Forum » Loža » Strmoglavil malezijski 777 v Ukrajini
Strmoglavil malezijski 777 v Ukrajini
Temo vidijo: vsi
Pac-Man ::
Sodni proces se bo začel 9. marca, livestream bo.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-4...
International arrest warrants have been issued for the four suspects and a court case will begin in the Netherlands on 9 March 2020. The Dutch-led joint investigation team (JIT) named the men as Igor Girkin, Sergei Dubinsky and Oleg Pulatov from Russia, as well as Ukrainian Leonid Kharchenko.
https://www.courtmh17.com/en/live-strea...
The proceedings will be live streamed on this website, in both Dutch and English, so that viewers in the Netherlands and abroad can follow them.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-4...
International arrest warrants have been issued for the four suspects and a court case will begin in the Netherlands on 9 March 2020. The Dutch-led joint investigation team (JIT) named the men as Igor Girkin, Sergei Dubinsky and Oleg Pulatov from Russia, as well as Ukrainian Leonid Kharchenko.
https://www.courtmh17.com/en/live-strea...
The proceedings will be live streamed on this website, in both Dutch and English, so that viewers in the Netherlands and abroad can follow them.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Še en Bellingcatov sodelavec.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
Explosive new statement just released by the Joint Investigation Team prosecuting the MH17 downing. In short: JIT provides hard evidence that Kremlin directly controlled military activities and weapons supply to Donbass militants in early July 2014.
This means that the military chain of command for criminal liability for the downing now goes all the way up to the Kremlin…and under Dutch law JIT will need to prosecute as far as the chain of command goes.
For the first time JIT publishes a trove of original, raw phone call intercepts, many of them containing voices of top Russian military commanders, Putin's aide Surkov, and FSB proxy Malofeev. Content appears damning.
Call intercepts include a call to the Russia's southern district military chief Serdyukov, who tells a militant commander he is instructed to only allocate weapons that are approved by "General Vladimir Ivanovich from FSB".
The identity of Gen. "Vladimir Ivanovich" from FSB is the key new suspect that JIT needs help identifying.
In one call, Alexander Boroday, then prime minister of "DNR", says he has only exclusive line of command and responsibility: to the Russian Federation.
In another, he says he fulfils the orders of "Kontora", Russia's colloquialism for FSB.
In another call from July 1 2014, a local militant commander asks a supervisor what the new rules of engagement are.
He is told: Shoigu (Russia's Defense Minister) mandated that local militant chiefs are kicked out and replaced by people sent from Moscow.
In a long, encrypted phone call (apparently not too well encrypted), Putin aide Surkov coaches Boroday, and takes requests from him.
They both laugh after Boroday explains Donetsk is a "humanitarian disaster" that will need to survive on Russian aid.
Another interesting call is between Malofeev and Boroday, also on an encrypted line.
In it Malofeev, who part-sponsors "the republic", orders Boroday to make Girkin give a TV interview declaring utter loyalty to supreme commander Putin, and to extol his virtues.
Girkin/Strelkov did make that odd-sounding statement back then. Apparently it was meant to reassure Putin that Girkin can be trusted and left in place.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
Explosive new statement just released by the Joint Investigation Team prosecuting the MH17 downing. In short: JIT provides hard evidence that Kremlin directly controlled military activities and weapons supply to Donbass militants in early July 2014.
This means that the military chain of command for criminal liability for the downing now goes all the way up to the Kremlin…and under Dutch law JIT will need to prosecute as far as the chain of command goes.
For the first time JIT publishes a trove of original, raw phone call intercepts, many of them containing voices of top Russian military commanders, Putin's aide Surkov, and FSB proxy Malofeev. Content appears damning.
Call intercepts include a call to the Russia's southern district military chief Serdyukov, who tells a militant commander he is instructed to only allocate weapons that are approved by "General Vladimir Ivanovich from FSB".
In one call, Alexander Boroday, then prime minister of "DNR", says he has only exclusive line of command and responsibility: to the Russian Federation.
In another, he says he fulfils the orders of "Kontora", Russia's colloquialism for FSB.
He is told: Shoigu (Russia's Defense Minister) mandated that local militant chiefs are kicked out and replaced by people sent from Moscow.
They both laugh after Boroday explains Donetsk is a "humanitarian disaster" that will need to survive on Russian aid.
In it Malofeev, who part-sponsors "the republic", orders Boroday to make Girkin give a TV interview declaring utter loyalty to supreme commander Putin, and to extol his virtues.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Smrekar1 ::
V Ukrajini sploh ne moremo več govoriti o državljanski vojni. Šlo je preprosto za invazijo in okupacijo dela države s strani Rusije in ob pomoči lokalnih izdajalcev.
Podporniki samostojnosti in suverenosti narodov tu pridno ploskajo Rusiji, ki da brani državo pred neonacisti.
Zakaj je že Paul Manafort ob kruhu in vodi?
Podporniki samostojnosti in suverenosti narodov tu pridno ploskajo Rusiji, ki da brani državo pred neonacisti.
Zakaj je že Paul Manafort ob kruhu in vodi?
jype ::
V Ukrajini sploh ne moremo več govoriti o državljanski vojni. Šlo je preprosto za invazijo in okupacijo dela države s strani Rusije in ob pomoči lokalnih izdajalcev.Drži. Enako velja za Izraelsko okupacijo zahodnega brega.
Podporniki samostojnosti in suverenosti narodov tu pridno ploskajo Rusiji, ki da brani državo pred neonacisti.Citiraj kakšnega.
Zakaj je že Paul Manafort ob kruhu in vodi?Ker se ti motiš.
Smrekar1 ::
Drži. Enako velja za Izraelsko okupacijo zahodnega brega.
Kolikor mi je znano na Zahodnem bregu ni nobenih okupacijskih sil, ki bi se pretvarjale za domače upornike. Poleg tega tam nihče ne govori o državljanski vojni. Priporočam preverbo odmerka.
Citiraj kakšnega.
Ajdi, recimo Luka Mesec in njegovi podrepniki.
https://www.levica.si/jastrebi-niso-dob...
https://www.levica.si/napotitev-enote-s...
https://www.levica.si/odziv-kaksna-so-r...
»Agresivna politika Rusije« v Ukrajini ni bila napad, ampak odziv na že drugo oranžno »revolucijo«, s katero so oblast prevzele skrajno nacionalistične in neoliberalne sile.
Ker se ti motiš.
Dvomim. Tip je ukrajinske neonaciste opremljal z ruskim denarjem. Podobna zgodba kot v Siriji, Rusi financirajo skrajneže med nasprotniki, da dobijo izgovor zakaj je njihov izbrani kandidat manjše zlo.
Nekateri jih zaradi tega felirajo kot velike borce proti ISIS.
Zgodovina sprememb…
- spremenil: Smrekar1 ()
jype ::
Kolikor mi je znano na Zahodnem bregu ni nobenih okupacijskih sil, ki bi se pretvarjale za domače upornike. Poleg tega tam nihče ne govori o državljanski vojni. Priporočam preverbo odmerka.Nepomembne podrobnosti.
Ajdi, recimo Luka Mesec in njegovi podrepniki.Če si nepismen, bi jo nemara bolje odnesel, če bi spremljal medije, ki vključujejo avdiovizualno gradivo.
DvomimJa, Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger effect @ Wikipedia to od tebe zahteva, vemo.
Smrekar1 ::
Nepomembne podrobnosti.
V debati o okupacijskih silah, ki se predstavljajo kot lokalni uporniki, je popolnoma enak primer tak, kjer nimaš okupacijskih sil, ki bi se predstavljale kot lokalni uporniki. Omenjena razlika je "nepomembna podrobnost".
Priporočam preverbo odmerka, STAT.
Če si nepismen, bi jo nemara bolje odnesel, če bi spremljal medije, ki vključujejo avdiovizualno gradivo.
Verjetno res. S sreči sem za razliko od nekaterih drugih, pismen.
Ja, Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger effect @ Wikipedia to od tebe zahteva, vemo.
Pokaži, da je Manafort pri kruhu in vodi, ker se jaz motim.
Več sreče in manj projiciranja ti želim!
Pac-Man ::
Weak sauce z zanikanjem. Zakarova poziva k skepticizmu.
Top Putin aide named by MH17 airliner investigators
...
The Dutch-led team said the intercepts showed two leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), who were charged with murder in June, had been in contact with Vladislav Surkov, a senior Putin aide, and Sergey Aksyonov, a Russian-appointed leader in Russian-annexed Crimea.
The Russian government, which has denied involvement in the plane’s destruction, said on Thursday it could not verify the authenticity of the intercepts.
Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow that the intercepts followed a wave of “fake news” on the subject and should be regarded with scepticism.
The Kremlin and Mr Surkov did not respond to requests for comment.
The investigation team published the telephone call intercepts on its website and appealed for witnesses to come forward.
In a conversation on July 3rd, 2014, prosecutors said Mr Surkov indicated reinforcements would be coming from Russia: “On Saturday they are already departing for the south to be combat ready.”
There were calls between rebel forces and authorities in Moscow “on a daily basis to discuss administrative, financial and military matters in the DPR”. The Jit released a series of phone numbers, asking witnesses to help identify the callers.
...
Top Putin aide named by MH17 airliner investigators
...
The Dutch-led team said the intercepts showed two leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), who were charged with murder in June, had been in contact with Vladislav Surkov, a senior Putin aide, and Sergey Aksyonov, a Russian-appointed leader in Russian-annexed Crimea.
The Russian government, which has denied involvement in the plane’s destruction, said on Thursday it could not verify the authenticity of the intercepts.
Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told a news briefing in Moscow that the intercepts followed a wave of “fake news” on the subject and should be regarded with scepticism.
The Kremlin and Mr Surkov did not respond to requests for comment.
The investigation team published the telephone call intercepts on its website and appealed for witnesses to come forward.
In a conversation on July 3rd, 2014, prosecutors said Mr Surkov indicated reinforcements would be coming from Russia: “On Saturday they are already departing for the south to be combat ready.”
There were calls between rebel forces and authorities in Moscow “on a daily basis to discuss administrative, financial and military matters in the DPR”. The Jit released a series of phone numbers, asking witnesses to help identify the callers.
...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
jype ::
Pac-Man ::
Primer na povezavi, nanj se nanaša tudi zadnji tvit.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
In reply to questions on the encryption of the "safe phones" provided by FSB, and how come they were not really safe.
These phones included in-band scrambling of the voice audio. In fact they used regular GSM communication but the voice was pre-scrambled using a secret algorithm.
Any scrambling algorithm can be ultimately de-scrambled, given enough time and computing power (same as brute-forcing a password).
So it apparently took a couple of years for JIT to do that. Here's an example of a call in which scrambling is turned on halfway through.
Note that early on 16 July, Boroday requests Moscow to provide helicopter fire in the area of Marynivka. Later that day a crucial battle at the border town ensues, with Russia providing cross-border artillery fire and aerial support.
Battle in Shakhtarsk Raion @ Wikipedia
16. julij je en dan pred 17. julijem...
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 @ Wikipedia
Tudi:
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
In this sophisticated piece, @MarkGaleotti attempts to analyze the context and motivation behind the latest JIT statement.
MH17 Recordings Are About Crowdsourcing Whistleblowers
While I agree with the statement of facts, I disagree with some conclusions.
First, the frustration of some Moscow officials with being unable to control certain local warlords does not represent a watershed between Moscow and local "separatists".
It represents simply a front between two (and sometimes more) Moscow power factions in charge of warlords.
As shown in a recent @bellingcat report, Bezler was a GRU asset.
FSB had their grasp over most of DNR's political\military but Bezler refused to succumb to their control, encouraged by his GRU handlers who at one point even sent a Spetznaz team to defend his positions.
So in fact the chaos and infighting was not caused by some local separatist agency but by Moscow powers fighting for control via proxies, and somerimes directly.
None of this diminishes Russia's legal liability for what happened in Eastern Ukraine, in particular to MH17.
And this brings us to the importance of the JIT release.
What it says is: enough playing around and waiting for Moscow to come to the table and negotiate a mea culpa deal.
We are willing to go to the top, and we have the means to (e.g. we unscrambled your secure comms)
JIT basically said "the fact that Russia has multiple silovik power centers is your problem, not ours. Being a rogue state is no immunity to legal liability". And that took balls to state.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
In reply to questions on the encryption of the "safe phones" provided by FSB, and how come they were not really safe.
These phones included in-band scrambling of the voice audio. In fact they used regular GSM communication but the voice was pre-scrambled using a secret algorithm.
Any scrambling algorithm can be ultimately de-scrambled, given enough time and computing power (same as brute-forcing a password).
So it apparently took a couple of years for JIT to do that. Here's an example of a call in which scrambling is turned on halfway through.
Note that early on 16 July, Boroday requests Moscow to provide helicopter fire in the area of Marynivka. Later that day a crucial battle at the border town ensues, with Russia providing cross-border artillery fire and aerial support.
Battle in Shakhtarsk Raion @ Wikipedia
16. julij je en dan pred 17. julijem...
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 @ Wikipedia
Tudi:
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
In this sophisticated piece, @MarkGaleotti attempts to analyze the context and motivation behind the latest JIT statement.
MH17 Recordings Are About Crowdsourcing Whistleblowers
While I agree with the statement of facts, I disagree with some conclusions.
First, the frustration of some Moscow officials with being unable to control certain local warlords does not represent a watershed between Moscow and local "separatists".
It represents simply a front between two (and sometimes more) Moscow power factions in charge of warlords.
As shown in a recent @bellingcat report, Bezler was a GRU asset.
FSB had their grasp over most of DNR's political\military but Bezler refused to succumb to their control, encouraged by his GRU handlers who at one point even sent a Spetznaz team to defend his positions.
So in fact the chaos and infighting was not caused by some local separatist agency but by Moscow powers fighting for control via proxies, and somerimes directly.
None of this diminishes Russia's legal liability for what happened in Eastern Ukraine, in particular to MH17.
And this brings us to the importance of the JIT release.
What it says is: enough playing around and waiting for Moscow to come to the table and negotiate a mea culpa deal.
We are willing to go to the top, and we have the means to (e.g. we unscrambled your secure comms)
JIT basically said "the fact that Russia has multiple silovik power centers is your problem, not ours. Being a rogue state is no immunity to legal liability". And that took balls to state.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Pravni manevri.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
An inspiring attempt to doggedly apply actual Russian law to demand accountability from the Kremlin.
Seleznev wrote to RU president requesting clarification on why RU insisted on release of foreign terrorist and MH17 witness Tsemakh.
He got an official response that "RU constitutional protects Putin from being forced to express opinions".
However, Seleznev never asked the person Putin for an opinion, but the President, where no such protection exists. He is taking this to court. Worth watching.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
An inspiring attempt to doggedly apply actual Russian law to demand accountability from the Kremlin.
Seleznev wrote to RU president requesting clarification on why RU insisted on release of foreign terrorist and MH17 witness Tsemakh.
He got an official response that "RU constitutional protects Putin from being forced to express opinions".
However, Seleznev never asked the person Putin for an opinion, but the President, where no such protection exists. He is taking this to court. Worth watching.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Debunk teorij zarot okrog potnih listov. Tole je z včerajšnjega strmoglavljenja ukrajinskega Boeinga v Iranu. Na 3. mestu v galeriji sta 2 lepo ohranjena potna lista.
https://www.instagram.com/p/B7ELKhGJm3n...
https://www.instagram.com/p/B7ELKhGJm3n...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Nič novega, je pa v petih minutah odlično razloženo za vse, ki spremljajo bolj površno ali sploh ne. Kaka minuta je namenjena tudi JIT, ki bo marca pričel s sodnim postopkom.
How Bellingcat tracked a Russian missile system in Ukraine
How Bellingcat tracked a Russian missile system in Ukraine
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Jutri se na Nizozemskem prične sojenje štirim obtožencem. Vsi zainteresirani so v nizkem startu.
Teža medsebojno potrjujočih se javno znanih dokazov ne deluje ravno pozitivno za ruske verzije dogodkov, ki imajo samo eno skupno točko - MH17 je sestrelila Ukrajina. Od kod in s čim je odvisno od dnevnega navdiha, če ga sploh imajo.
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status...
Ahead of the MH17 trial starting next week Russian officials are inevitably crying like little children about how unfair everything is and making up stories about images of the Buk in Ukraine being fake. Let's follow that logic then.
https://www.9news.com.au/national/mh17-...
The "fake" images Russia refers to are the images of the Buk missile launcher filled on July 17th and 18th, geolocated to a route running through separatist territory towards the launch site of the missile that shot down MH17.
So first, if these images are faked, then the fakers made sure it was along a realistic route. Not impossible, but then we have some other issues.
There's social media sightings of the Buk as it was travelling through those locations, prior to MH17 being shot down. That means if those images are fake then the social media posts are also fake, and as they were posted before MH17 was shot down it would mean those posts were prearranged, broadening the conspiracy to not just fake images, but fake social media posts made before the shootdown.
Not only that, but the social media posts about the Buk, made before MH17 was shot down, are on accounts that have been around for some times, even years before MH17 was shot down, with normal everyday interactions before and after July 17th 2014. That's quite the set up.
Maybe you'll argue these accounts were hacked, but they continue as normal after July 17th 2014, showing no signs of being hijacked or the account owners claiming they were hacked.
So now it's not just fake photos and videos, it's fake social media accounts set up years ago posting about a non-existent Buk missile launcher prior to MH17 being shot down. And it doesn't end there!
There's satellite imagery from Digital Globe showing the Buk convoy at 11:08am in the morning, very close to a position where it was also filmed. Is Digital Globe also part of the conspiracy?
Plus we have an AP journalist who reported seeing the Buk being unloaded in Snizhne in a story filed prior to MH17 being shot down, so they must be part of the conspiracy as well.
After the photo of the Buk in Torez was geolocated journalists went to the location and spoke to locals who confirmed seeing the Buk at a time consistent with the social media posts. So they must have been planted there or decided to lie in a manner consistent with the conspiracy
Russia, for its part, has relied on conspiracy websites and internet rumours for its claims the photographs and videos have been faked, which is definitely what you'd do if you had a solid case to make.
What we can say for sure is in the aftermath of MH17 being shot down Russia presented "evidence" that was a series of lies and fabrications, including lying about images of the Buk and altering and lying about the dates of satellite imagery
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-...
Of course, it's obvious to any reasonable person that Russia is guilty of shooting down MH17 and has been lying about it non-stop for the past 5 and a half years, but I think it's worthwhile to lay out how absurd their lies are.
Last year we released a 6 part documentary podcast on MH17 that examines these claims and much more, which you can download from any good podcast app, and some rubbish ones too
https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/t...
Those who expect the JIT's case at the MH17 trial will be based on social media posts and images found on the internet will be in for deep disappointment, but we can still expect the same denials and conspiracy theories to be recycled by the denialists and truthers.
And to end the thread, I'll note this is just about the route of the Buk in Ukraine, there's also much the same kind of evidence that points to the launch site, the route of the Buk in Russia, and features matching the Buk in Ukraine to the Buk in Russia.
So those who attack this evidence ignore the entire body of evidence and the implications of their allegations to that evidence, because ultimately they only care about appearances and denying Russia's guilt, not facts and evidence.
