg gang, and served a six-year prison term for money laundering, extortion, and fraud. Known for his discretion as the “Gray Cardinal,” his rise had tracked the political ascent of Putin, who left the KGB in 1991 and moved into local politics in St. Petersburg when underworld figures were a brazen presence there.

...

Among the latter enterprises was the Petersburg Fuel Company, which in 1995—in a decision that involved then-deputy mayor Vladimir Putin—won the exclusive right to sell gasoline in the city, according to Spanish court documents and other sources.

...

By 2007, the local Guard unit had been joined by investigative teams from Madrid, deployed to dig deeper into what they had already concluded was a vast criminal empire. Petrov’s holdings in Russia were thought to include a chain of more than 300 jewelry stores owned through front men, supermarkets, a maritime oil shipping company, and firms developing property in the resort of Sochi for upcoming Winter Olympics, court documents show. (...) they were tied to the smuggling of cobalt and cigarettes through Finland, and they were connected to black-market sales of military helicopters and MiG fighter jets in Africa, according to court documents. Petrov had also been implicated in an embezzlement scheme that had skimmed away more than $100 million and cost thousands of shipyard workers their jobs in Germany, the documents show.

...

The intercepts recorded Petrov’s contacts with a Russian deputy prime minister and at least five other cabinet ministers, as well as legislators, oligarchs, and bankers, investigative documents show. (...) In one chat, a government friend offered that he was sorry to see Petrov’s “close friend,” the minister of health, lose his post in a cabinet shuffle. Then again, the official added, Petrov could celebrate the appointment of another old friend from St. Petersburg, Dmitry Kozak, among the new crop of ministers, documents show. (Kozak, one of Putin’s closest aides, served as both his presidential chief of staff and as deputy prime minister.)

...

And then there was Vladislav Reznik, an urbane businessman-turned-legislator who had also come up through the rough and tumble of St. Petersburg politics, Spanish investigators said. Reznik, whom Petrov called by the diminutive “Slava” or “Slavik,” rose to become a founder and vice president of Putin’s political party, United Russia, and the powerful head of the finance committee in Russia’s parliament, the Duma.

...

By the time Spanish detectives began to follow his movements in 2007, Reznik had bought Petrov’s first Mallorca home and set it up as a regular getaway, stocking it with fine wines and expensive art. (...) In Spain, Petrov, and Reznik used the same secretary, the same lawyer and the same financial adviser, documents say. They shared a private jet, leased by one of Petrov’s companies, to shuttle back and forth to Moscow in style.

...

The Spanish indictment accuses Reznik of operating at “the highest levels of power in Russia on behalf of Mr. Petrov and his organization.” And in their recorded conversations, Petrov talked to and about Reznik as if he were both a partner and friend. On one call, Petrov said he and Reznik would meet to discuss having Petrov’s enemies “put in jail” in Russia, according to prosecution documents.

...

On visits to Russia, Petrov often moved around Moscow in an armored vehicle accompanied by bodyguards armed with machine guns and grenade launchers, documents show. He also received protection from Nikolai Aulov, a square-jawed police general and senior Interior Ministry official whom he paid to deflect investigations, remove incriminating information from government databases, order the arrests of rival gangsters, and appoint allies to useful posts in the security forces, according to court documents. In a kind of mob role-reversal, the general also supplied muscle to the visiting gangster when necessary, the documents indicate. Aulov also apparently liked to chat: Over a one-year period, the Spanish investigators recorded 78 calls between him and Petrov, 74 of them placed by the general.

Petrov’s highly placed friends did not come cheaply, documents from the Spanish investigation show. In return for services such as providing confidential law-enforcement information or relaying messages to the country’s special prosecutor, for example, documents show that he paid for a senior prosecution official’s home, car, office computers and even his dental bills.

In June of 2008, the Spanish authorities made their move, raiding Petrov’s villa and leading him away in handcuffs. Around Mallorca and on the Spanish mainland, they arrested nearly 20 others, seized $17 million in cash and confiscated two yachts.

