Strmoglavil malezijski 777 v Ukrajini

Smrekar1 je 9. jun 2016 ob 12:59 izjavil:

D3m je 9. jun 2016 ob 10:18 izjavil:

Donbas ni Sudetenland.

To je res. Donbas leži vzhodneje in za razliko od Sudetije je konflikt v celoti sproduciran v Kremlju. Sudetski nemci so si namreč večvidel dejansko želeli živeti v nacistični Nemčiji, medtem ko v Donbasu ni ravno jasno ali bi raje živeli v fašistični Rusiji ali ne.

Pac-Man je 2. jul 2016 ob 20:51 izjavil:

Mikroskhemy s voyennoy priyomkoy. 134-ya proizvedena Voronezhskim VZPP 12 nedelya 1985 goda, 153-ya proizvodstva Foton Tashkent 9 nedelya 1986 goda. Uchityvaya tsikl proizvodstva konechnoye izdeliye moglo byt' vypushcheno v kontse 1986 - v seredine 1987 goda. Tekhnika odnoznachno voyennaya. Pokhozhe na kakoye-to logicheskoye ustroystvo tipa prosteyshego kontrollera.

Chips with military acceptance. 134-I is produced by Voronezh VSP Week 12 1985 153rd Photon production Tashkent 9 Week 1986. Given the cycle of the final product could be released at the end of 1986 - in mid-1987. Technique uniquely military. It looks like some of the simplest logic controller type device.

"Yesli eto deystvitel'no passazhirskiy layner, to eto sdelali ne my", — zaveril Boroday. Po yego informatsii, upavshiy v Toreze samolet gorazdo men'she, chem Boeing. Krome togo, napomnil prem'yer, Kiyev zakryl nebo nad DNR i LNR dlya poletov grazhdanskikh sudov.

"If this is a passenger liner, it did not us", - assured Boroday. According to him, the aircraft crashed in Torez much smaller than Boeing. In addition, the Prime Minister recalled, Kiev closed the sky over the DNR and LNR to civil courts.

2. Strengthening of the air defense of the LPR, which allowed to lower the importance of enemy aviation significantly. The destruction of the radar station in April-May wasn't in vain. The appearance of a combat-ready "Buk" is a significant aid. The operational Su-25 is for now a cherry on a pie, but also not unnecessary.

Brane22 je 27. sep 2016 ob 08:25 izjavil:

Paa saj spreminjanje zgodovine ni ruski izum, tudi če gre tam za to.

stjan je 27. sep 2016 ob 09:15 izjavil:

Glede Orwella so Rusi kar lepo zaostali ta "razvitim" svetom.
Trudijo se zelo v tej smeri, samo smo jim mi že ušli v skrajne napovedi te knjige:( .

Invictus je 28. sep 2016 ob 14:45 izjavil:

Kot da so upali napisati kako drugo poročilo.

Ukrajinci pa še vedno niso dali na voljo radarskih posnetkov tistega dne...

mtosev je 28. sep 2016 ob 18:27 izjavil:

RT tak nikoli za nič ni bil kredibilen.

Alexander Novak, Energy Minister of Russia (Russian): "Together with the Ministry of Economy and Trade we have looked at the priority directions for replacing imported machinery, which we should deal with in first place. In the middle and long-term view there are 12 main directions. The ones we consider most important until 2016 are the hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling technologies. "

From February 2015 to July 2016 three researchers at Bellingcat — Higgins, Aric Toler, and Veli-Peka Kivimaki — who had contributed MH17 articles received numerous spearphishing emails, with Higgins alone receiving at least 16 phishing emails targeting his personal email account.(...) These spearphishing attempts consist of a variety of spoofed Gmail security notices alerting the target that suspicious activity was detected on their account.

The attackers used several methods to redirect the target to credential harvesting pages. In at least 21 of the emails, the URL redirects the victim to a shortened Bitly URL.

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The specifically crafted URLs with target-specific strings are consistent with a FANCY BEAR technique highlighted in Dell Secureworks research and employed against a DNC staffer whose files were leaked on DCLeaks.

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In the June 2016 example, Toler was targeted with a message that used hellomail1@yandex[.]com in a manner consistent with how Billy Rinehart was targeted prior to content from his personal Gmail being posted to DCLeaks.

The domains evrosatory[.]com,us-westmail-undeliversystem[.]com have been previously identified by Pricewaterhouse Coopers as FANCY BEAR, and the domain servicetransfermail[.]com closely resembles the servicetransferemail[.]com infrastructure that German Intelligence (BvF) established as FANCY BEAR within Cyber Brief Nr. 01/2016.

FANCY BEAR also previously used both the Cata501836 and Carbon2u name servers to host infrastructure and email addresses from 1&1’s mail.com to register domains. We were able to identify further overlaps with other FANCY BEAR infrastructure by pivoting off of these indicators, which we will describe in a later blog post. Based on these consistencies, we assess FANCY BEAR almost certainly is behind the spearphishing and credential harvesting campaign targeting Eliot Higgins and other Bellingcat researchers.

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CyberBerkut defaced the Bellingcat webpage on February 10, 2016, claiming credit for the attack and singling out Ruslan Leviev, a Russian opposition blogger and Bellingcat contributor.

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Throughout our research, we have focused on FANCY BEAR, an advanced persistent threat (APT) group assessed to be Russian government. CyberBerkut, on the other hand, was a referential data point when we looked at precedence for pro-Russian proxies interfering with elections. CrowdStrike assessed in its 2015 Global Threat Report “there are indications that CyberBerkut has ties to Russian state security,” but the degree of Russian government control over the group is disputed.

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We looked to see if we could identify other overlaps between FANCY BEAR and CyberBerkut that would help us assess which of these two scenarios was more likely. Through our research into the Bellingcat activity, we found some surprising content overlaps with DCLeaks — another assessed Russian influence outlet — and a CyberBerkut pattern of registering infrastructure that FANCY BEAR also uses. These developments move the needle slightly towards a more coordinated relationship between the two groups, but not decisively.

(...) cyber-berkut[.]net was registered by “Aleksandr Panchenko” using the email address alex_panchenko@mail[.]com.

While certainly not definitive, the use of a mail.com email address to register domains is consistent with recently identified FANCY BEAR registration activity against the DCCC, WADA, and CAS.

The activity that Bellingcat alerted us to provided a plethora of domains, IP addresses, email addresses, and other registration and hosting information for us to pivot off of to identify other pertinent infrastructure. In an upcoming blog post, we’ll seek to identify as much FANCY BEAR infrastructure and aliases as possible using the ThreatConnect platform and capabilities from some of our industry partners.

Reviewing the CATA501836 and Carbon2u name servers, we were able to identify dozens of active domains that fit the FANCY BEAR mold and likely spoof organizations that Moscow would seek to compromise.

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The campaign against Bellingcat provides yet another example of sustained targeting against an organization that shines a light on Russian perfidy. The spearphishing campaign is classic FANCY BEAR activity while CyberBerkut’s role raises yet more questions about the group’s ties to Moscow. These end-to-end cyber operations begin with targeting and exploitation and end with strategic leaks and other active measures employed against those with whom they disagree.

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The BEARs win if their active measures campaigns push, scare, or intimidate their targets into doing what they want. If you encounter a BEAR, you’re doing something right. Don’t back down. And turn on two-factor authentication for everything.