Teža medsebojno potrjujočih se javno znanih dokazov ne deluje ravno pozitivno za ruske verzije dogodkov, ki imajo samo eno skupno točko - MH17 je sestrelila Ukrajina. Od kod in s čim je odvisno od dnevnega navdiha, če ga sploh imajo.
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status...
Ahead of the MH17 trial starting next week Russian officials are inevitably crying like little children about how unfair everything is and making up stories about images of the Buk in Ukraine being fake. Let's follow that logic then.
https://www.9news.com.au/national/mh17-...
Dr Pavlosky also pointed a finger at Australian media, claiming it did not cover "the truth".
But when asked what he thought that truth was, Dr Pavolosky replied, "I don't know".
The "fake" images Russia refers to are the images of the Buk missile launcher filled on July 17th and 18th, geolocated to a route running through separatist territory towards the launch site of the missile that shot down MH17.
There's social media sightings of the Buk as it was travelling through those locations, prior to MH17 being shot down. That means if those images are fake then the social media posts are also fake, and as they were posted before MH17 was shot down it would mean those posts were prearranged, broadening the conspiracy to not just fake images, but fake social media posts made before the shootdown.
Not only that, but the social media posts about the Buk, made before MH17 was shot down, are on accounts that have been around for some times, even years before MH17 was shot down, with normal everyday interactions before and after July 17th 2014. That's quite the set up.
Maybe you'll argue these accounts were hacked, but they continue as normal after July 17th 2014, showing no signs of being hijacked or the account owners claiming they were hacked.
So now it's not just fake photos and videos, it's fake social media accounts set up years ago posting about a non-existent Buk missile launcher prior to MH17 being shot down. And it doesn't end there!
There's satellite imagery from Digital Globe showing the Buk convoy at 11:08am in the morning, very close to a position where it was also filmed. Is Digital Globe also part of the conspiracy?
Plus we have an AP journalist who reported seeing the Buk being unloaded in Snizhne in a story filed prior to MH17 being shot down, so they must be part of the conspiracy as well.
After the photo of the Buk in Torez was geolocated journalists went to the location and spoke to locals who confirmed seeing the Buk at a time consistent with the social media posts. So they must have been planted there or decided to lie in a manner consistent with the conspiracy
Russia, for its part, has relied on conspiracy websites and internet rumours for its claims the photographs and videos have been faked, which is definitely what you'd do if you had a solid case to make.
What we can say for sure is in the aftermath of MH17 being shot down Russia presented "evidence" that was a series of lies and fabrications, including lying about images of the Buk and altering and lying about the dates of satellite imagery
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-...
Of course, it's obvious to any reasonable person that Russia is guilty of shooting down MH17 and has been lying about it non-stop for the past 5 and a half years, but I think it's worthwhile to lay out how absurd their lies are.
Last year we released a 6 part documentary podcast on MH17 that examines these claims and much more, which you can download from any good podcast app, and some rubbish ones too
https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/t...
Those who expect the JIT's case at the MH17 trial will be based on social media posts and images found on the internet will be in for deep disappointment, but we can still expect the same denials and conspiracy theories to be recycled by the denialists and truthers.
And to end the thread, I'll note this is just about the route of the Buk in Ukraine, there's also much the same kind of evidence that points to the launch site, the route of the Buk in Russia, and features matching the Buk in Ukraine to the Buk in Russia.
So those who attack this evidence ignore the entire body of evidence and the implications of their allegations to that evidence, because ultimately they only care about appearances and denying Russia's guilt, not facts and evidence.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Spodnji tvitajo v živo. Twitter je v zadnjih dneh modificiral nitenje, tako da zna kaj "past ven". Kogar zanima, naj pogleda direktno na račun.
Trenutno samo proceduralne fore, ampak zna prit prav v nadaljevanju.
zna Nizozemsko, ampak je amater
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
dopisnik za The Telegraph:
https://twitter.com/RolandOliphant/stat...
profesorica mednarodnega prava:
https://twitter.com/mariekedehoon/statu...
dopisnica iz Haaga za več medijev:
https://twitter.com/MollyQuell/status/1...
šef AFP v Haagu:
https://twitter.com/dannyctkemp/status/...
Trenutno samo proceduralne fore, ampak zna prit prav v nadaljevanju.
zna Nizozemsko, ampak je amater
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
dopisnik za The Telegraph:
https://twitter.com/RolandOliphant/stat...
profesorica mednarodnega prava:
https://twitter.com/mariekedehoon/statu...
dopisnica iz Haaga za več medijev:
https://twitter.com/MollyQuell/status/1...
šef AFP v Haagu:
https://twitter.com/dannyctkemp/status/...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Seznam ljudi, ki tvitajo o sojenju
https://twitter.com/i/lists/12369479888...
in povzetek, RTji iz
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins
Odpira tožilstvo (OM). Enako mislim počet tudi za obrambo. Popoldne pride bonus, vsi ki imate problem s preveč Angleščine boste navdušeni. Vsaj upam :)
The JIT investigated several scenarios in addition to the hypothesis that a Russian BUK was transported from Kursk to the launch location - including that Ukraine did it. All information given by Russia to the JIT was weighed, considered and analyzed.
The most important new detail found in the summons of the #MH17trial: The four suspects may have provided the Buk crew a phone and Ukrainian sim card for easy communication
"Whether or not Ukraine should have closed its airspace is not a question that this court will address. No answer to that question would absolve the guilty parties from shooting a missile at a civillian airplane"
Prosecution interestingly blames Russian foreign policy for bringing this trial:
1) because the BUK should never have been in Ukraine and
2) because of Russia's obstruction of investigation and refusal to accept responsibility.
"After reviewing all scenarios, it became clear that the 53rd Brigade based in Kursk provided the murder weapon and repatriated it back to Russia shortly after the crime"
For the first time, prosecution discloses that the BUK that the Russian GRU officer code-named "Orion" (identified by us as Oleg Ivannikov) referred to on 14 July, referred to another BUK Telar that caught fire while transported from Russia to Ukraine.
While "Orion" and his commander "Delfin" were involved with removing the BUK that shot down MH17, there is not enough evidence they were involved with that BUK *before* the crime was committed. Thus they will not be prosecuted on the basis of available evidence.
Igor "a bird is flying towards you" Bezler is also not standing trial. The prosecution thinks that time that elapsed between audio clip and launching of BUK is too short to have really contributed. Therefore unlikely that he is guilty; prosecution does not proceed against him
Under Dutch law, you can be prosecuted for a crime in 4 ways: direct involvement, commanding a crime, making it possible to commit a crime and covering up a crime. The four men here are charged for making it possible to commit murder, by transporting and deploying the Buk.
Defense is bringing up a lot of questions about the evidence, interviews with air traffic controllers, findings from some Dutch government investigations. Seems to be focusing on why Ukraine didn't close their airspace. Bit of a preview of what the defense will argue.
The defense goes into minutiae as to what "must have been known" by Ukraine in terms of weaponry available to armed groups... If that's going to be the defense's main line of argument, seems like a "mitigating circumstance" or "time-buying" strategy as opposed to exculpation.
Prosecution refutes Russia's claims that Ukraine had any veto rights on what information the Joint Investigation Team is included in the file or made public.
100's of witnesses were interviewed in many countries, bodies of victims were forensically analyzed, thousands of photos of videos were studied. We took an unusually conservative approach to validating evidence due to the contentious nature of the evidence
The JIT did not just take for granted the telephone intercepts provided by Ukraine. It validated it by multiple methods, including getting raw telecoms data, comparing it with data from other international parties such as Spain and Poland, and "auditing" callers on the content
The prosecutor gives examples of how data contained in intercepted phone calls was validated by comparing events mentioned in the calls to actual (non-public) events known to JIT from other sources
The authors of the videos and photos of the BUK & trail of smoke were sought out and whenever possible, the original SD cards of the photo/video-taker was taken and forensically analyzed for manipulation. Actual weather conditions were compared to photo content.
We have a lot of detail of conversations from telephone communications. The extensive validation of all data took time but thereby offers broad net of evidence. There's also video material, examined by e.g. Neth Forensic Institute for tampering, and weather and environment tests
Now the OM is addressing the various witnesses. Around 13 witnesses will testify anonymously. That is because, as the OM says, the rule of law has been replaced with the rule of violence. It's not safe for their identities to known.
Intercepted calls from July 2014 show militants discussed how they received approval from Moscow to execute people. (not previously disclosed!)
Furthermore, GRU attempted to hack the Dutch Safety Board and the Malaysian JIT team. A witness #28 said that their laptop was confiscated by FSB while he/she was investigating MH17 within Russian territory.
OM also addresses the considerations of the defendants. Friendly reminder that its inquisitorial, not adversarial here in the Netherlands so the OM is supposed to take all of the evidence, even exculpatory evidence, into account.
OM also says that there is no witness whose testimony could be considered "decisive," meaning there isn't someone on whose testimony the entire case hinges
A witness #58 who says he was a Russian volunteer in 2014 in DNR. He said during the downing of Mh17 he was at Snizhne at the moment the missile was launched. He was tasked to guard the site. Details of the location were exhaustive. He and others were initially happy until they realized a civilian plane has been downed. We have taken extreme measures to protect the identity of M 58, and he was interrogated by a magistrate w/o prosecutor or defense being present. Interrogations must happen as early as possible to prevent outing by media
Another witness S21 in summer of 2014 reported to t Kharchenko. On 17.07 he was tasked to help transport the BUK Telar from Snizhne to Debaltseve S 21 said another witness S 07 was also present during this removal process although he remained silent. We need to question S 7
Witnes S17 says on 17 July he saw a video of a tank-looking system recorded by a friend . We need to confront him with images of a BUK-Telar to check if his recollection matches that image. S27 describes convos of people who took part of the launch. We need to ask more questions
S32 said he filmed a BUK Telar using their dashboard camera. Many of these witnesses were not re-interrogated due to safety concerns but we request the court to review possibility for safe interviewing at this time.
Today, the Kremlin heard what it has feared for years: the JIT has received confessions and witness testimony from actual Russian mercenaries/volunteers who were stationed at the launch site of the BUK Telar in Snizhne on the day of the MH17 shoot-down...and saw it all.
OM is ending on every journalist's favorite term these days: fake news. "After MH17 was shot down, a disinformation campaign was started that continues to this day."
After Mh17, a coordinated campaign was started... and we have pinpointed its source precisely. In the first hours, information flowed unfiltered. Russian media boasted about a missile shoot-down by "rebels" of a "Ukrainian plane" (quotes from RU media read out)
The early media coverage mention truthful elements that were later established by the investigation: rebels role, use of BUK missile, and the exact area. The only incorrect reporting was WHAT was shot down.
When it became clear it was a civilian aircraft, the disinformation started immediately. LifeNews TV deleted all previous reporting, and changed the narrative to Ukrainian surface-to-air missile, and later changed again to Ukrainian fighter jet - in line with the MoD's then story
In the first MoD press conference presented two alternative stories: a Ukrainian BUK or a Ukrainian fighter jet. Until May 2015, the fighter jet was the main Russian scenario. But once the DSB report was published, Russia shifted to a Ukrainian BUK scenario, forgetting the jet.
The jet totally disappeared when Russia provided radar data showing no airplane present in the vicinity of MH17. Then MoD claimed that Ukraine used a missile inhererited from the Soviet Union. But until today, there is no one coherent story from Russia on what happened.
The only consistent Russian narrative is that JIT is biased and uses falsified data. At the same time, Russia has consistently published falsified data, and has stated there is no reason to allow interrogation of Russian citizens by JIT.
https://twitter.com/i/lists/12369479888...
in povzetek, RTji iz
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins
Odpira tožilstvo (OM). Enako mislim počet tudi za obrambo. Popoldne pride bonus, vsi ki imate problem s preveč Angleščine boste navdušeni. Vsaj upam :)
The JIT investigated several scenarios in addition to the hypothesis that a Russian BUK was transported from Kursk to the launch location - including that Ukraine did it. All information given by Russia to the JIT was weighed, considered and analyzed.
The most important new detail found in the summons of the #MH17trial: The four suspects may have provided the Buk crew a phone and Ukrainian sim card for easy communication
"Whether or not Ukraine should have closed its airspace is not a question that this court will address. No answer to that question would absolve the guilty parties from shooting a missile at a civillian airplane"
Prosecution interestingly blames Russian foreign policy for bringing this trial:
1) because the BUK should never have been in Ukraine and
2) because of Russia's obstruction of investigation and refusal to accept responsibility.
"After reviewing all scenarios, it became clear that the 53rd Brigade based in Kursk provided the murder weapon and repatriated it back to Russia shortly after the crime"
For the first time, prosecution discloses that the BUK that the Russian GRU officer code-named "Orion" (identified by us as Oleg Ivannikov) referred to on 14 July, referred to another BUK Telar that caught fire while transported from Russia to Ukraine.
While "Orion" and his commander "Delfin" were involved with removing the BUK that shot down MH17, there is not enough evidence they were involved with that BUK *before* the crime was committed. Thus they will not be prosecuted on the basis of available evidence.
Igor "a bird is flying towards you" Bezler is also not standing trial. The prosecution thinks that time that elapsed between audio clip and launching of BUK is too short to have really contributed. Therefore unlikely that he is guilty; prosecution does not proceed against him
Under Dutch law, you can be prosecuted for a crime in 4 ways: direct involvement, commanding a crime, making it possible to commit a crime and covering up a crime. The four men here are charged for making it possible to commit murder, by transporting and deploying the Buk.
Defense is bringing up a lot of questions about the evidence, interviews with air traffic controllers, findings from some Dutch government investigations. Seems to be focusing on why Ukraine didn't close their airspace. Bit of a preview of what the defense will argue.
The defense goes into minutiae as to what "must have been known" by Ukraine in terms of weaponry available to armed groups... If that's going to be the defense's main line of argument, seems like a "mitigating circumstance" or "time-buying" strategy as opposed to exculpation.
Prosecution refutes Russia's claims that Ukraine had any veto rights on what information the Joint Investigation Team is included in the file or made public.
100's of witnesses were interviewed in many countries, bodies of victims were forensically analyzed, thousands of photos of videos were studied. We took an unusually conservative approach to validating evidence due to the contentious nature of the evidence
The JIT did not just take for granted the telephone intercepts provided by Ukraine. It validated it by multiple methods, including getting raw telecoms data, comparing it with data from other international parties such as Spain and Poland, and "auditing" callers on the content
The prosecutor gives examples of how data contained in intercepted phone calls was validated by comparing events mentioned in the calls to actual (non-public) events known to JIT from other sources
The authors of the videos and photos of the BUK & trail of smoke were sought out and whenever possible, the original SD cards of the photo/video-taker was taken and forensically analyzed for manipulation. Actual weather conditions were compared to photo content.
We have a lot of detail of conversations from telephone communications. The extensive validation of all data took time but thereby offers broad net of evidence. There's also video material, examined by e.g. Neth Forensic Institute for tampering, and weather and environment tests
Now the OM is addressing the various witnesses. Around 13 witnesses will testify anonymously. That is because, as the OM says, the rule of law has been replaced with the rule of violence. It's not safe for their identities to known.
Intercepted calls from July 2014 show militants discussed how they received approval from Moscow to execute people. (not previously disclosed!)
Furthermore, GRU attempted to hack the Dutch Safety Board and the Malaysian JIT team. A witness #28 said that their laptop was confiscated by FSB while he/she was investigating MH17 within Russian territory.
OM also addresses the considerations of the defendants. Friendly reminder that its inquisitorial, not adversarial here in the Netherlands so the OM is supposed to take all of the evidence, even exculpatory evidence, into account.
OM also says that there is no witness whose testimony could be considered "decisive," meaning there isn't someone on whose testimony the entire case hinges
A witness #58 who says he was a Russian volunteer in 2014 in DNR. He said during the downing of Mh17 he was at Snizhne at the moment the missile was launched. He was tasked to guard the site. Details of the location were exhaustive. He and others were initially happy until they realized a civilian plane has been downed. We have taken extreme measures to protect the identity of M 58, and he was interrogated by a magistrate w/o prosecutor or defense being present. Interrogations must happen as early as possible to prevent outing by media
Another witness S21 in summer of 2014 reported to t Kharchenko. On 17.07 he was tasked to help transport the BUK Telar from Snizhne to Debaltseve S 21 said another witness S 07 was also present during this removal process although he remained silent. We need to question S 7
Witnes S17 says on 17 July he saw a video of a tank-looking system recorded by a friend . We need to confront him with images of a BUK-Telar to check if his recollection matches that image. S27 describes convos of people who took part of the launch. We need to ask more questions
S32 said he filmed a BUK Telar using their dashboard camera. Many of these witnesses were not re-interrogated due to safety concerns but we request the court to review possibility for safe interviewing at this time.
Today, the Kremlin heard what it has feared for years: the JIT has received confessions and witness testimony from actual Russian mercenaries/volunteers who were stationed at the launch site of the BUK Telar in Snizhne on the day of the MH17 shoot-down...and saw it all.
OM is ending on every journalist's favorite term these days: fake news. "After MH17 was shot down, a disinformation campaign was started that continues to this day."
After Mh17, a coordinated campaign was started... and we have pinpointed its source precisely. In the first hours, information flowed unfiltered. Russian media boasted about a missile shoot-down by "rebels" of a "Ukrainian plane" (quotes from RU media read out)
The early media coverage mention truthful elements that were later established by the investigation: rebels role, use of BUK missile, and the exact area. The only incorrect reporting was WHAT was shot down.
When it became clear it was a civilian aircraft, the disinformation started immediately. LifeNews TV deleted all previous reporting, and changed the narrative to Ukrainian surface-to-air missile, and later changed again to Ukrainian fighter jet - in line with the MoD's then story
In the first MoD press conference presented two alternative stories: a Ukrainian BUK or a Ukrainian fighter jet. Until May 2015, the fighter jet was the main Russian scenario. But once the DSB report was published, Russia shifted to a Ukrainian BUK scenario, forgetting the jet.
The jet totally disappeared when Russia provided radar data showing no airplane present in the vicinity of MH17. Then MoD claimed that Ukraine used a missile inhererited from the Soviet Union. But until today, there is no one coherent story from Russia on what happened.
The only consistent Russian narrative is that JIT is biased and uses falsified data. At the same time, Russia has consistently published falsified data, and has stated there is no reason to allow interrogation of Russian citizens by JIT.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Kot sem obljubil - včeraj sem v Slovenščino prevedel dva poziva pričam JIT, z junija in novembra 2019.
https://www.politie.nl/themas/flight-mh...
Poziv pričam junij 2019: posadka BUK TELAR-ja
Prestreženi klici
Leta 2015 je JIT objavil prestreženi telefonski klic, v katerem osumljenec Dubinski vpraša, ali je "to" prišlo s posadko. Očitno se "to" nanaša na BUK TELAR, ki je pripadal 53. protiletalski raketni brigadi iz Kurska v Ruski federaciji.