...

The Russian government’s primary response to the charges was to deny them and to file motions asking that Spain cede its authority to prosecute and turn the cases over to Russian justice. (...) A Kremlin spokesman dismissed the suggestion that Putin himself was connected to organized crime as “beyond the realm of reason.”

...

Last year, the Spanish prosecutors took the case into a new realm, charging a high-profile Ukrainian oligarch named Dmitry Firtash with being a boss of the money laundering operation. Firtash, who is based in Vienna, was also once a business partner of Paul Manafort, the former Trump campaign chairman

...

After nearly a decade of preparation, Spanish prosecutors are gearing up for a trial in the Petrov case next February. But the moment may be anticlimactic. Petrov, who is said to be ill, cannot be tried in absentia under Spanish law. The most prominent defendant might therefore be his friend Reznik, the legislator, who has said he will come to Madrid to clear his name. The other defendants will be mostly accused Spanish accomplices. Still, the investigators said they are gratified to have disrupted the mafias, even if the bosses remain beyond reach.

“These cases are like a long-distance race,” Grinda said. “We are telling them: not here. We don’t want you here.”

To me spominja na sledeče.

Antični Rim ni bil obrambna organizacija ampak agresor.

So what ?

Policija se na kriminalce opira vsepovsod. To ni samo ruska posebnost.

Ostale točke ne bi niti našteval, pa je z njimi podobno.
Kjer je na kupu veliko denarja, tja gravitira kriminal. Pa naj gre za nafto, mamila ali kaj tretjega.

Pri vsakem objektivu je nivo vedno manjši izven njegovega vidnega polja.

Kako recimo, da se ne sekiraš toliko okrog tistih Rusov, ki so svoj naropani denar odnesli s sabo v VB in USA ?

Brane22 je 11. nov 2017 ob 20:19 izjavil:

Kako recimo, da se ne sekiraš toliko okrog tistih Rusov, ki so svoj naropani denar odnesli s sabo v VB in USA ?

Uh huh?

https://slo-tech.com/forum/t687918/p570...

No ja, Španija.

Okej, hočeš anglosaksonce. Vse sem že lepil.



Mikhail Lesin @ Wikipedia

Vsak raptor nese naropani cash na Cayman Ialands.
Apple, lep primerek.

lol ... Putin pravi, da je užaljen zaradi obtožb. KGB agent je užaljen.

Corbet report - Why Is The US Air Force Collecting Russian DNA?

Ne zanima me "paragon" ampak novica.
Ki očitno ni izmišljena.

Brane22 je 13. nov 2017 ob 14:40 izjavil:

Ne zanima me "paragon" ampak novica.
Ki očitno ni izmišljena.

Tako kot niso izmišljene novice o tem kako je Su-25 sestrelil Malezijskega Boeinga, kako so 11. September zorganizirali sami američani, kako bo vojska ZDA zdaj zdaj prevzela nadzor nad državo in kako je Brexit po nosu udaril britanske oligarhe?

Zanimiv standard in vpogled v tvoj um, ni kaj.

Pardon, tipu delam krivico.

The Colbert Report @ Wikipedia

Zadeva je parodija, podobno kot Onion. Zanimivo kakšne vire uporablja Brane22. Da ne gre za čisto norčevanje?
Če da čestitke Brane22, res si me potegnil za nos

BTW, prej je bilo nekaj rezgetanja ob shodu parih (baje) tadesnih v Moskvi. Za kar je seveda bil kriv Putin.

Meanwhile in significant NATO ally in EU:

ANALIZA Deseci tisuća fašista marširali u srcu Europe, čeka li to i Hrvatsku?

Čudi me, kako to, da folk, ki je profesionalno zaskrbljen za "demokracijo" opazi dva tipa s krčem v desni roki, če stojita v Moskvi, ne opazi pa 60.000 folka, ki stoji v Varšavi...

Ampak dva "objektivna" tipa na ST pa niti črke.