17. julij 2014, 09:08
Na podlagi tega pogovora in drugih informacij je možno sklepati, da sta BUK TELAR in njegova posadka prišla iz Ruske federacije. Istega dne, 17. julija 2014, je bil prestrežen pogovor med osumljencem Harčenkom ("A") in nekim "Ryazanom" ("B"). Ryazan naziva Harčenka s "poveljnikom". Ta pogovor je JIT objavil prej v letu 2015.
17. julij 2014, 21:32
Očitno je en od članov posadke BUK TELAR-ja, ki je sestrelil MH17, izgubil stik s preostalimi člani. JIT bi rad vedel, kdo je ta član posadke. Ti telefonski pogovori ne dokazujejo, kateri enoti pripada posadka. JIT ima dokaze iz drugih virov, da so bili takrat v bližini meje z vzhodno Ukrajino ruski vojaki 53. brigade iz Kurska.
JIT bi rad vedel:
Kdo je bil član posadke, ki se je izgubil kmalu po sestrelitvi MH17?
Kdo ima podatke, ki lahko JIT privedejo do njegove identitete?
Pogovori v družbenih omrežjih
Številni vojaki so bili aktivni na družbenih omrežjih. V predstavitvi JIT z dne 19. junija 2019
je bil predstavljen klepet iz leta 2015, v katerem sodeluje vojak ("vojak M") 2. bataljona 53. brigade. Vojak je bil del konvoja, ki je 23. junija 2014 odšel iz baze 53. brigade v Kursku in se napotil proti Millerovemu v Ruski federaciji. Ta konvoj je vseboval tudi BUK TELAR s številkama 3 in 2 na strani.
Vojak M klepeta z neko "Anastazijo".
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Na podlagi tega pogovora je mogoče sklepati, da je bil vojak "M" v drugem bataljonu in je potoval skupaj z nekaterimi "kul fanti" in prvim poročnikom iz 3. bataljona 53. brigade. BUK TELAR, ki je bil uporabljen pri sestrelitvi MH17, izvira iz 3. bataljona 53. brigade. "M" ne more razkriti, kam so šli "kul fantje" iz tretjega bataljona, ker je to skrivnost. Vendar pravi, da so šli na zahod.
JIT bi rad stopil v stik s prvim poročnikom, ki je zdaj kapetan. Njegovo ime je tukaj cenzurirano, toda JIT ima informacije, da je del 53. brigade iz Kurska. JIT poziva prvega poročnika ali druge priče, naj se javijo JIT, da pomagajo odgovoriti na številna vprašanja o njegovi vlogi.
JIT bi rad vedel:
JIT bi rad stopil v stik s prvim poročnikom, zdaj kapetanom, ki je sodeloval v klepetu. JIT ve, da je častnik pripadnik 53. protiletalske raketne brigade iz Kurska.
JIT poziva prvega poročnika ali druge priče, naj se javijo JIT, da bi pomagali odgovoriti na številna vprašanja o njegovi vlogi.
Fotografije
Na družbenih omrežjih je bilo objavljenih več fotografij, ki prikazujejo vojake 53. brigade in so bile narejene poleti 2014 v regiji blizu vzhodne Ukrajine. Tu je objavljen izbor teh fotografij.
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
JIT ima dokumente o 53. protiletalski raketni brigadi, ki natančno navajajo, kateri pripadniki 53. brigade so bili sredi julija 2014 na območju blizu ukrajinske meje. Poleg tega ima JIT informacije, da se je vojaški konvoj, ki se je junija 2014 odpravil v Millerovo s šestimi TELAR-ji, septembra 2014 z vlakom vrnil v bazo v Kursku s samo petimi TELAR-ji. 24. maja 2018 je JIT pokazal dokaze,
https://www.politie.nl/en/news/2018/mei...
da BUK TELAR, ki je sestrelil MH17, izvira iz 53. brigade. Zato pripadniki te brigade morda poznajo identiteto posadke TELAR-ja. JIT bi rad vedel, ali je bila katera od oseb na fotografijah 17. julija 2014 na vzhodu Ukrajine in ali ima kaj informacij o BUK TELAR-ju, ki je sestrelil MH17 in njegovi posadki.
JIT bi rad vedel:
Ali je bila katera od oseb na fotografijah, objavljenih na tej strani 17. julija 2014 v vzhodni Ukrajini?
Ali ima kdo od oseb na fotografijah informacije o uporabi BUK TELAR-ja s številkama „3“ in „2“ na boku na vzhodu Ukrajine 17. julija 2014?
Kateri vojaki so bili del posadke BUK TELAR-ja, ki je sestrelila let MH17?
Poziv pričam Junij 2019: Veriga odgovornosti znotraj Ruske federacije
Zdi se malo verjetno, da bi se posadka samostojno odločila za odhod na vzhod Ukrajine. JIT išče dodatne informacije o tem, kdo jih je napotil tja.
Viri kažejo, da je vodstvo samooklicane Doneške ljudske republike v mesecih pred 17. julijem 2014 večkrat zaprosilo za vojaško podporo Ruske federacije. Te zahteve sta podala tako imenovani "premier" Aleksander Borodaj, kot tudi osumljenec Igor Girkin, tako imenovani "minister za obrambo". Girkin je bil v stiku s Sergejem Aksjonovom, guvernerjem Krima, ki ga je leta 2014 imenovala Ruska federacija.
8. junija 2014 se Girkin (380930721558) pogovarja z aksjonovim podrejenim (380962662006). Od Rusije želi vojaško podporo, vključno s sposobnim protiletalskim sistemom z usposobljeno posadko.
Glede na prestrežen pogovor se Girkinu mudi, saj bo kmalu izgubil bitko. Želi si dostojne zračne obrambe, ne "manpadsov", ki se izstreljujejo z rame. In želi si usposobljenih kadrov, ker ni časa za šolanje. Približno petnajst minut po tem pogovoru ga pokliče Aksjonov (380962662006). V tem pogovoru Aksjonov pravi, da se že urejajo potrebna dovoljenja za zahtevano podporo.
Junija in julija 2014 imata Girkin in Borodaj pogoste telefonske stike z osebami v Ruski federaciji. V tem obdobju lahko Borodaja redno najdemo v Moskvi.
10. julija 2014 imata Girkin in Borodaj tiskovno konferenco v Donjecku. Borodaj se je pravkar vrnil iz Moskve in govori o svojem obisku.
Borodaj ne deluje skrivnosten glede kontaktov v Ruski federaciji. Nekaj tednov prej je Borodaj v intervjuju že povedal, s kom vse je v stiku v Moskvi. V intervjuju za ruski časopis omeni, da je visoki uradnik ruske vlade Vladislav Surkov "v veliko podporo Donecki ljudski republiki" in "resnično naš človek v Kremlju".
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Dan po tiskovni konferenci v Donjecku, 11. julija 2014, Borodaj (79265318514) pokliče Surkova (79265318528). Ta pogovor potrjuje, da so potekali pogovori o vojaški podpori med "premierjem" samooklicane Doneške narodne republike in visokim uradnikom Ruske federacije. Zdi se, da je protiletalski sistem, ki je bil zahtevan že od junija 2014, dejansko dostavljen po 11. juliju 2014.
JIT bi rad vedel:
Kdo je odločil, da se bo v Ukrajino poslalo ruski protiletalski sistem BUK TELAR s številkama "3" in "2"?
Kdo je določil, katere osebe bodo člani posadke tega BUK TELAR-ja?
Kakšna navodila je prejela posadka?
Kdo je posredoval ta navodila?
https://www.politie.nl/themas/flight-mh...
Poziv pričam november 2019
Skupna preiskovalna skupina (JIT) je 19. junija 2019 sporočila, da bodo štirje obtoženci kazensko preganjani zaradi vloge pri sestrelitvi MH17 17. julija 2014. JIT je nadalje sporočil, da se preiskava nadaljuje in osredotoča na posadko BUK TELAR-ja in posameznike, ki so bili pomembni členi v procesu odločanja znotraj ruske federacije pri dislokaciji tega BUK TELAR-ja.
JIT je objavil prestrežene telefonske klice. Ti so pokazali, da so voditelji oborožene skupine "Doneška ljudska republika" (DPR) vzdrževali stike z ruskimi vladnimi uradniki glede ruske vojaške podpore. Med temi voditelji sta bila tudi Aleksander Borodaj, samooklicani "premier" in obtoženi Igor Girkin, samooklicani "obrambni minister". Komunicirala sta s Sergejem Aksjonovom, ruskim guvernerjem na Krimu in Vladislavom Surkovom, visokim uradnikom ruske vlade.
Nedavna analiza izjav prič in drugih informacij je pokazala, da je ruski vpliv na DPR presegal vojaško podporo in da se vezi med ruskimi uradniki in voditelji DPR zdijo tesnejše. Intenzivnost ruskega vpliva je pomembna za nadaljno preiskavo posameznikov, vpletenih v sestrelitev MH17. Zato danes JIT objavlja nov poziv pričam.
JIT želi izvedeti več o tem, kdo je poleti 2014 ukazoval Borodaju, obtožencu Girkinu, drugim članom DPR in posadki BUK TELAR-ja. JIT želi stopiti v stik z nadaljnjimi pričami, ki lahko podajo dodatne informacije o linijah poveljevanja in vlogah, ki bi jih lahko imeli ruski vladni uradniki. Danes JIT objavlja nadaljnje posnete pogovore. Spodaj povzemamo te pogovore in postavljamo dodatna vprašanja.
Ruski vpliv na "Donješko ljudsko republiko"
V javnih intervjujih so voditelji DPR izjavljali, da so prostovoljci, ki jim ne poveljuje nihče. Obtoženi Igor Girkin je v intervjuju leta 2017 dejal:
"Nihče me ni imenoval ali poslal."
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Na novinarski konferenci 10. julija 2014 je Borodaj dejal:
"Rad bi vam povedal, da sva z Igorjem že dolgo časa prostovoljca. Prostovoljstvo je v Rusiji dobro razvito."
Vendar ima JIT indikacije, da sta bila v resnici vodena iz Ruske federacije. JIT je govoril z več pričami, ki so poleti 2014 pripadale DPR. Te priče so izjavile, da so bile ključne figure oborožene skupine vodene iz Ruske federacije.
Njihovo pričanje je podkrepljeno s telefonskimi pogovori, ki so bili takrat posneti. Na primer Borodaja, ene od ključnih figur. V klicu z osebo (B) 3. julija 2014 ob 17:30:15 se zdi, da Borodaj (A) prizna, da sledi ruskim navodilom:
A: No, vaši načrti so daljnosežni. Moji niso. Izvajam ukaze in ščitim interese ene in edine države, Ruske federacije. To je vse.
V drugem klicu, z začetka julija 2014, član DPR lokalnemu poveljniku sporoča, da "prihajajo možje z blagoslovom Šojguja". Sergej Šojgu je ruski obrambni minister. Po besedah člana DPR bodo ti možje "odstranili lokalne vojskovodje iz enot", "ljudje iz Moskve" pa bodo prevzeli nadzor.
1. julija 2014 ob 22:08:05 borca s kodnim imenom Mongol (A) 380951267673 pokliče neznana oseba (B) 380509133442
B: Kot poveljnik Makejevke bi to zelo rad vedel. Želim vedeti, kam gredo stvari.
A: Premikamo se k enotni liniji poveljevanja. Kar se bo zgodilo je, da bo prišlo kup moških z blagoslovom Šojguja, ki bodo lokalne vojskovodje odjebali iz enot -
B: Uh.
A:… in potem bodo ljudje iz Moskve prevzeli komando. (...)
B: (...) Nekaj moram vedeti: komu naj jebeno odgovarjam, ko se to zgodi?
A: Odgovarjal boš obrambnemu ministru. (...) Obrambnemu ministru DPR.
(...) Naš obrambni minister je Strelkov, naš vrhovni poveljnik - kot kateri koli drugi predsednik ali premier - Borodaj
Več bivših borcev je JIT povedalo, da sta bili ruska obveščevalna služba FSB in vojaška obveščevalna služba GRU vključeni v vsakodnevno vodenje DPR. Ena od prič je izjavila, da so voditelji DPR redno hodili v Moskvo, da bi se posvetovali s svojimi kontakti pri FSB in GRU.
Prestreženi telefonski klici kažejo na vpletenost ruskih obveščevalnih služb, ki z ramo ob rami sodelujeta pri vodenju DPR. Na primer, 18. julija 2014, dva člana DPR razpravljata, kako prejemata navodila iz Moskve; en od FSB, drugi od GRU.
18. julija 2014 ob 18:52:57 borca s kodnim imenom Mongol (A) 380951267673 pokliče drugi borec s kodnim imenom Šerif (B) 380958851694.
(...)
B: Prejšnji teden smo direktno… [neslišno] v Moskvo in dobili povelja. (...)
A: Mi prav tako dobivamo povelja iz Moskve, pri nas je enako.
B: Toda v vašem primeru je FSB? Drži?
A: Da.
B: V našem primeru je GRU. To je edina razlika.
A: Popolnoma vse mi je jasno.
Avgusta 2014, nedolgo po sestrelitvi MH17, je obtoženi Girkin napovedal odhod in Borodaju povedal, da se "vrača v štab". Očitno se je vrnil v organizacijo, pri kateri je delal prej.
13. avgusta 2014 ob 00:28:31 je Borodaj (B) 79265318514 poklical obtoženca Girkina (C) 380637087501.
(...)
B: Pozdravljen ?! Kje si?
C: No, vračam se v štab.
B: Vračaš se v štab?
C: Ja, se. Tam se spreminja celoten koncept. Mislim, nismo več bogati živinorejci, ampak revni ulični ... kaj že ... berači.
B: (...) Torej, kaj počnemo? Ali gremo v štab?
C: Da-da-da! Nazaj v štab. (...) Adijo!
B: V redu potem! To je to! V redu! Gremo v štab! Uh huh ...
C: Uh ... da.
B: [mimo mikrofona] Kot ponavadi gremo ...
Obtoženi Girkin in Borodaj sta avgusta 2014 zapustila vzhodno Ukrajino in se vrnila v Moskvo. V intervjuju leta 2017 je Girkin pojasnil:
"Naročeno mi je bilo, da poveljstvo prenesem na Zaharčenka. [... V: In zakaj mislite, da je bil izbran on?] No, ne vem, on in Borodaj sta se sestala s Surkovom. In očitno je bil izbran, to je za formalnega vodjo poveljstva. In zakaj in kako se je to zgodilo ... Surkove odločitve so vedno drek."
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Očitno je Surkov ukazal Girkinu, da preda poveljstvo Zaharčenku.
Nadaljnji viri, vključno z intervjuji in tiskovnimi konferencami, kažejo, da je Zakharčenko dejansko prevzel poveljstvo nad DPR.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT želi vedeti:
Kdo je poleti 2014 ukazoval Girkinu in Borodaju? Kakšna je bila vloga članov "štaba" pri tem?
Kdo je naročil Girkinu, da prenese svoje poveljstvo na Zaharčenka?
Načini komunikacije
Člani DPR so poleg navadnih telefonov uporabljali tudi varovana komunikacijska sredstva. Zdi se, da je številne od njih zagotovila Ruska federacija, poleg tega so jih ruski visoki uradniki uporabljali pri svojih stikih z borci.
JIT je našla indice, da je FSB zagotovila telefone, ki jim ni moč prisluškovati. V pogovoru s 3. julija 2014 je obtoženi Dubinski naštel borce, ki imajo posebne telefone in omenil kje so jih dobili:
3. julija 2014 ob 20:01:11 Dubinski (A) 380631213401 pokliče Semenova 380639602502.
A: (...) kako ste s tistimi posebnimi komunikacijskimi telefoni, veste, ki jih imamo? Tisti, ki gredo preko interneta, da? Varovani. (...) To so posebni telefoni, ki jih ne morete kupiti. Dobili smo jih iz Moskve. Od FSB. (...) Glej, berem seznam ljudi, ki ... glej, ... ki jih imajo ... Strelkov, Borodaj, Gubarev, Agap, Čapaj ... no, poveljnik Kramatorska, Konstantinivke ... em ... moj telefon, lzvarine, Mozgovoj ... no, potem pa Snižne, Zakhar, ...kajže... Oplot, vidiš, da? (...) Potem ... kaj že ... Kalmius, Gubarev, Gubarev je v Rostovu, ne? ... poveljstvo Družkivke, Aksjonov, Purgin, er ... Bocman, Bes, Kalmius. To so tisti, ki ... zdaj ... ki imajo te neposredne telefone. Zavrtiš tri številke ...
Posamezniki, ki so imeli po izjavi Dubinskega tako varovane telefone, so bili pomembneži v DPR. Med njimi je tudi obtoženi Girkin, omenjen pod kodnim imenom Strelkov in premier DPR Borodaj. Aksjonov, guverner Krima, ki ga je imenovala Rusija, je prav tako v skupini, ki jo omenja Dubinski.
Poleg tega ključne osebe v DPR redno vzpostavljajo klice s serijo telefonskih številk, v katerih je prvi niz devetih številk enak, razlikujeta se samo zadnji dve števki. Za dodatno varnost uporabljajo kodirnik.
Aleksander Borodaj, "premier" DPR, je imel telefonsko številko iz te serije (79265318514) in je v obdobju od junija 2014 do sredine avgusta 2014 skoraj vsak dan klical tri druge številke iz iste serije: 79265318528, 79265318520 in 79265318563. Teme teh klicev bodo obravnavane v nadaljevanju.
VPRAŠANJE
JIT želi vedeti:
Kdo so bili imetniki telefonskih številk serije, ki se začne s 792653185?
Področje vpliva - uprava
V našem pozivu pričam z 19. junija 2019 smo objavili pogovor z 11. julija 2014 med Borodajem in uporabnikom prve številke iz te serije Vladislavom Surkovom, visokim vladnim uradnikom Ruske federacije. V pogovoru Borodaj pravi, da nujno potrebuje vojaško pomoč iz Moskve. Drugi pogovori nakazujejo, da se Surkova vpletenost ni končala tu.
3. julija 2014 sta imela Surkov (B) in Borodaj (A) sledeči pogovor. Surkov pravi, da bodo iz Rusije prispele okrepitve:
(...)
B: Nek Antjufejev se bo odpravil k tebi. Govoril sem ti o njem. (...) V resnici je nameraval oditi že v soboto ... ali celo v nedeljo. (...) V soboto se že odpravljajo na jug, da bi bili pripravljeni na boj. No, Saša, obstaja ena stvar - takoj ti bom povedal o tem - kot trdijo za GB. Ampak sem rekel, da je Kodakovski vodil GB.
A: Brez ugovorov. Mislim, da se bo Kodakovski, mimogrede, veselo umaknil. (...)
B: Ne. Poglej, Saš! Odločite se ... odločite se sami. Če se bo umaknil [...], mu pustite [...]. Če se iz nekih razlogov ne bo hotel [...], naj poiščejo še eno posebno storitev. Ne bo se zgodilo nič slabega.
Surkov spodbuja Borodaja, naj uredi, da Vladimir Antjufejev dobi visoko pozicijo v administraciji DPR. Teden kasneje, 10. julija 2014, Antjufejev pripravi tiskovno konferenco skupaj z Borodajem in obtoženim Girkinom. Antjufejev novinarjem pove, da je istega dne prišel iz Rusije in da bodo pod njegov nadzor prešli sektorji državne varnosti, notranjih zadev in pravosodja.
Drugi telefonski pogovor Borodaja prav tako kaže na ruski vpliv pri imenovanjih v DPR. Te ustreza vsebini e-pošte s priponko, naslovljene Surkovu, ki je bila najdena v prosto dostopnih virih. V tem elektronskem sporočilu je bil priložen seznam kandidatov za vlado DPR.
Vsi kandidati s tega seznama niso bili imenovani, kot kaže sledeči telefonski pogovor. Borodajev pomočnik (B) pokliče Pušilina (A), ki se bo pridružil "vladi". To očitno zahteva odobritev iz Moskve. 15. maja 2014 ob 13:25:25, Pušilina (A) 380507117096 pokliče (B) 380639835490:
B: (...) Na našo žalost Purgina ne moremo vključiti v Varnostni svet. Opravičili se mu bomo.
A: Uh?
B: Moskva je odobrila že finaliziran seznam. Purgina ni na njem. (...) Ti ... si. Odvisno je od položaja, veš. Podpredsednik vlade preprosto ni vključen v Varnostni svet. Oprostite, fantje. (...) Kdaj se začne seja?
A: Čez pol ure.
B: (...) Ne začnite brez nas. V redu? Ne začnite brez nas. Kmalu pridemo. (...) Purgin žal ne more biti zraven. (...)
A: No, to mi je jasno. Bom ... To mu bom razložil. In potem boste dodali svoje ... ker bo nekoliko užaljen.
B: Seveda, seveda. Pač ga Moskva ni odobrila.
Prestreženi telefonski klici prikazujejo kako je Surkov reševal težave voditeljev DPR. Na primer v pogovoru obtoženega Leonida Harčenka s 14. marca 2015. Harčenko govori o skorajšnji aretaciji soobtoženega Sergeja ("Nikolajeviča") Dubinskega. Dubinski je v težavah, ker naj bi v Rusijo vstopil ilegalno.
14. marca 2015 ob 10:45:44 Harčenko (A) 380660827518 pokliče nekega Andreja (B) 79154650595
A: (...) Poslušaj, Andrej, ali lahko dobiš informacije o situaciji z Nikolajevičem.
B: (...) No, rekli so da gre preko Strelkova, kajne? ... on je rešil ... vsaj poskusil ... (...) Včeraj sem govoril z administracijo...
A: Uh.
B: predsednika ... Rekli so, da se je [...] rešilo preko Surkova. Surkov je dal Smirnovu ukaz ... in Smirnov ... no, ne ukaz ... Surkov je Smirnova vprašal in on je dal ... eee ... odobritev. (...) Kolikor vem, je vse OK.
A: (...) ... tu se zabavamo, ker je vstopil nezakonito in ga želijo aretirati. Nujno moramo dobiti informacije o tem.
Po izjavi Andreja je Surkov rešil nesporazum okrog Dubinskega. Težavo je odpravil Smirnov, namestnik šefa FSB.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT želi vedeti:
So ruski uradniki nadzirali imenovanja vodstva DPR? Kdo je izvajal ta nadzor?
Ali je Surkov sodeloval pri imenovanju ali vodenju administracije DPR?
Kdo je sprejel odločitev o imenovanju Antjufejeva?
Področje vpliva - finance
Različni viri, vključno z izjavami prič, kažejo, da so samooklicano vlado DPR financirali ruski viri. Po izjavi visokega člana DPR je skoraj ves proračun DPR prišel iz ruskih skladov.
To dokazuje tudi naslednji telefonski pogovor. 12. julija 2014 Borodaj (A) razpravlja o svojih denarnih težavah z uporabnikom ene od treh številk iz serije: * 8520 (B). Borodaj trdi, da mu zmanjkuje denarja. Oseba z imenom "Kolja" je obljubila "180 000". Ta denar čaka v Moskvi, a za nakazilo vseeno potrebujejo odobritev.
A: (...) Torej...ja, največja težava, ki jo imam zdaj, je...eeee...zmanjkalo mi je denarja. Mislim da, tako rekoč, sto petdeset, ki sem jih vzel s seboj, praktično konec je z njimi. Ker petdeset - Zaharju, milijon hriven - Igorju, plus vsi drugi stroški, v redu? (...)
B: No, za to je bila uvedena ekonomska doktrina..., da bi bilo mogoče [...] lokalno.
A: Da. Lokalni denar bomo dejansko dobili čez približno dva tedna. Vidiš?
B: (...) denar morajo nekako nakazati.
A: Ja, moram nekako [...] ta denar. Kolja je obljubil sto osemdeset tisoč ... eee ... Prosil sem ga, naj teh sto osemdeset tisoč uredi preko Lenje, vendar je rekel, da potrebuje potrditev, denar je moral biti v Moskvi ... v glavnem je [nerazumljivo] prebrisana oseba, prikriva situacijo.
B: No, sam ga pozovi, in ga opomni kaj ti je rekel v moji prisotnosti. (...) Reci mu: "Dragi prijatelj (...) daj mi sto osemdeset in sam veš kdo...ti bo vrnil v Moskvi. (...) Torej... poleg tega mi je njegov...eee...tako rekoč nekdanji delodajalec to potrdil...zato ga enostavno ne bom spet klical za teh sto osemdeset tisoč. Preprosto bom prišel in mu dal ta denar. Rekel bom: "Tu imaš. Je za to." (...) Veš da smo se dogovorili za sto osemdeset. Vzemi. Ostalo uredi sam. Če vseeno ne bo steklo, bomo uredili po drugi poti. In povej Nikolaju: "(...) zdaj potrebujem sto osemdeset, kasneje pa bom potreboval ta in ta znesek." (...)
A: Z mano se dogovori o vsoti, ki jo potrebuješ in ti jo bom dal ... tako rečeno (...) OK. Dogovorjeno.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT bi rad vedel:
Kdo je oseba ("Kolya"), ki je Borodaju obljubila finančno pomoč?
Kdo je moral odobriti plačilo?
Kateri nadaljnji posamezniki v Ruski federaciji so bili vključeni v zagotavljanje finančne podpore za DPR?
Področje vpliva - Vojaške operacije
Več nekdanjih članov DPR je JIT pričalo o vojaškem vplivu iz Ruske federacije. Na primer, visoki član je dejal, da so lokalni poveljniki razpravljali o vojaških zadevah s predstavniki ruskih obveščevalnih služb v Moskvi. Druga priča je pripovedovala o zbirnem mestu borcev DPR v Rostovu v Rusiji, ulica Levoberežnaja 1.
V prvi polovici julija 2014 je DPR sodeloval v težkih bojih z ukrajinskimi oboroženimi silami. Z Rusko federacijo so potekali številni telefonski pogovori o vojaških operacijah. V pogovoru z uporabnikom tretje številke v seriji (* 8563) Borodaj govori o vojaški pomoči. Borodaj ga nagovarja kot "Vladimirja Ivanoviča" in sprašuje, ali je mogoče, da "naši" helikopterji izvedejo napad blizu Marjinke.
16. julija 2014 ob 08:59:04 Borodaj (A) 79265318514 pokliče uporabnika telefonske številke 79265318563 (B).
(...)
A: Vladimir Ivanovič. No.
B: Pri telefonu.
A: Povejte mi, ali je mogoče, da naši helikopterji izvedejo napad? Dobro jutro, se opravičujem.
B: Dobro jutro.
A: Torej je mogoče, da naši helikopterji izvedejo napad v bližini Marjinke? Naši? [mimo mikrofona] Pritisnite gumb. (...)
Odgovora Vladimirja Ivanoviča ni mogoče razumeti, ker se v tistem trenutku vklopi šifriranje. Lahko poslušate tudi zvočna posnetka dveh dodatnih pogovorov z Vladimirjem Ivanovičem preko druge telefonske številke (79381340450). JIT sumi, da gre za isto osebo. V drugem pogovoru je Vladimir Ivanovič omenjen kot "šef višjega ranga", "ki je priletel iz Moskve".
17. julija 2014 ob 8:56:50 nek Sergej (A) 380997759037 pokliče Vladimirja Ivanoviča (B) 79381340450. Sergej kliče s Krima in Vladimirju Ivanoviču sporoči, da bo naslednji dan letel v Rostov blizu ukrajinsko-ruske meje z ekipo sedmih mož. Od tam bodo nadaljevali pot. V soboto morajo biti na cilju, verjetno v vzhodni Ukrajini. Za svojo misijo potrebujejo več reči.
A: (...) Vladimir Ivanovič, kajne?
B: Ja, tu. Vladimir Ivanovič.
A: Eeee ... Aksjonov mi je dal vašo telefonsko številko. Rekel mi je, da je bilo dogovorjeno z Bortnikovom.
B: OK. Kako vam lahko pomagam?
A: (...) Kako vam lahko predam naš seznam želja? Jutri odletimo v Rostov. Moji možje so ... Sem iz Simferopola, možje pa so v Moskvi. Imamo seznam stvari, ki bi jih radi, in seznam stvari, ki so nujne. (...) Jutri bomo v Rostovu, bistvo pa je, da moramo biti v soboto že na cilju. Err ... Ali lahko najdete način, da ... eee ... da vas nekako kontaktiramo ... (...) Sedem nas je. Sedem mož. Osrednja ekipa je sedem mož. (...) Pomembno za nas je zdaj, da zagotovimo, da teh sedem pride na kraj z ... vsem kar potrebujejo.
B: (...) V redu ... No, v resnici so mi povedali, kaj potrebujete ... (...) Nimam vašega seznama. OK, bom uredil in vas pokličem nazaj.
A: OK. Prosim, dajte mi Viber številko. Vse bomo že prejeli in končali z misijo, ko bodo to dekodirali.
B: OK. OK. (...)
Sergej pove Vladimirju Ivanoviču, da je njegovo telefonsko številko dobil od Aksjonova, guvernerja Krima. Pravi, da je Aksjonov koordiniral z Bortnikovom, direktorjem FSB. Ni pa jasno, kdo mu bo dostavil zahtevano opremo. Drugi pogovori ob približno istem času pokažejo, kaj Sergej potrebuje: opremo za nočno opazovanje, maskirne uniforme, infrardeča očala, plinske maske, "železo", strelivo in oklepna vozila.
Kasneje istega dne, ob 13:27:50, ima Sergej (A) (380997759037) še en pogovor z Vladimirjem Ivanovičem (B) (79381340450). Sergej kliče iz urada "našega generala iz Moskve" na Krimu. Pravi, da je s šefom govoril o svojem seznamu želja za misijo. Njegov šef je Sergeju rekel, naj po potrebi kontaktira Surkova, saj da je on tisti, ki dodeljuje misije.
A: (...) Poslušajte, ima Nefiodov varno linijo, kot jo ima Golovkin? (...) Pravkar sem vstopil v urad našega generala iz Moskve. Trenutno je v Moskvi. Poklical sem svojega nadrejenega in mu povedal o vašem vprašanju in o tem, kako naj bi odgovoril ...
B: [mimo mikrofona]: V trenutku bomo nadaljevali, Saša. Nadaljevali bomo v trenutku! [nazaj na telefon]: Oprostite, kaj ste rekli?
A: Pravim, povedal sem svojemu nadrejenemu, ki je trenutno v Moskvi, o vprašanju, ki ste mi ga zastavil. Ste ultimativna avtoriteta, ki nam lahko pomaga, razumete? In rekel mi je - tega ne morem povedati po telefonu - rekel je: "Če kaj, osebno stopite v stik s Surkovom. On je tisti, ki dodeljuje misije“.
B: Mmm, v redu, vidim. (...) V redu je. Glede vašega seznama ne morem reči ničesar. Ja. Ker imam direktivo o tem, kaj bi vam moral zagotoviti. Tako enostavno je.
A: Oprostite, kdo vam je dal to direktivo?
B: Moj šef.
Vladimir Ivanovič pove Sergeju, da mu ne more povedati ničesar o opremi, ki jo je zahteval Sergej, saj ima navodila od svojega šefa.
Tu boste našli druge klice tega Sergeja, ki dajo več vpogleda v njegove pogovore z Vladimirjem Ivanovičem.
Ti pogovori vključujejo vlogo generala Serdjukova, poveljnika Južnega vojaškega okrožja Ruske federacije, pri zagotavljanju opreme za misijo. Sergej (A) govori tudi o ruskem obrambnem ministru Šojguju, ki naj bi pri zadevi sodeloval že v zgodnejši fazi:
A: Tvojega smo poklicali že trikrat. Na kratko, ukazal je že kakomuježeime? ... No, strinjali so se, da nas bodo opremili [...], potem ko so prejeli povelje osebe, ki začne na "Š". Ga poznaš?
B: Ne, ne. Kdo je to?
A: No, Šojgu. Šojgu.
B: Uh. In kje? Kje bodo predali opremo?
A: Kje? V Rostovu. Kje drugje?
31. julija 2014 ob 00:56:38 se obtoženi Girkin (C) in neznana oseba (D) pogovarjata o dobavi opreme in vlogi Vladimirja Ivanoviča pri tem. Girkin pravi, da mu Vladimir Ivanovič daje ukaze, toda Girkin poveljuje svojim ljudem.
D: Torej ... Igor Ivanovič, eee ... Od Vladimirja Ivanoviča ... Pripeljal sem ta konvoj ... Dobil sem ukaz, da dam Kozitsynu dve vozili, ostalo pa vam.
C: Torej, ne dajte nikomur ničesar ... nikomur ... Kozitsynu. Hvala vam. Vedno sem imel dovolj streliva ... že štiri mesece imam dovolj streliva ... Kozitsyn prvi ... in jaz sem bil vedno zadnji. Jaz [...] ničesar Vladimirju Ivanoviču ... Torej, potrebujem opremo in ljudi, ljudi in opremo, orožje in strelivo. Nihče od mojih ljudi ne bo izpolnil drugih ukazov kot od mene.
D: Torej, ali dajete ukaz, da vam vse pošljem?
C: Moj ukaz je ... vse namenjeno meni, mora priti do mene. Vse namenjeno meni ... Vladimir ... Kozitsyn ...
D: Torej pravite, da kljub temu, da mi je Vladimir Ivanovič dal nalogo ... mi je dal nalogo ... bom zdaj ...
C: Jaz ... jaz ... Vladimir Ivanovič mi mora samo naročiti. Ampak naj ne komandira mojih ljudi preko moje glave. Moji ljudje bodo izpolnili moje ukaze.
D: Pa počakajte ... Naloga ni bila dana vašim ljudem. Naloga je bila dana meni. Osebi, ki je pripeljala ta konvoj. Naročil mi je, da dam dve vozili ... Mislim, vam dam vse, razen dveh vozil.
C: Kakšnih vozil?
D: Dve vozili s... dobro s stvarmi, ki... s svetlobo [...]... s svetlobo [...]... z lahko strojno opremo in dodatki. Vse ostalo bo šlo k vam.
Objavljamo tudi nekaj pogovorov drugih borcev o Vladimirju Ivanoviču. Tu je na primer rečeno, da je Vladimir Ivanovič poveljnik operacije:
Na koncu objavljamo pogovor, v katerem sam Vladimir Ivanovič trdi, da ima "operativni komunikacijski telefon" s številko 83-81-70.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT želi vedeti:
Kdo je omenjeni Vladimir Ivanovič? Kakšno vlogo je imel poleti 2014 v oboroženem spopadu v vzhodni Ukrajini?
Ali so Surkov, Aksjonov, Šojgu in Bortnikov imeli vlogo pri načrtovanju in izvedbi vojaških operacij v vzhodni Ukrajini poleti leta 2014?
So bili ti posamezniki del dislokacije BUK TELAR-ja 17. julija 2014?
Zaključek
Kot je razvidno zgoraj, ima JIT informacije, ki kažejo, da je imela Ruska federacija vpliv na upravne, finančne in vojaške zadeve v DPR. Medsebojni stiki so se okrepili v prvi polovici julija 2014. Bili so skoraj dnevni klici med vodstvom DPR in njihovimi kontakti v Ruski federaciji. Govorili so z voditelji v Moskvi, blizu meje z Ukrajino in na Krimu. Komunikacija je večinoma potekala preko varovanih telefonov, ki jih je zagotovila ruska obveščevalna služba.
Znaki tesnih odnosov med voditelji DPR in ruskimi vladnimi uradniki postavljajo vprašanja o njihovi morebitni vpletenosti v napotitev BUK TELAR-ja, ki je 17. julija 2014 sestrelil let MH17. BUK TELAR je prišel iz 53. protiletalske raketne brigade, enote ruskih oboroženih sil iz Kurska v Ruski federaciji.
JIT išče priče, ki bi lahko nudile informacije o tistih, ki so nadzorovali vodstvo DPR v Donecku in sprejeli odločitev o dislokaciji BUK TELAR-ja.
https://www.politie.nl/themas/flight-mh...
Poziv pričam junij 2019: posadka BUK TELAR-ja
Prestreženi klici
Leta 2015 je JIT objavil prestreženi telefonski klic, v katerem osumljenec Dubinski vpraša, ali je "to" prišlo s posadko. Očitno se "to" nanaša na BUK TELAR, ki je pripadal 53. protiletalski raketni brigadi iz Kurska v Ruski federaciji.
17. julij 2014, 09:08
Na podlagi tega pogovora in drugih informacij je možno sklepati, da sta BUK TELAR in njegova posadka prišla iz Ruske federacije. Istega dne, 17. julija 2014, je bil prestrežen pogovor med osumljencem Harčenkom ("A") in nekim "Ryazanom" ("B"). Ryazan naziva Harčenka s "poveljnikom". Ta pogovor je JIT objavil prej v letu 2015.
17. julij 2014, 21:32
Očitno je en od članov posadke BUK TELAR-ja, ki je sestrelil MH17, izgubil stik s preostalimi člani. JIT bi rad vedel, kdo je ta član posadke. Ti telefonski pogovori ne dokazujejo, kateri enoti pripada posadka. JIT ima dokaze iz drugih virov, da so bili takrat v bližini meje z vzhodno Ukrajino ruski vojaki 53. brigade iz Kurska.
JIT bi rad vedel:
Kdo je bil član posadke, ki se je izgubil kmalu po sestrelitvi MH17?
Kdo ima podatke, ki lahko JIT privedejo do njegove identitete?
Pogovori v družbenih omrežjih
Številni vojaki so bili aktivni na družbenih omrežjih. V predstavitvi JIT z dne 19. junija 2019
je bil predstavljen klepet iz leta 2015, v katerem sodeluje vojak ("vojak M") 2. bataljona 53. brigade. Vojak je bil del konvoja, ki je 23. junija 2014 odšel iz baze 53. brigade v Kursku in se napotil proti Millerovemu v Ruski federaciji. Ta konvoj je vseboval tudi BUK TELAR s številkama 3 in 2 na strani.
Vojak M klepeta z neko "Anastazijo".
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Na podlagi tega pogovora je mogoče sklepati, da je bil vojak "M" v drugem bataljonu in je potoval skupaj z nekaterimi "kul fanti" in prvim poročnikom iz 3. bataljona 53. brigade. BUK TELAR, ki je bil uporabljen pri sestrelitvi MH17, izvira iz 3. bataljona 53. brigade. "M" ne more razkriti, kam so šli "kul fantje" iz tretjega bataljona, ker je to skrivnost. Vendar pravi, da so šli na zahod.
JIT bi rad stopil v stik s prvim poročnikom, ki je zdaj kapetan. Njegovo ime je tukaj cenzurirano, toda JIT ima informacije, da je del 53. brigade iz Kurska. JIT poziva prvega poročnika ali druge priče, naj se javijo JIT, da pomagajo odgovoriti na številna vprašanja o njegovi vlogi.
JIT bi rad vedel:
JIT bi rad stopil v stik s prvim poročnikom, zdaj kapetanom, ki je sodeloval v klepetu. JIT ve, da je častnik pripadnik 53. protiletalske raketne brigade iz Kurska.
JIT poziva prvega poročnika ali druge priče, naj se javijo JIT, da bi pomagali odgovoriti na številna vprašanja o njegovi vlogi.
Fotografije
Na družbenih omrežjih je bilo objavljenih več fotografij, ki prikazujejo vojake 53. brigade in so bile narejene poleti 2014 v regiji blizu vzhodne Ukrajine. Tu je objavljen izbor teh fotografij.
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
JIT ima dokumente o 53. protiletalski raketni brigadi, ki natančno navajajo, kateri pripadniki 53. brigade so bili sredi julija 2014 na območju blizu ukrajinske meje. Poleg tega ima JIT informacije, da se je vojaški konvoj, ki se je junija 2014 odpravil v Millerovo s šestimi TELAR-ji, septembra 2014 z vlakom vrnil v bazo v Kursku s samo petimi TELAR-ji. 24. maja 2018 je JIT pokazal dokaze,
https://www.politie.nl/en/news/2018/mei...
da BUK TELAR, ki je sestrelil MH17, izvira iz 53. brigade. Zato pripadniki te brigade morda poznajo identiteto posadke TELAR-ja. JIT bi rad vedel, ali je bila katera od oseb na fotografijah 17. julija 2014 na vzhodu Ukrajine in ali ima kaj informacij o BUK TELAR-ju, ki je sestrelil MH17 in njegovi posadki.
JIT bi rad vedel:
Ali je bila katera od oseb na fotografijah, objavljenih na tej strani 17. julija 2014 v vzhodni Ukrajini?
Ali ima kdo od oseb na fotografijah informacije o uporabi BUK TELAR-ja s številkama „3“ in „2“ na boku na vzhodu Ukrajine 17. julija 2014?
Kateri vojaki so bili del posadke BUK TELAR-ja, ki je sestrelila let MH17?
Poziv pričam Junij 2019: Veriga odgovornosti znotraj Ruske federacije
Zdi se malo verjetno, da bi se posadka samostojno odločila za odhod na vzhod Ukrajine. JIT išče dodatne informacije o tem, kdo jih je napotil tja.
Viri kažejo, da je vodstvo samooklicane Doneške ljudske republike v mesecih pred 17. julijem 2014 večkrat zaprosilo za vojaško podporo Ruske federacije. Te zahteve sta podala tako imenovani "premier" Aleksander Borodaj, kot tudi osumljenec Igor Girkin, tako imenovani "minister za obrambo". Girkin je bil v stiku s Sergejem Aksjonovom, guvernerjem Krima, ki ga je leta 2014 imenovala Ruska federacija.
8. junija 2014 se Girkin (380930721558) pogovarja z aksjonovim podrejenim (380962662006). Od Rusije želi vojaško podporo, vključno s sposobnim protiletalskim sistemom z usposobljeno posadko.
Glede na prestrežen pogovor se Girkinu mudi, saj bo kmalu izgubil bitko. Želi si dostojne zračne obrambe, ne "manpadsov", ki se izstreljujejo z rame. In želi si usposobljenih kadrov, ker ni časa za šolanje. Približno petnajst minut po tem pogovoru ga pokliče Aksjonov (380962662006). V tem pogovoru Aksjonov pravi, da se že urejajo potrebna dovoljenja za zahtevano podporo.
Junija in julija 2014 imata Girkin in Borodaj pogoste telefonske stike z osebami v Ruski federaciji. V tem obdobju lahko Borodaja redno najdemo v Moskvi.
10. julija 2014 imata Girkin in Borodaj tiskovno konferenco v Donjecku. Borodaj se je pravkar vrnil iz Moskve in govori o svojem obisku.
Borodaj ne deluje skrivnosten glede kontaktov v Ruski federaciji. Nekaj tednov prej je Borodaj v intervjuju že povedal, s kom vse je v stiku v Moskvi. V intervjuju za ruski časopis omeni, da je visoki uradnik ruske vlade Vladislav Surkov "v veliko podporo Donecki ljudski republiki" in "resnično naš človek v Kremlju".
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Dan po tiskovni konferenci v Donjecku, 11. julija 2014, Borodaj (79265318514) pokliče Surkova (79265318528). Ta pogovor potrjuje, da so potekali pogovori o vojaški podpori med "premierjem" samooklicane Doneške narodne republike in visokim uradnikom Ruske federacije. Zdi se, da je protiletalski sistem, ki je bil zahtevan že od junija 2014, dejansko dostavljen po 11. juliju 2014.
JIT bi rad vedel:
Kdo je odločil, da se bo v Ukrajino poslalo ruski protiletalski sistem BUK TELAR s številkama "3" in "2"?
Kdo je določil, katere osebe bodo člani posadke tega BUK TELAR-ja?
Kakšna navodila je prejela posadka?
Kdo je posredoval ta navodila?
https://www.politie.nl/themas/flight-mh...
Poziv pričam november 2019
Skupna preiskovalna skupina (JIT) je 19. junija 2019 sporočila, da bodo štirje obtoženci kazensko preganjani zaradi vloge pri sestrelitvi MH17 17. julija 2014. JIT je nadalje sporočil, da se preiskava nadaljuje in osredotoča na posadko BUK TELAR-ja in posameznike, ki so bili pomembni členi v procesu odločanja znotraj ruske federacije pri dislokaciji tega BUK TELAR-ja.
JIT je objavil prestrežene telefonske klice. Ti so pokazali, da so voditelji oborožene skupine "Doneška ljudska republika" (DPR) vzdrževali stike z ruskimi vladnimi uradniki glede ruske vojaške podpore. Med temi voditelji sta bila tudi Aleksander Borodaj, samooklicani "premier" in obtoženi Igor Girkin, samooklicani "obrambni minister". Komunicirala sta s Sergejem Aksjonovom, ruskim guvernerjem na Krimu in Vladislavom Surkovom, visokim uradnikom ruske vlade.
Nedavna analiza izjav prič in drugih informacij je pokazala, da je ruski vpliv na DPR presegal vojaško podporo in da se vezi med ruskimi uradniki in voditelji DPR zdijo tesnejše. Intenzivnost ruskega vpliva je pomembna za nadaljno preiskavo posameznikov, vpletenih v sestrelitev MH17. Zato danes JIT objavlja nov poziv pričam.
JIT želi izvedeti več o tem, kdo je poleti 2014 ukazoval Borodaju, obtožencu Girkinu, drugim članom DPR in posadki BUK TELAR-ja. JIT želi stopiti v stik z nadaljnjimi pričami, ki lahko podajo dodatne informacije o linijah poveljevanja in vlogah, ki bi jih lahko imeli ruski vladni uradniki. Danes JIT objavlja nadaljnje posnete pogovore. Spodaj povzemamo te pogovore in postavljamo dodatna vprašanja.
Ruski vpliv na "Donješko ljudsko republiko"
V javnih intervjujih so voditelji DPR izjavljali, da so prostovoljci, ki jim ne poveljuje nihče. Obtoženi Igor Girkin je v intervjuju leta 2017 dejal:
"Nihče me ni imenoval ali poslal."
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Na novinarski konferenci 10. julija 2014 je Borodaj dejal:
"Rad bi vam povedal, da sva z Igorjem že dolgo časa prostovoljca. Prostovoljstvo je v Rusiji dobro razvito."
Vendar ima JIT indikacije, da sta bila v resnici vodena iz Ruske federacije. JIT je govoril z več pričami, ki so poleti 2014 pripadale DPR. Te priče so izjavile, da so bile ključne figure oborožene skupine vodene iz Ruske federacije.
Njihovo pričanje je podkrepljeno s telefonskimi pogovori, ki so bili takrat posneti. Na primer Borodaja, ene od ključnih figur. V klicu z osebo (B) 3. julija 2014 ob 17:30:15 se zdi, da Borodaj (A) prizna, da sledi ruskim navodilom:
A: No, vaši načrti so daljnosežni. Moji niso. Izvajam ukaze in ščitim interese ene in edine države, Ruske federacije. To je vse.
V drugem klicu, z začetka julija 2014, član DPR lokalnemu poveljniku sporoča, da "prihajajo možje z blagoslovom Šojguja". Sergej Šojgu je ruski obrambni minister. Po besedah člana DPR bodo ti možje "odstranili lokalne vojskovodje iz enot", "ljudje iz Moskve" pa bodo prevzeli nadzor.
1. julija 2014 ob 22:08:05 borca s kodnim imenom Mongol (A) 380951267673 pokliče neznana oseba (B) 380509133442
B: Kot poveljnik Makejevke bi to zelo rad vedel. Želim vedeti, kam gredo stvari.
A: Premikamo se k enotni liniji poveljevanja. Kar se bo zgodilo je, da bo prišlo kup moških z blagoslovom Šojguja, ki bodo lokalne vojskovodje odjebali iz enot -
B: Uh.
A:… in potem bodo ljudje iz Moskve prevzeli komando. (...)
B: (...) Nekaj moram vedeti: komu naj jebeno odgovarjam, ko se to zgodi?
A: Odgovarjal boš obrambnemu ministru. (...) Obrambnemu ministru DPR.
(...) Naš obrambni minister je Strelkov, naš vrhovni poveljnik - kot kateri koli drugi predsednik ali premier - Borodaj
Več bivših borcev je JIT povedalo, da sta bili ruska obveščevalna služba FSB in vojaška obveščevalna služba GRU vključeni v vsakodnevno vodenje DPR. Ena od prič je izjavila, da so voditelji DPR redno hodili v Moskvo, da bi se posvetovali s svojimi kontakti pri FSB in GRU.
Prestreženi telefonski klici kažejo na vpletenost ruskih obveščevalnih služb, ki z ramo ob rami sodelujeta pri vodenju DPR. Na primer, 18. julija 2014, dva člana DPR razpravljata, kako prejemata navodila iz Moskve; en od FSB, drugi od GRU.
18. julija 2014 ob 18:52:57 borca s kodnim imenom Mongol (A) 380951267673 pokliče drugi borec s kodnim imenom Šerif (B) 380958851694.
(...)
B: Prejšnji teden smo direktno… [neslišno] v Moskvo in dobili povelja. (...)
A: Mi prav tako dobivamo povelja iz Moskve, pri nas je enako.
B: Toda v vašem primeru je FSB? Drži?
A: Da.
B: V našem primeru je GRU. To je edina razlika.
A: Popolnoma vse mi je jasno.
Avgusta 2014, nedolgo po sestrelitvi MH17, je obtoženi Girkin napovedal odhod in Borodaju povedal, da se "vrača v štab". Očitno se je vrnil v organizacijo, pri kateri je delal prej.
13. avgusta 2014 ob 00:28:31 je Borodaj (B) 79265318514 poklical obtoženca Girkina (C) 380637087501.
(...)
B: Pozdravljen ?! Kje si?
C: No, vračam se v štab.
B: Vračaš se v štab?
C: Ja, se. Tam se spreminja celoten koncept. Mislim, nismo več bogati živinorejci, ampak revni ulični ... kaj že ... berači.
B: (...) Torej, kaj počnemo? Ali gremo v štab?
C: Da-da-da! Nazaj v štab. (...) Adijo!
B: V redu potem! To je to! V redu! Gremo v štab! Uh huh ...
C: Uh ... da.
B: [mimo mikrofona] Kot ponavadi gremo ...
Obtoženi Girkin in Borodaj sta avgusta 2014 zapustila vzhodno Ukrajino in se vrnila v Moskvo. V intervjuju leta 2017 je Girkin pojasnil:
"Naročeno mi je bilo, da poveljstvo prenesem na Zaharčenka. [... V: In zakaj mislite, da je bil izbran on?] No, ne vem, on in Borodaj sta se sestala s Surkovom. In očitno je bil izbran, to je za formalnega vodjo poveljstva. In zakaj in kako se je to zgodilo ... Surkove odločitve so vedno drek."
https://www.politie.nl/binaries/content...
Očitno je Surkov ukazal Girkinu, da preda poveljstvo Zaharčenku.
Nadaljnji viri, vključno z intervjuji in tiskovnimi konferencami, kažejo, da je Zakharčenko dejansko prevzel poveljstvo nad DPR.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT želi vedeti:
Kdo je poleti 2014 ukazoval Girkinu in Borodaju? Kakšna je bila vloga članov "štaba" pri tem?
Kdo je naročil Girkinu, da prenese svoje poveljstvo na Zaharčenka?
Načini komunikacije
Člani DPR so poleg navadnih telefonov uporabljali tudi varovana komunikacijska sredstva. Zdi se, da je številne od njih zagotovila Ruska federacija, poleg tega so jih ruski visoki uradniki uporabljali pri svojih stikih z borci.
JIT je našla indice, da je FSB zagotovila telefone, ki jim ni moč prisluškovati. V pogovoru s 3. julija 2014 je obtoženi Dubinski naštel borce, ki imajo posebne telefone in omenil kje so jih dobili:
3. julija 2014 ob 20:01:11 Dubinski (A) 380631213401 pokliče Semenova 380639602502.
A: (...) kako ste s tistimi posebnimi komunikacijskimi telefoni, veste, ki jih imamo? Tisti, ki gredo preko interneta, da? Varovani. (...) To so posebni telefoni, ki jih ne morete kupiti. Dobili smo jih iz Moskve. Od FSB. (...) Glej, berem seznam ljudi, ki ... glej, ... ki jih imajo ... Strelkov, Borodaj, Gubarev, Agap, Čapaj ... no, poveljnik Kramatorska, Konstantinivke ... em ... moj telefon, lzvarine, Mozgovoj ... no, potem pa Snižne, Zakhar, ...kajže... Oplot, vidiš, da? (...) Potem ... kaj že ... Kalmius, Gubarev, Gubarev je v Rostovu, ne? ... poveljstvo Družkivke, Aksjonov, Purgin, er ... Bocman, Bes, Kalmius. To so tisti, ki ... zdaj ... ki imajo te neposredne telefone. Zavrtiš tri številke ...
Posamezniki, ki so imeli po izjavi Dubinskega tako varovane telefone, so bili pomembneži v DPR. Med njimi je tudi obtoženi Girkin, omenjen pod kodnim imenom Strelkov in premier DPR Borodaj. Aksjonov, guverner Krima, ki ga je imenovala Rusija, je prav tako v skupini, ki jo omenja Dubinski.
Poleg tega ključne osebe v DPR redno vzpostavljajo klice s serijo telefonskih številk, v katerih je prvi niz devetih številk enak, razlikujeta se samo zadnji dve števki. Za dodatno varnost uporabljajo kodirnik.
Aleksander Borodaj, "premier" DPR, je imel telefonsko številko iz te serije (79265318514) in je v obdobju od junija 2014 do sredine avgusta 2014 skoraj vsak dan klical tri druge številke iz iste serije: 79265318528, 79265318520 in 79265318563. Teme teh klicev bodo obravnavane v nadaljevanju.
VPRAŠANJE
JIT želi vedeti:
Kdo so bili imetniki telefonskih številk serije, ki se začne s 792653185?
Področje vpliva - uprava
V našem pozivu pričam z 19. junija 2019 smo objavili pogovor z 11. julija 2014 med Borodajem in uporabnikom prve številke iz te serije Vladislavom Surkovom, visokim vladnim uradnikom Ruske federacije. V pogovoru Borodaj pravi, da nujno potrebuje vojaško pomoč iz Moskve. Drugi pogovori nakazujejo, da se Surkova vpletenost ni končala tu.
3. julija 2014 sta imela Surkov (B) in Borodaj (A) sledeči pogovor. Surkov pravi, da bodo iz Rusije prispele okrepitve:
(...)
B: Nek Antjufejev se bo odpravil k tebi. Govoril sem ti o njem. (...) V resnici je nameraval oditi že v soboto ... ali celo v nedeljo. (...) V soboto se že odpravljajo na jug, da bi bili pripravljeni na boj. No, Saša, obstaja ena stvar - takoj ti bom povedal o tem - kot trdijo za GB. Ampak sem rekel, da je Kodakovski vodil GB.
A: Brez ugovorov. Mislim, da se bo Kodakovski, mimogrede, veselo umaknil. (...)
B: Ne. Poglej, Saš! Odločite se ... odločite se sami. Če se bo umaknil [...], mu pustite [...]. Če se iz nekih razlogov ne bo hotel [...], naj poiščejo še eno posebno storitev. Ne bo se zgodilo nič slabega.
Surkov spodbuja Borodaja, naj uredi, da Vladimir Antjufejev dobi visoko pozicijo v administraciji DPR. Teden kasneje, 10. julija 2014, Antjufejev pripravi tiskovno konferenco skupaj z Borodajem in obtoženim Girkinom. Antjufejev novinarjem pove, da je istega dne prišel iz Rusije in da bodo pod njegov nadzor prešli sektorji državne varnosti, notranjih zadev in pravosodja.
Drugi telefonski pogovor Borodaja prav tako kaže na ruski vpliv pri imenovanjih v DPR. Te ustreza vsebini e-pošte s priponko, naslovljene Surkovu, ki je bila najdena v prosto dostopnih virih. V tem elektronskem sporočilu je bil priložen seznam kandidatov za vlado DPR.
Vsi kandidati s tega seznama niso bili imenovani, kot kaže sledeči telefonski pogovor. Borodajev pomočnik (B) pokliče Pušilina (A), ki se bo pridružil "vladi". To očitno zahteva odobritev iz Moskve. 15. maja 2014 ob 13:25:25, Pušilina (A) 380507117096 pokliče (B) 380639835490:
B: (...) Na našo žalost Purgina ne moremo vključiti v Varnostni svet. Opravičili se mu bomo.
A: Uh?
B: Moskva je odobrila že finaliziran seznam. Purgina ni na njem. (...) Ti ... si. Odvisno je od položaja, veš. Podpredsednik vlade preprosto ni vključen v Varnostni svet. Oprostite, fantje. (...) Kdaj se začne seja?
A: Čez pol ure.
B: (...) Ne začnite brez nas. V redu? Ne začnite brez nas. Kmalu pridemo. (...) Purgin žal ne more biti zraven. (...)
A: No, to mi je jasno. Bom ... To mu bom razložil. In potem boste dodali svoje ... ker bo nekoliko užaljen.
B: Seveda, seveda. Pač ga Moskva ni odobrila.
Prestreženi telefonski klici prikazujejo kako je Surkov reševal težave voditeljev DPR. Na primer v pogovoru obtoženega Leonida Harčenka s 14. marca 2015. Harčenko govori o skorajšnji aretaciji soobtoženega Sergeja ("Nikolajeviča") Dubinskega. Dubinski je v težavah, ker naj bi v Rusijo vstopil ilegalno.
14. marca 2015 ob 10:45:44 Harčenko (A) 380660827518 pokliče nekega Andreja (B) 79154650595
A: (...) Poslušaj, Andrej, ali lahko dobiš informacije o situaciji z Nikolajevičem.
B: (...) No, rekli so da gre preko Strelkova, kajne? ... on je rešil ... vsaj poskusil ... (...) Včeraj sem govoril z administracijo...
A: Uh.
B: predsednika ... Rekli so, da se je [...] rešilo preko Surkova. Surkov je dal Smirnovu ukaz ... in Smirnov ... no, ne ukaz ... Surkov je Smirnova vprašal in on je dal ... eee ... odobritev. (...) Kolikor vem, je vse OK.
A: (...) ... tu se zabavamo, ker je vstopil nezakonito in ga želijo aretirati. Nujno moramo dobiti informacije o tem.
Po izjavi Andreja je Surkov rešil nesporazum okrog Dubinskega. Težavo je odpravil Smirnov, namestnik šefa FSB.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT želi vedeti:
So ruski uradniki nadzirali imenovanja vodstva DPR? Kdo je izvajal ta nadzor?
Ali je Surkov sodeloval pri imenovanju ali vodenju administracije DPR?
Kdo je sprejel odločitev o imenovanju Antjufejeva?
Področje vpliva - finance
Različni viri, vključno z izjavami prič, kažejo, da so samooklicano vlado DPR financirali ruski viri. Po izjavi visokega člana DPR je skoraj ves proračun DPR prišel iz ruskih skladov.
To dokazuje tudi naslednji telefonski pogovor. 12. julija 2014 Borodaj (A) razpravlja o svojih denarnih težavah z uporabnikom ene od treh številk iz serije: * 8520 (B). Borodaj trdi, da mu zmanjkuje denarja. Oseba z imenom "Kolja" je obljubila "180 000". Ta denar čaka v Moskvi, a za nakazilo vseeno potrebujejo odobritev.
A: (...) Torej...ja, največja težava, ki jo imam zdaj, je...eeee...zmanjkalo mi je denarja. Mislim da, tako rekoč, sto petdeset, ki sem jih vzel s seboj, praktično konec je z njimi. Ker petdeset - Zaharju, milijon hriven - Igorju, plus vsi drugi stroški, v redu? (...)
B: No, za to je bila uvedena ekonomska doktrina..., da bi bilo mogoče [...] lokalno.
A: Da. Lokalni denar bomo dejansko dobili čez približno dva tedna. Vidiš?
B: (...) denar morajo nekako nakazati.
A: Ja, moram nekako [...] ta denar. Kolja je obljubil sto osemdeset tisoč ... eee ... Prosil sem ga, naj teh sto osemdeset tisoč uredi preko Lenje, vendar je rekel, da potrebuje potrditev, denar je moral biti v Moskvi ... v glavnem je [nerazumljivo] prebrisana oseba, prikriva situacijo.
B: No, sam ga pozovi, in ga opomni kaj ti je rekel v moji prisotnosti. (...) Reci mu: "Dragi prijatelj (...) daj mi sto osemdeset in sam veš kdo...ti bo vrnil v Moskvi. (...) Torej... poleg tega mi je njegov...eee...tako rekoč nekdanji delodajalec to potrdil...zato ga enostavno ne bom spet klical za teh sto osemdeset tisoč. Preprosto bom prišel in mu dal ta denar. Rekel bom: "Tu imaš. Je za to." (...) Veš da smo se dogovorili za sto osemdeset. Vzemi. Ostalo uredi sam. Če vseeno ne bo steklo, bomo uredili po drugi poti. In povej Nikolaju: "(...) zdaj potrebujem sto osemdeset, kasneje pa bom potreboval ta in ta znesek." (...)
A: Z mano se dogovori o vsoti, ki jo potrebuješ in ti jo bom dal ... tako rečeno (...) OK. Dogovorjeno.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT bi rad vedel:
Kdo je oseba ("Kolya"), ki je Borodaju obljubila finančno pomoč?
Kdo je moral odobriti plačilo?
Kateri nadaljnji posamezniki v Ruski federaciji so bili vključeni v zagotavljanje finančne podpore za DPR?
Področje vpliva - Vojaške operacije
Več nekdanjih članov DPR je JIT pričalo o vojaškem vplivu iz Ruske federacije. Na primer, visoki član je dejal, da so lokalni poveljniki razpravljali o vojaških zadevah s predstavniki ruskih obveščevalnih služb v Moskvi. Druga priča je pripovedovala o zbirnem mestu borcev DPR v Rostovu v Rusiji, ulica Levoberežnaja 1.
V prvi polovici julija 2014 je DPR sodeloval v težkih bojih z ukrajinskimi oboroženimi silami. Z Rusko federacijo so potekali številni telefonski pogovori o vojaških operacijah. V pogovoru z uporabnikom tretje številke v seriji (* 8563) Borodaj govori o vojaški pomoči. Borodaj ga nagovarja kot "Vladimirja Ivanoviča" in sprašuje, ali je mogoče, da "naši" helikopterji izvedejo napad blizu Marjinke.
16. julija 2014 ob 08:59:04 Borodaj (A) 79265318514 pokliče uporabnika telefonske številke 79265318563 (B).
(...)
A: Vladimir Ivanovič. No.
B: Pri telefonu.
A: Povejte mi, ali je mogoče, da naši helikopterji izvedejo napad? Dobro jutro, se opravičujem.
B: Dobro jutro.
A: Torej je mogoče, da naši helikopterji izvedejo napad v bližini Marjinke? Naši? [mimo mikrofona] Pritisnite gumb. (...)
Odgovora Vladimirja Ivanoviča ni mogoče razumeti, ker se v tistem trenutku vklopi šifriranje. Lahko poslušate tudi zvočna posnetka dveh dodatnih pogovorov z Vladimirjem Ivanovičem preko druge telefonske številke (79381340450). JIT sumi, da gre za isto osebo. V drugem pogovoru je Vladimir Ivanovič omenjen kot "šef višjega ranga", "ki je priletel iz Moskve".
17. julija 2014 ob 8:56:50 nek Sergej (A) 380997759037 pokliče Vladimirja Ivanoviča (B) 79381340450. Sergej kliče s Krima in Vladimirju Ivanoviču sporoči, da bo naslednji dan letel v Rostov blizu ukrajinsko-ruske meje z ekipo sedmih mož. Od tam bodo nadaljevali pot. V soboto morajo biti na cilju, verjetno v vzhodni Ukrajini. Za svojo misijo potrebujejo več reči.
A: (...) Vladimir Ivanovič, kajne?
B: Ja, tu. Vladimir Ivanovič.
A: Eeee ... Aksjonov mi je dal vašo telefonsko številko. Rekel mi je, da je bilo dogovorjeno z Bortnikovom.
B: OK. Kako vam lahko pomagam?
A: (...) Kako vam lahko predam naš seznam želja? Jutri odletimo v Rostov. Moji možje so ... Sem iz Simferopola, možje pa so v Moskvi. Imamo seznam stvari, ki bi jih radi, in seznam stvari, ki so nujne. (...) Jutri bomo v Rostovu, bistvo pa je, da moramo biti v soboto že na cilju. Err ... Ali lahko najdete način, da ... eee ... da vas nekako kontaktiramo ... (...) Sedem nas je. Sedem mož. Osrednja ekipa je sedem mož. (...) Pomembno za nas je zdaj, da zagotovimo, da teh sedem pride na kraj z ... vsem kar potrebujejo.
B: (...) V redu ... No, v resnici so mi povedali, kaj potrebujete ... (...) Nimam vašega seznama. OK, bom uredil in vas pokličem nazaj.
A: OK. Prosim, dajte mi Viber številko. Vse bomo že prejeli in končali z misijo, ko bodo to dekodirali.
B: OK. OK. (...)
Sergej pove Vladimirju Ivanoviču, da je njegovo telefonsko številko dobil od Aksjonova, guvernerja Krima. Pravi, da je Aksjonov koordiniral z Bortnikovom, direktorjem FSB. Ni pa jasno, kdo mu bo dostavil zahtevano opremo. Drugi pogovori ob približno istem času pokažejo, kaj Sergej potrebuje: opremo za nočno opazovanje, maskirne uniforme, infrardeča očala, plinske maske, "železo", strelivo in oklepna vozila.
Kasneje istega dne, ob 13:27:50, ima Sergej (A) (380997759037) še en pogovor z Vladimirjem Ivanovičem (B) (79381340450). Sergej kliče iz urada "našega generala iz Moskve" na Krimu. Pravi, da je s šefom govoril o svojem seznamu želja za misijo. Njegov šef je Sergeju rekel, naj po potrebi kontaktira Surkova, saj da je on tisti, ki dodeljuje misije.
A: (...) Poslušajte, ima Nefiodov varno linijo, kot jo ima Golovkin? (...) Pravkar sem vstopil v urad našega generala iz Moskve. Trenutno je v Moskvi. Poklical sem svojega nadrejenega in mu povedal o vašem vprašanju in o tem, kako naj bi odgovoril ...
B: [mimo mikrofona]: V trenutku bomo nadaljevali, Saša. Nadaljevali bomo v trenutku! [nazaj na telefon]: Oprostite, kaj ste rekli?
A: Pravim, povedal sem svojemu nadrejenemu, ki je trenutno v Moskvi, o vprašanju, ki ste mi ga zastavil. Ste ultimativna avtoriteta, ki nam lahko pomaga, razumete? In rekel mi je - tega ne morem povedati po telefonu - rekel je: "Če kaj, osebno stopite v stik s Surkovom. On je tisti, ki dodeljuje misije“.
B: Mmm, v redu, vidim. (...) V redu je. Glede vašega seznama ne morem reči ničesar. Ja. Ker imam direktivo o tem, kaj bi vam moral zagotoviti. Tako enostavno je.
A: Oprostite, kdo vam je dal to direktivo?
B: Moj šef.
Vladimir Ivanovič pove Sergeju, da mu ne more povedati ničesar o opremi, ki jo je zahteval Sergej, saj ima navodila od svojega šefa.
Tu boste našli druge klice tega Sergeja, ki dajo več vpogleda v njegove pogovore z Vladimirjem Ivanovičem.
Ti pogovori vključujejo vlogo generala Serdjukova, poveljnika Južnega vojaškega okrožja Ruske federacije, pri zagotavljanju opreme za misijo. Sergej (A) govori tudi o ruskem obrambnem ministru Šojguju, ki naj bi pri zadevi sodeloval že v zgodnejši fazi:
A: Tvojega smo poklicali že trikrat. Na kratko, ukazal je že kakomuježeime? ... No, strinjali so se, da nas bodo opremili [...], potem ko so prejeli povelje osebe, ki začne na "Š". Ga poznaš?
B: Ne, ne. Kdo je to?
A: No, Šojgu. Šojgu.
B: Uh. In kje? Kje bodo predali opremo?
A: Kje? V Rostovu. Kje drugje?
31. julija 2014 ob 00:56:38 se obtoženi Girkin (C) in neznana oseba (D) pogovarjata o dobavi opreme in vlogi Vladimirja Ivanoviča pri tem. Girkin pravi, da mu Vladimir Ivanovič daje ukaze, toda Girkin poveljuje svojim ljudem.
D: Torej ... Igor Ivanovič, eee ... Od Vladimirja Ivanoviča ... Pripeljal sem ta konvoj ... Dobil sem ukaz, da dam Kozitsynu dve vozili, ostalo pa vam.
C: Torej, ne dajte nikomur ničesar ... nikomur ... Kozitsynu. Hvala vam. Vedno sem imel dovolj streliva ... že štiri mesece imam dovolj streliva ... Kozitsyn prvi ... in jaz sem bil vedno zadnji. Jaz [...] ničesar Vladimirju Ivanoviču ... Torej, potrebujem opremo in ljudi, ljudi in opremo, orožje in strelivo. Nihče od mojih ljudi ne bo izpolnil drugih ukazov kot od mene.
D: Torej, ali dajete ukaz, da vam vse pošljem?
C: Moj ukaz je ... vse namenjeno meni, mora priti do mene. Vse namenjeno meni ... Vladimir ... Kozitsyn ...
D: Torej pravite, da kljub temu, da mi je Vladimir Ivanovič dal nalogo ... mi je dal nalogo ... bom zdaj ...
C: Jaz ... jaz ... Vladimir Ivanovič mi mora samo naročiti. Ampak naj ne komandira mojih ljudi preko moje glave. Moji ljudje bodo izpolnili moje ukaze.
D: Pa počakajte ... Naloga ni bila dana vašim ljudem. Naloga je bila dana meni. Osebi, ki je pripeljala ta konvoj. Naročil mi je, da dam dve vozili ... Mislim, vam dam vse, razen dveh vozil.
C: Kakšnih vozil?
D: Dve vozili s... dobro s stvarmi, ki... s svetlobo [...]... s svetlobo [...]... z lahko strojno opremo in dodatki. Vse ostalo bo šlo k vam.
Objavljamo tudi nekaj pogovorov drugih borcev o Vladimirju Ivanoviču. Tu je na primer rečeno, da je Vladimir Ivanovič poveljnik operacije:
Na koncu objavljamo pogovor, v katerem sam Vladimir Ivanovič trdi, da ima "operativni komunikacijski telefon" s številko 83-81-70.
VPRAŠANJA
JIT želi vedeti:
Kdo je omenjeni Vladimir Ivanovič? Kakšno vlogo je imel poleti 2014 v oboroženem spopadu v vzhodni Ukrajini?
Ali so Surkov, Aksjonov, Šojgu in Bortnikov imeli vlogo pri načrtovanju in izvedbi vojaških operacij v vzhodni Ukrajini poleti leta 2014?
So bili ti posamezniki del dislokacije BUK TELAR-ja 17. julija 2014?
Zaključek
Kot je razvidno zgoraj, ima JIT informacije, ki kažejo, da je imela Ruska federacija vpliv na upravne, finančne in vojaške zadeve v DPR. Medsebojni stiki so se okrepili v prvi polovici julija 2014. Bili so skoraj dnevni klici med vodstvom DPR in njihovimi kontakti v Ruski federaciji. Govorili so z voditelji v Moskvi, blizu meje z Ukrajino in na Krimu. Komunikacija je večinoma potekala preko varovanih telefonov, ki jih je zagotovila ruska obveščevalna služba.
Znaki tesnih odnosov med voditelji DPR in ruskimi vladnimi uradniki postavljajo vprašanja o njihovi morebitni vpletenosti v napotitev BUK TELAR-ja, ki je 17. julija 2014 sestrelil let MH17. BUK TELAR je prišel iz 53. protiletalske raketne brigade, enote ruskih oboroženih sil iz Kurska v Ruski federaciji.
JIT išče priče, ki bi lahko nudile informacije o tistih, ki so nadzorovali vodstvo DPR v Donecku in sprejeli odločitev o dislokaciji BUK TELAR-ja.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Omenjeno že prej, ampak tule gre bolj v detajle. JIT ima za pričo separatista, ki je bil na kontrolni točki poleg Buka, ko je izstrelil raketo na MH17.
https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/12...
Maybe the biggest revelation from today's MH17 trial is "Witness M58" -- a separatist fighter who was at the checkpoint just a few hundred meters east of the launch site. This witness gave the JIT info about who was with the Buk when it fired.
This checkpoint that "M58" was manning can be found at 47.973235, 38.768588.
Satellite image from the day before the downing:
Vzeto iz te solate, ki jo je sproduciralo tožilstvo:
Status of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - part 2 (10-3-2020)
The witness addresses these points at certain moments. He states, for example, that he recognised Russian accents among the military personnel present at the launch site, that Russian military personnel were present with the Buk and that he heard from his companions that people from the FSB were present at the shooting down of the aeroplane.
https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/12...
Maybe the biggest revelation from today's MH17 trial is "Witness M58" -- a separatist fighter who was at the checkpoint just a few hundred meters east of the launch site. This witness gave the JIT info about who was with the Buk when it fired.
Satellite image from the day before the downing:
Vzeto iz te solate, ki jo je sproduciralo tožilstvo:
Status of the investigation and position on the progress of the trial - part 2 (10-3-2020)
The witness addresses these points at certain moments. He states, for example, that he recognised Russian accents among the military personnel present at the launch site, that Russian military personnel were present with the Buk and that he heard from his companions that people from the FSB were present at the shooting down of the aeroplane.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Al Jazeera Balkans ima trenutno na sporedu dokumentarec o Bellingcatu. Enkrat aprila bo še na angleški verziji.
http://balkans.aljazeera.net/uzivo
http://balkans.aljazeera.net/uzivo
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Ob 23:05 je ponovitev. Sem si ga že ogledal, če imate čas res priporočam ogled.
http://balkans.aljazeera.net/uzivo
https://www.danas.rs/kultura/bellingcat...
http://balkans.aljazeera.net/uzivo
https://www.danas.rs/kultura/bellingcat...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Ni treba čakat ponovitve. Zgleda so kupili pravice za vse in ga imajo na YT kanalu. Yaay Al Jazeera Balkans.
Regioskop: Bellingcat - istina u svijetu postistine
Regioskop: Bellingcat - istina u svijetu postistine
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Tole so ljudje, ki trdijo, da ni važno kdo je sestrelil MH17, gre za protirusko propagando, je Russiagate prenapihnjena (OK, I'll give them that) in preko druge organizacije zanikajo uporabo bojnih strupov s strani Assada.
Ko so začeli povezovat koronavirus in Gatesa je Chomsky spizdil stran kakor hitro je zmogel.
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status...
Ko so začeli povezovat koronavirus in Gatesa je Chomsky spizdil stran kakor hitro je zmogel.
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Girkin je še naprej dober pravoslavni kristjan t.j. ne laže.
Na rusko žalost s tem posredno potrjuje njihovo vpletenost.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
Girkin comes closest to admission to explicitly Russia shooting MH17. In addition to his stock answer "the rebels didn't shoot it down", he now says "I felt a huge blow when I found out a passenger plane was shot.. I knew I was at least partly responsible".
Probably his most damaging admission (from a Russian propaganda standpoint, and somewhat from a legal perspective) is that he indeed requested anti-aircraft support with trained crews from Moscow a week or so before the MH17 downing. Didn't challenge authenticity of intercepts.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
What a shitstorm...today's 3-hour interview by Ukrainian TV celebrity Gordon with Igor Girkin... Girkin is now being destroyed by his fans on VK for talking to the enemy...Gordon is being destroyed by his viewers & Ukrainian politicians for giving Girkin exposure.
In one segment of the interview, Gordon lists 3 names of GRU/FSB officers supervising Russian & pro-Russian forces in Donbass at the time of MH17, all 3 identified by @bellingcat. He asks Girkin to confirm identities. He says "No comment" and smiles. Thanks Girkin.
Na rusko žalost s tem posredno potrjuje njihovo vpletenost.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
Girkin comes closest to admission to explicitly Russia shooting MH17. In addition to his stock answer "the rebels didn't shoot it down", he now says "I felt a huge blow when I found out a passenger plane was shot.. I knew I was at least partly responsible".
Probably his most damaging admission (from a Russian propaganda standpoint, and somewhat from a legal perspective) is that he indeed requested anti-aircraft support with trained crews from Moscow a week or so before the MH17 downing. Didn't challenge authenticity of intercepts.
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/statu...
What a shitstorm...today's 3-hour interview by Ukrainian TV celebrity Gordon with Igor Girkin... Girkin is now being destroyed by his fans on VK for talking to the enemy...Gordon is being destroyed by his viewers & Ukrainian politicians for giving Girkin exposure.
In one segment of the interview, Gordon lists 3 names of GRU/FSB officers supervising Russian & pro-Russian forces in Donbass at the time of MH17, all 3 identified by @bellingcat. He asks Girkin to confirm identities. He says "No comment" and smiles. Thanks Girkin.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Od ponedeljka do srede je spet potekalo sojenje, tokrat je tožilstvo predstavljalo dokaze & metodologijo. Spodaj je povzetek.
Zelo na hitro, kaj je novega:
Rusija jih je zavajala še bolj kot je bilo javno znano. Med drugim so ponarejali papirje o raketi, da bi ta postala ukrajinska in nočejo podat informacij, kje je bil TELAR 17. julija češ da gre za lažne novice in jim tega ni treba.
Lastnik Volvo tovornjaka je med pričami, v dokaze je dal potrdilo o zasegu s strani DNR in posnetek le-tega z varnostne kamere.
Ponedeljek:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1269...
First step was to inspect all mortal remains for "foreign objects" . This was done via CT scans and autopsy "triages" Prosecution shows a video demonstrating the triage forensic investigation in search of metal fragments in the victims' bodies
In October and November 2014, two types of BUK missiles - the older and the newer version - were dismantled in an experiment to see differences in the warhead. Both were found to have identical warheads with the same schrapnel fragments. 
Last, a full-missile arena explosion test was conducted to track the exact dispersal and damage from different sections of the warhead 
Some artifacts a BUK explosion that didn't make sense could only be explained thanks to the arena explosion test. For example, these ostensibly "inside-outward" petalling holes - which apparently are the result of structural damage to compressed metal layers. 
Prosecution now explains why SBU were able to publish intercepts several hours after the shootdown. SBU had been tracking these phones for months already. After the incident SBU engaged its field offices to listen to recent calls to find relevant conversations. These initial "hits" were only starting points, and not the final evidence. They provided leads to look for other calls, and to start interpreting topics and references. Data was aggregated from 3 different sources: intel, ongoing criminal investigations, and MH17 investigations
Initially, SBU searched for references to "BUK"s to find relevant convos. But soon it became clear Russia's FSB had provided special secure phones that couldn't be tapped
Here, Girkin doesn't know how to turn on the encryption... 
JIT didn't just take SBU provided intercepts at public value. It applied a holistic validation method - comparing Ukraine data with international call metadata, confirming content with some participants, and finding open-source confirmation of certain calls having taken place. In addition Dutch IT forensic experts conducted on-the-ground network experiments in Ukraine and compared it to the metadata obtained from Ukrainian mobile operators.
Another validation route was by cross-referencing hardware signatures (IMEI) among different operators, and call duration and timing metadata (i.e. to ensure there was no overlaps or other inconsistencies)
Whenever any Ukrainian intercept included an international call, JIT retreived the corresponding call metadata (or audio) from the other (Polish, Spanish etc) mobile operator. All such cross-checked matched.
Prosecutors describe how they searched for witnesses. The first way was by using tips provided by SBU from ongoing investigations. Second were other countries that provided access to witnesses. Third, repeated appeal for witnesses were made by JIT via web, radio ads etc. Witness came forward between 2014 and 2019, and in 2019 the investigative judge started hearing each witness, and studied their individual safety situation to approve or not their anonymization. The judge also independently assessed the credibility of such witnesses.
Torek:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1270...
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1270...
The prosecutor explains the various RCS (Radar cross-section) factors for different flying objects - the point is that a BUK missile is nearly infinitely much less likely to be captured on primary radar data than an aircraft.
Plus, in simplified terms, the settings of a radar installation define what degree of granularity (what threshold of RCS) is even recorded; "noise" and "clutter" from small objects is usually discarded 
JIT requested Ukraine, Russia and NATO "AWACS" radar data. AWACS did not produce any relevant data. Ukraine could not provide primary data from the only in-range radar base due to "scheduled maintenance". JIT investigated such claims thoroughly. 
After engaging international military and civilian experts and seizing and inspecting work logs, JIT validated that the radar station in Chuguev indeed had pre-scheduled maintenance on July 17. Other stationary radar bases within reach of MH17 were under Donbass militants control 
Russian MoD showed a satellite photo purporting to contain a Ukraine base with a missing BUK system between first and second photo
However, when JIT obtained a photo from the European Space Agency of the Ukrainian military base that Russia proved showed a missing BUK Telar on 17.07. It showed a completely different situation with no missing BUK telar. 
Other comparison of photos presented by Russia and same location photos obtained from Google earth showed that Russia, in fact, used photos that could not have come from the dates it claimed. 
Last, JIT checked with the Dutch meteroligal service and found that the photo presented by Russia could not have been taken on the claimed date, as there were clouds on that date and time that didn't match the photos. Russia refused to provide raw satellite data for years. Just a coupe of days before the start of the MH17 trial in March, Russia finally responded that it "didn't store the original satellite photo data" because it was cloudy on that day.
JIT obtained from Ukraine the map of deployed BUK SAMs on July 17. it provide the first map. JIT asked independently Dutch military intel for its map. That's the second map. There was one extra BUK telar that Dutch intel showed, outside shooting range.
In May 2018, JIT requested Russia for data on manufacturing date and ownership data of the venturi of the missile fragments found on the crash site. Russia replied that this number is of a sequence from the 23rd anti-aircraft brigade that was deployed in Ukrainian USSR 
Russia also said that a delivery of this BUK to that unit was confirmed by a receipt. Russia did not provide such receipt to JIT. Ukraine then provided the missile log of the unit that Russia claimed received this unit. This missile is not listed in the Ukraine log.
Russia's log presented to JIT lists the type of warhead as 9M314. This is the older type of warhead. Above the printed text, an M is hand-inserted. The M seems to modify the type to a more recent type of missile.
Crucially, Russia provided assembly documents for the missile that it said was in Ukrainian possession. However, this did not match the production date that was on the missile remains - which were not provided to Russia (!) 
JIT was able to track the movement of the BUK-Telar by identifying phones of people who traveled with the vehicle. Once finding the correlated numbers, it was easy to track the movement near perfectly 
This same route was validated by witnesses who saw or photographed the BUK Telar as it traveled. The letter-number combinations on this chart indicates different anonymized witnesses that have passed the credibility test. 
On top of the telecoms metadata and witness evidence, JIt superimposed social media and photo data that was published as the BUK Telar moved. This resulted in this consistent composite route map. 
JIT first started its route investigation based on this photo in Paris Match magazine. JIT contacted the owner of the business that had its number on the side - he testified that his business had been seized by "DNR militants" 
The owner - who became a witness - provided a receipt for his truck being impounded by the DNR militants 
The owner also presented security camera footage showing the seizure on 8 July. But that's not all - the commander who impounded the truck was later detained by Ukraine, and he testified confirming the takeover, and his own role in the DNR. He was in charge of support & logistics.
Now prosecution will move to describe its validation of the launch site at Snizhne. The hypothesis for this location started from open-source data showing a missile contrail near Snizhne - also validated by @Bellingcat. JIT contacted the author of the photo in Torez.
The original SD card was handed over to JIT and was authenticated as non-manipulated. The contrast was increased to see the contrail better (left). According to the experts, the trail was lifting upwards and could not be a plane. 
Furthermore, a witness interrogated by the investigative judge, pointed to a precise location where he/she saw the BUk Telar (the cross). It is exactly the place seen on the satellite photos. 
Then JIT had to reconstruct the outbound route following the shoot-down. It had fewer data-points, partly because the escape was at night where fewer witnesses would have had a chance to see or photograph it. The one thing that made it easier to validate the return route was that a former DNR militant had become a witness who had taken part in the repatriation - and was charged with moving the BUK-Telar to Debaltseve.
Another objective piece of evidence was the video of the BUK Telar with one missing missile in Luhansk 
JIT was able to obtain the original camera from which the video was made. Videos on this camera were compared to landmarks on Google Earth and the location in Luhansk was determined with high confidence. Timing was chronolocated to 4:03 and 4:20.
Intercepted calls showed that a series of 9 telephone numbers had been issued to people accompanying the BUK Telar, all starting with +3806334263*
The intercepted conversations specifically indicate that the BUK Telar arrived from - and was repatriated into - Russia. And that this BUK Telar was only one of several heavy weapons installations provided by the Russian federation.
JIT requested from Russia information about whether this BUK Telar belonged to 53rd Brigade, and where this Telar 3x2 was located on July 17 2014. Russia replied that "the photographs of this BUK Telar in Ukraine are fake and therefore we do not need to give you this information"
Another hypothesis that JIT investigated was whether the actual target of the BUK had been an Aeroflot flight, under the theory that the intent was a false-flag operation aiming to blame Ukraine for a commercial airline shoot-down. JIT concluded this was unlikely.
In conclusion, JIT has not completed the investigation into what exactly happened in the last moments before the shootdown, and what led to the decision to fire at MH17. At this point, the most plausible scenario still is the mistaken targeting a Ukrainian military plane.
Sreda:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1270...
JIT consulted experts from Russia, Ukraine, Finland, and Germany, and got actual operating manuals from Georgia and Ukraine
JIT previously published a call in which main suspect Girkin asked for anti-air support from Russia "including trained crew as we don't have time to train them". He acknowledged authenticity of call on his own VK account. 
Prosecutor lists several other protected witnesses who provided insider information on the movement and usage of the BUK-Telar..including from drivers and body-guards of some of the charged 4 persons.
All intercepted calls showed that Russia supplied the militants with weapons and communication tools and contributed to recruitment and payment of fighters. Furthermore, Russian military provided cross-border artillery shelling and air-support. In intercepted conversations, combatants from DNR routinely referred to locking up civilians in basements, torture, including by electric shocks, executions. Many violation of law of war were registered by external authoritative sources. This condition thus also fails.
In conclusion: other than the first criteria, where objective evidence shows Russia was a party to the war,(but it does not even acknowledge this), all other criteria for combatant immunity are missing. JIT would like to hear of course the position of the accused.
We have asked Russia to inform us, for example, if Dubinsky was in service of the Russian state in July 2014. Russia refused to answer. It also declined our request to interrogate the accused on this particular topic on Russian territory.
Zelo na hitro, kaj je novega:
Rusija jih je zavajala še bolj kot je bilo javno znano. Med drugim so ponarejali papirje o raketi, da bi ta postala ukrajinska in nočejo podat informacij, kje je bil TELAR 17. julija češ da gre za lažne novice in jim tega ni treba.
Lastnik Volvo tovornjaka je med pričami, v dokaze je dal potrdilo o zasegu s strani DNR in posnetek le-tega z varnostne kamere.
Ponedeljek:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1269...
First step was to inspect all mortal remains for "foreign objects" . This was done via CT scans and autopsy "triages" Prosecution shows a video demonstrating the triage forensic investigation in search of metal fragments in the victims' bodies
Prosecution now explains why SBU were able to publish intercepts several hours after the shootdown. SBU had been tracking these phones for months already. After the incident SBU engaged its field offices to listen to recent calls to find relevant conversations. These initial "hits" were only starting points, and not the final evidence. They provided leads to look for other calls, and to start interpreting topics and references. Data was aggregated from 3 different sources: intel, ongoing criminal investigations, and MH17 investigations
Initially, SBU searched for references to "BUK"s to find relevant convos. But soon it became clear Russia's FSB had provided special secure phones that couldn't be tapped
Another validation route was by cross-referencing hardware signatures (IMEI) among different operators, and call duration and timing metadata (i.e. to ensure there was no overlaps or other inconsistencies)
Prosecutors describe how they searched for witnesses. The first way was by using tips provided by SBU from ongoing investigations. Second were other countries that provided access to witnesses. Third, repeated appeal for witnesses were made by JIT via web, radio ads etc. Witness came forward between 2014 and 2019, and in 2019 the investigative judge started hearing each witness, and studied their individual safety situation to approve or not their anonymization. The judge also independently assessed the credibility of such witnesses.
Torek:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1270...
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1270...
The prosecutor explains the various RCS (Radar cross-section) factors for different flying objects - the point is that a BUK missile is nearly infinitely much less likely to be captured on primary radar data than an aircraft.
Russian MoD showed a satellite photo purporting to contain a Ukraine base with a missing BUK system between first and second photo
Last, JIT checked with the Dutch meteroligal service and found that the photo presented by Russia could not have been taken on the claimed date, as there were clouds on that date and time that didn't match the photos. Russia refused to provide raw satellite data for years. Just a coupe of days before the start of the MH17 trial in March, Russia finally responded that it "didn't store the original satellite photo data" because it was cloudy on that day.
JIT obtained from Ukraine the map of deployed BUK SAMs on July 17. it provide the first map. JIT asked independently Dutch military intel for its map. That's the second map. There was one extra BUK telar that Dutch intel showed, outside shooting range.
Russia's log presented to JIT lists the type of warhead as 9M314. This is the older type of warhead. Above the printed text, an M is hand-inserted. The M seems to modify the type to a more recent type of missile.
Now prosecution will move to describe its validation of the launch site at Snizhne. The hypothesis for this location started from open-source data showing a missile contrail near Snizhne - also validated by @Bellingcat. JIT contacted the author of the photo in Torez.
Then JIT had to reconstruct the outbound route following the shoot-down. It had fewer data-points, partly because the escape was at night where fewer witnesses would have had a chance to see or photograph it. The one thing that made it easier to validate the return route was that a former DNR militant had become a witness who had taken part in the repatriation - and was charged with moving the BUK-Telar to Debaltseve.
Intercepted calls showed that a series of 9 telephone numbers had been issued to people accompanying the BUK Telar, all starting with +3806334263*
The intercepted conversations specifically indicate that the BUK Telar arrived from - and was repatriated into - Russia. And that this BUK Telar was only one of several heavy weapons installations provided by the Russian federation.
JIT requested from Russia information about whether this BUK Telar belonged to 53rd Brigade, and where this Telar 3x2 was located on July 17 2014. Russia replied that "the photographs of this BUK Telar in Ukraine are fake and therefore we do not need to give you this information"
Another hypothesis that JIT investigated was whether the actual target of the BUK had been an Aeroflot flight, under the theory that the intent was a false-flag operation aiming to blame Ukraine for a commercial airline shoot-down. JIT concluded this was unlikely.
In conclusion, JIT has not completed the investigation into what exactly happened in the last moments before the shootdown, and what led to the decision to fire at MH17. At this point, the most plausible scenario still is the mistaken targeting a Ukrainian military plane.
Sreda:
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1270...
JIT consulted experts from Russia, Ukraine, Finland, and Germany, and got actual operating manuals from Georgia and Ukraine
All intercepted calls showed that Russia supplied the militants with weapons and communication tools and contributed to recruitment and payment of fighters. Furthermore, Russian military provided cross-border artillery shelling and air-support. In intercepted conversations, combatants from DNR routinely referred to locking up civilians in basements, torture, including by electric shocks, executions. Many violation of law of war were registered by external authoritative sources. This condition thus also fails.
In conclusion: other than the first criteria, where objective evidence shows Russia was a party to the war,(but it does not even acknowledge this), all other criteria for combatant immunity are missing. JIT would like to hear of course the position of the accused.
We have asked Russia to inform us, for example, if Dubinsky was in service of the Russian state in July 2014. Russia refused to answer. It also declined our request to interrogate the accused on this particular topic on Russian territory.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
7982884e ::
jaz dam se 4 leta, okoli 10. obletnice, da priznajo.
takrat bo itak vse tako potihnilo da rtvslo-jevski rusofili ne bodo vec seznanjeni
takrat bo itak vse tako potihnilo da rtvslo-jevski rusofili ne bodo vec seznanjeni
fikus_ ::
Zgleda da si poln predsodkov!
Je javna skrivnost oz. se ve, čigabva je bila oprema, je samo vprašanje, točno kdo je dal zeleno luč oz. kdo (neusposobljen človek) je pritisnil na knof. Ter najbolj pomembno, komu bodo uspeli dokazat, da je kriv in bo nosil sankcije/kazen.
Je javna skrivnost oz. se ve, čigabva je bila oprema, je samo vprašanje, točno kdo je dal zeleno luč oz. kdo (neusposobljen človek) je pritisnil na knof. Ter najbolj pomembno, komu bodo uspeli dokazat, da je kriv in bo nosil sankcije/kazen.
7982884e ::
Zgleda da si poln predsodkov!
Je javna skrivnost oz. se ve, čigabva je bila oprema, je samo vprašanje, točno kdo je dal zeleno luč oz. kdo (neusposobljen človek) je pritisnil na knof. Ter najbolj pomembno, komu bodo uspeli dokazat, da je kriv in bo nosil sankcije/kazen.
predsodek je dejstvo, da je komentatorska publika strogo usmerjena v dolocena politicna prepricanja? :)
glede posadke mislim da se ve, kdo jo je sestavljal in kdo bi moral nositi odgovornost (za sam ukaz), sicer pa odgovornost je na mnogih, predvsem na tistih ki so zakrivali in zavajali
Pac-Man ::
KIIS & Levada sta po Ukrajini delala anketo, kdo je odgovoren za MH17. L. 2014 in 2019.
https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/12...
https://twitter.com/AricToler/status/12...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
fikus_ ::
Brezvezna anketa, ker nič ne rešuje; razultate se pa da v naprej predvidet, ker so odgovori v skladu s predsodki vprašanih.
gozdar1 ::
Glede na število rusofilov, ki dnevno konzumirajo rusko propagando bi znali biti rezultati take ankete v sloveniji.
gozdar1 ::
Hja če nekoga ne prepričajo nobeni dokazi in je pripravljen kupit najbolj bizarne teorije, ki krivijo drugo stran, ne gre več samo za predsodke.
Jarno ::
Kakorkoli, sestrelitev je povezana s predsodki in projiciranjem.
Eni maščevalni osebki so svoje komplekse projicirali na neko piko na zaslonu in povzročili tragedijo.
Eni maščevalni osebki so svoje komplekse projicirali na neko piko na zaslonu in povzročili tragedijo.
#65W!
fikus_ ::
Po pisanji soideč so kar predsodki!
Za BUK se ve, čigav je bil ozz kdo ga je posodil, ugotovit je še potrebno, kdo iz nesposobne (skup nabrane) poosadke BUK-a je pritisnil na gumb.
Za BUK se ve, čigav je bil ozz kdo ga je posodil, ugotovit je še potrebno, kdo iz nesposobne (skup nabrane) poosadke BUK-a je pritisnil na gumb.
Pac-Man ::
Bolj zabavno bo, ko se bo ugotavljalo kdo jih je napotil na mesto dislokacije v sosednjo državo.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Pri nizozemskem NOS so dobili prisluhe Dubinskega z začetka julija, ki se uporabljajo kot dokazni material v procesu. Potrjujejo, da je Buk prišel iz Rusije s posadko in da je izstrelil raketo. Na začetku so bili prepričani, da so zadeli vojaško letalo. Iz tega je nastala zgodbica kako je ukrajinski lovec sestrelil MH17, oni pa lovca. Problem je, da ostankov lovca ni nikjer, v Boeingu & žrtvah so pa ostanki rakete Buka, zato gre po novem za ukrajinski Buk :)
Omenjen je Su-23, ki ne obstaja. Verjetno je mišljen Su-25, ki je bil 16. julija tudi sestreljen, kot kaže s strani ruskega letalstva, aktualen pa je bil tudi na neslavni novinarski konferenci ruskega obrambnega ministrstva par dni kasneje. Kdo je kiksnil pri imenu ne vem, verjetno avtorji članka.
Menjava na vrhu DNR (Girkin/Borodaj gresta nazaj v Moskvo) se je pripravljala že pred sestrelitvijo.
Audio tapes of thousands of overheard conversations, a reconstruction of the MH17 disaster
Wednesday, 16 July 2014
...
Less than an hour later, Dubinsky calls a colleague, the deputy commander of the 'Vostok' battalion: "Sanych, I'm not sure that my men can hold out there." In this conversation, Dubinsky says that there is nothing he can do against the Ukrainian combat aircraft. It would be good to have a Buk. "If I can get the Buk system early enough in the morning, I can take it there. Then it's okay. If not, I'm in the shit."
...
A little later, Pulatov calls back to give him the first good news of the day. They have downed an SU23 Ukrainian combat aircraft, using a MANPADS, a shoulder-fired air defence system.
Thirty minutes later, he corrects himself: The aircraft has not been downed by a MANPADS, but by another aircraft. Later that day, the Ukrainian army also reports their aircraft being downed by a Russian combat aircraft.
// tu je sestreljen Su-25: List of Ukrainian aircraft losses during the War in Donbass @ Wikipedia
...
In July, Russia's military as well as its political influence increases. The separatists increasingly take orders from Moscow. Late in the evening of 4 July, Dubinsky receives a phone call. Nieuwsuur has not been able to establish who the caller is, but this man warns Dubinsky: "Today, someone from Moscow has arrived. And it looks like the whole top will be replaced. The political top, that is."
Dubinsky is clearly aware of the situation. "That's correct. There has been an order involving the political top. Borodai is currently in Moscow. He has flown to Moscow." At that point, Alexander Borodai is the political leader of the self-declared republic. "This morning, they went to Moscow. As soon as they're back, we'll know what decisions have been made."
...
Thursday, 17 July 2014
A little past 9:00 a.m., Bibliotekar reports to Dubinsky by telephone. "Hi Nikolayevich, where do we deliver this beauty?" Dubinsky asks whether this is about the Buk-M. Bibliotekar confirms. It is on a trailer and the crew have arrived with it.
At 9:30 a.m. Dubinsky calls his associate Pulatov, who is in the Marinovka area at that point. Dubinsky: "Krot will tow the Buk-M to you any minute now." Pulatov: "Yes, understood." Dubinsky: "You are to set it up near Pervomayskoye, that Buk-M. And Vostok will send three tanks as security."
A little later, Kharchenko is ordered to take the Buk to Pervomaysk. "Set up there, and take the rest of the people with you. You are a reserve and you need to guard that thing." And, he adds, "Gyurza (Pulatov) will join you later." A minute later, he reports the status to Pulatov. They are to go to Pervomaysk to "guard the Buk". Dubinsky: "... you wait for Lonya (Kharchenko). Lonya is now sending that B-M, you understand, right?"
Pulatov: "Yes." Dubinsky: "The Buk, the Buk." Pulatov: "Yes, yes, understood ( )" Dubinsky: "Understood. So, you, Lonya, and the rest look up Pervomaysk. Once you get to Pervomaysk, your job is to be reserve to guard that BUK and to organize that...., you understood, do you?" Pulatov: "Yes."
At the end of the conversation, Dubinsky repeats his order one more time: "Your job is to be reserve and to guard that B. You understand me?"
Around 12:45 p.m., the Buk transport reaches the town of Snizhne. (...) Journalists of the AP press agency see the Buk in the town centre of Snizhne around 1:00 p.m. There, the Buk is unloaded from the flat-bed and then drives to Pervomaysk on its own.
...
At 4:19 p.m., a missile is launched from the field near Snizhne. A little under a minute later, it explodes next to the cockpit of flight MH17. Not long after that, reports appear on social media about a missile and explosions.
Nearly half an hour later, Kharchenko reports to Dubinsky that they have downed a Ukrainian combat aircraft: "We are on the spot. We have already brought down a 'Sushka'. Dubinsky: "Well done, big guys! A 'Sushka'! Well done."
...
Less than 30 minutes later, the two men have further contact. Kharchenko reports artillery bombardments near Marinovka. "Did you put the Buk well in place? Will it not be shot to pieces?" Dubinsky wants to know. "No, they can't reach it. We are out of their reach anyway."
An hour later, Dubinsky calls a unit in the northern area controlled by the separatists. Botsman: "A place has been downed here near me. I'm on my way to the boxes now." Dubinsky has no idea what Botsman is talking about and repeats Kharchenko's claim that they have downed a Ukrainian combat aircraft. "We have now also brought down an aircraft, a Sushka", says Dubinsky. "The enemy is trying to break through", but "thank god, the BUK-M arrived this morning, so it's easier now."
He also expects support from Russia. The Ukrainian army is close to the Russian border and is striking at the separatists in Marinovka from that position. "Now we wait for the Russians who should be firing at their position from that end."
Two hours later, Dubinsky still does not know what has really happened. That becomes clear from a conversation with someone who indicates that he is being bombarded by journalists with questions about a downed Boeing.
John Doe: "I am getting calls from journalists telling me that a Boeing has been shot south of Donetsk." Dubinsky: "Is there a fight going on?" (Dubinsky probably mistakes 'Boeing' for 'boj', the Russian word for fight) John Doe: "Boeing! There's been a plane crash." Dubinsky: "Ah, our people have brought one down over Savur-Mohyla, near Marinovka, our people have brought down a 'Sushka'."
...
After the tête-a-tête at Girkin's office, Dubinsky is suddenly worried about what has transpired. Around 8:00 p.m., he calls his deputy Pulatov. He wants to have clarity about who has shot what. Dubinsky: "Tell me, did or did not our BUK fire?" Pulatov: "The Buk has brought down a 'Sushka'." Dubinsky: "So..." Pulatov: "But before that, the 'Sushka' downed the Boeing. They tried to blame us for that." (...) Two minutes later, Dubinsky repeats this story to his boss, Igor Girkin.
...
Not much later, Pulatov and Kharchenko both call from the MH17 crash site. Dubinsky himself now also seems to question the story that his subordinates have reported to him. When Kharchenko calls from the crash site asking if they should give the OSCE access, Dubinsky also asks him who has downed the Boeing: "You did observe that it was brought down by a 'Sushka', or was it ours after all?"
Kharchenko "Not ours, Nikolayevich, not ours." Dubinsky: "So a 'Sushka' then? And then after that, the 'Sushka' brought down by our Buk, right?" Kharchenko: "Yes, first there was a bang up there, and then there was our bang."
It was a Ukrainian combat aircraft; that's also what the separatists keep telling each other. They lay the foundation for the story that, a few days later, will also be officially embraced by the Russian Ministry of Defence. It will soon become clear that the evidence submitted by the Ministry in that respect is false. Russia will later switch to a different theory: flight MH17 has not been downed by the separatists, but by a Buk from the Ukrainian army.
At 8:30 p.m., five hours after flight MH17, Dubinsky calls Girkin. The Minister instructs him to take the 'box' to the border with the neighbouring Lugansk region. Dubinsky and his men control a large part of the Donetsk region, but the only route to Russia leads through the Lugansk region, which is controlled by other rebel forces.
Meanwhile, Kharchenko reports that the 'box' has left the launch site on its own and is headed for Snizhne. A town not far from the launch site. At 10:30 p.m. he calls Dubinsky again. Kharchenko: "Where does it go, where should I escort it to?" Dubinsky: "Up to the border with the Lugansk region." Kharchenko: "Aha." Dubinsky: "And then that's it. Clear?"
But 45 minutes later, the Buk is still in Snizhne, at less than 10 km from the original launch site: "They don't know the way, nobody knows anything."
Friday, 18 July 2014
After midnight, the two leaders have completely lost sight of the Buk, and the Minister of Defence Girkin is getting edgy. Dubinsky can't get a hold of his people on the phone, and rumour has it that they are no longer driving in the direction of Russia, but are, in fact, coming back.
...
Dubinsky immediately calls his boss Girkin. He implies that he has carried out his boss's orders and has driven to Snizhne. "I just got fucking back. Everything was okay over there." Dubinsky repeats what Kharchenko has told him. "The machine was already in Russia; he immediately transferred the fucking thing." But Girkin's sources tell him that the transfer has failed. Dubinsky then calls again and Kharchenko repeats that the 'machine' is in Russia. Kharchenko: "I've just got off the phone with them. They are already getting another machine from Russia."
...
At 10:50 that morning, Dubinsky receives one last call on this number about flight MH17. The OSCE wants to bring Ukrainian aircraft experts to the crash site and is Dubinsky okay with that? "Let them go, I've already got the boxes anyway," says Dubinsky, "one yesterday evening, and we found another one last night. I'm not sure, maybe there are four of them, but we've already got two."
...
Then the tapped number goes quiet. Dubinsky switches to a new number. That number is tapped as well, but there is no more talk of MH17 or any Buk.
Omenjen je Su-23, ki ne obstaja. Verjetno je mišljen Su-25, ki je bil 16. julija tudi sestreljen, kot kaže s strani ruskega letalstva, aktualen pa je bil tudi na neslavni novinarski konferenci ruskega obrambnega ministrstva par dni kasneje. Kdo je kiksnil pri imenu ne vem, verjetno avtorji članka.
Menjava na vrhu DNR (Girkin/Borodaj gresta nazaj v Moskvo) se je pripravljala že pred sestrelitvijo.
Audio tapes of thousands of overheard conversations, a reconstruction of the MH17 disaster
Wednesday, 16 July 2014
...
Less than an hour later, Dubinsky calls a colleague, the deputy commander of the 'Vostok' battalion: "Sanych, I'm not sure that my men can hold out there." In this conversation, Dubinsky says that there is nothing he can do against the Ukrainian combat aircraft. It would be good to have a Buk. "If I can get the Buk system early enough in the morning, I can take it there. Then it's okay. If not, I'm in the shit."
...
A little later, Pulatov calls back to give him the first good news of the day. They have downed an SU23 Ukrainian combat aircraft, using a MANPADS, a shoulder-fired air defence system.
Thirty minutes later, he corrects himself: The aircraft has not been downed by a MANPADS, but by another aircraft. Later that day, the Ukrainian army also reports their aircraft being downed by a Russian combat aircraft.
// tu je sestreljen Su-25: List of Ukrainian aircraft losses during the War in Donbass @ Wikipedia
...
In July, Russia's military as well as its political influence increases. The separatists increasingly take orders from Moscow. Late in the evening of 4 July, Dubinsky receives a phone call. Nieuwsuur has not been able to establish who the caller is, but this man warns Dubinsky: "Today, someone from Moscow has arrived. And it looks like the whole top will be replaced. The political top, that is."
Dubinsky is clearly aware of the situation. "That's correct. There has been an order involving the political top. Borodai is currently in Moscow. He has flown to Moscow." At that point, Alexander Borodai is the political leader of the self-declared republic. "This morning, they went to Moscow. As soon as they're back, we'll know what decisions have been made."
...
Thursday, 17 July 2014
A little past 9:00 a.m., Bibliotekar reports to Dubinsky by telephone. "Hi Nikolayevich, where do we deliver this beauty?" Dubinsky asks whether this is about the Buk-M. Bibliotekar confirms. It is on a trailer and the crew have arrived with it.
At 9:30 a.m. Dubinsky calls his associate Pulatov, who is in the Marinovka area at that point. Dubinsky: "Krot will tow the Buk-M to you any minute now." Pulatov: "Yes, understood." Dubinsky: "You are to set it up near Pervomayskoye, that Buk-M. And Vostok will send three tanks as security."
A little later, Kharchenko is ordered to take the Buk to Pervomaysk. "Set up there, and take the rest of the people with you. You are a reserve and you need to guard that thing." And, he adds, "Gyurza (Pulatov) will join you later." A minute later, he reports the status to Pulatov. They are to go to Pervomaysk to "guard the Buk". Dubinsky: "... you wait for Lonya (Kharchenko). Lonya is now sending that B-M, you understand, right?"
Pulatov: "Yes." Dubinsky: "The Buk, the Buk." Pulatov: "Yes, yes, understood ( )" Dubinsky: "Understood. So, you, Lonya, and the rest look up Pervomaysk. Once you get to Pervomaysk, your job is to be reserve to guard that BUK and to organize that...., you understood, do you?" Pulatov: "Yes."
At the end of the conversation, Dubinsky repeats his order one more time: "Your job is to be reserve and to guard that B. You understand me?"
Around 12:45 p.m., the Buk transport reaches the town of Snizhne. (...) Journalists of the AP press agency see the Buk in the town centre of Snizhne around 1:00 p.m. There, the Buk is unloaded from the flat-bed and then drives to Pervomaysk on its own.
...
At 4:19 p.m., a missile is launched from the field near Snizhne. A little under a minute later, it explodes next to the cockpit of flight MH17. Not long after that, reports appear on social media about a missile and explosions.
Nearly half an hour later, Kharchenko reports to Dubinsky that they have downed a Ukrainian combat aircraft: "We are on the spot. We have already brought down a 'Sushka'. Dubinsky: "Well done, big guys! A 'Sushka'! Well done."
...
Less than 30 minutes later, the two men have further contact. Kharchenko reports artillery bombardments near Marinovka. "Did you put the Buk well in place? Will it not be shot to pieces?" Dubinsky wants to know. "No, they can't reach it. We are out of their reach anyway."
An hour later, Dubinsky calls a unit in the northern area controlled by the separatists. Botsman: "A place has been downed here near me. I'm on my way to the boxes now." Dubinsky has no idea what Botsman is talking about and repeats Kharchenko's claim that they have downed a Ukrainian combat aircraft. "We have now also brought down an aircraft, a Sushka", says Dubinsky. "The enemy is trying to break through", but "thank god, the BUK-M arrived this morning, so it's easier now."
He also expects support from Russia. The Ukrainian army is close to the Russian border and is striking at the separatists in Marinovka from that position. "Now we wait for the Russians who should be firing at their position from that end."
Two hours later, Dubinsky still does not know what has really happened. That becomes clear from a conversation with someone who indicates that he is being bombarded by journalists with questions about a downed Boeing.
John Doe: "I am getting calls from journalists telling me that a Boeing has been shot south of Donetsk." Dubinsky: "Is there a fight going on?" (Dubinsky probably mistakes 'Boeing' for 'boj', the Russian word for fight) John Doe: "Boeing! There's been a plane crash." Dubinsky: "Ah, our people have brought one down over Savur-Mohyla, near Marinovka, our people have brought down a 'Sushka'."
...
After the tête-a-tête at Girkin's office, Dubinsky is suddenly worried about what has transpired. Around 8:00 p.m., he calls his deputy Pulatov. He wants to have clarity about who has shot what. Dubinsky: "Tell me, did or did not our BUK fire?" Pulatov: "The Buk has brought down a 'Sushka'." Dubinsky: "So..." Pulatov: "But before that, the 'Sushka' downed the Boeing. They tried to blame us for that." (...) Two minutes later, Dubinsky repeats this story to his boss, Igor Girkin.
...
Not much later, Pulatov and Kharchenko both call from the MH17 crash site. Dubinsky himself now also seems to question the story that his subordinates have reported to him. When Kharchenko calls from the crash site asking if they should give the OSCE access, Dubinsky also asks him who has downed the Boeing: "You did observe that it was brought down by a 'Sushka', or was it ours after all?"
Kharchenko "Not ours, Nikolayevich, not ours." Dubinsky: "So a 'Sushka' then? And then after that, the 'Sushka' brought down by our Buk, right?" Kharchenko: "Yes, first there was a bang up there, and then there was our bang."
It was a Ukrainian combat aircraft; that's also what the separatists keep telling each other. They lay the foundation for the story that, a few days later, will also be officially embraced by the Russian Ministry of Defence. It will soon become clear that the evidence submitted by the Ministry in that respect is false. Russia will later switch to a different theory: flight MH17 has not been downed by the separatists, but by a Buk from the Ukrainian army.
At 8:30 p.m., five hours after flight MH17, Dubinsky calls Girkin. The Minister instructs him to take the 'box' to the border with the neighbouring Lugansk region. Dubinsky and his men control a large part of the Donetsk region, but the only route to Russia leads through the Lugansk region, which is controlled by other rebel forces.
Meanwhile, Kharchenko reports that the 'box' has left the launch site on its own and is headed for Snizhne. A town not far from the launch site. At 10:30 p.m. he calls Dubinsky again. Kharchenko: "Where does it go, where should I escort it to?" Dubinsky: "Up to the border with the Lugansk region." Kharchenko: "Aha." Dubinsky: "And then that's it. Clear?"
But 45 minutes later, the Buk is still in Snizhne, at less than 10 km from the original launch site: "They don't know the way, nobody knows anything."
Friday, 18 July 2014
After midnight, the two leaders have completely lost sight of the Buk, and the Minister of Defence Girkin is getting edgy. Dubinsky can't get a hold of his people on the phone, and rumour has it that they are no longer driving in the direction of Russia, but are, in fact, coming back.
...
Dubinsky immediately calls his boss Girkin. He implies that he has carried out his boss's orders and has driven to Snizhne. "I just got fucking back. Everything was okay over there." Dubinsky repeats what Kharchenko has told him. "The machine was already in Russia; he immediately transferred the fucking thing." But Girkin's sources tell him that the transfer has failed. Dubinsky then calls again and Kharchenko repeats that the 'machine' is in Russia. Kharchenko: "I've just got off the phone with them. They are already getting another machine from Russia."
...
At 10:50 that morning, Dubinsky receives one last call on this number about flight MH17. The OSCE wants to bring Ukrainian aircraft experts to the crash site and is Dubinsky okay with that? "Let them go, I've already got the boxes anyway," says Dubinsky, "one yesterday evening, and we found another one last night. I'm not sure, maybe there are four of them, but we've already got two."
...
Then the tapped number goes quiet. Dubinsky switches to a new number. That number is tapped as well, but there is no more talk of MH17 or any Buk.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Video o prisluhih z angleškimi podnapisi. 12 minut.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
Mortis poglobljeno tvita o sojenju. V Ruščini, ampak prevajalnik reši zadevo.
https://twitter.com/Mortis_Banned/statu...
https://twitter.com/Mortis_Banned/statu...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
on:
Nizozemsko tožilstvo je naredilo interaktivno predstavitev dokaznega materiala:
https://criminalfilesmh17.prosecutionse...
off:
Pri Bellingcat so pripravili letno poročilo & revizijo za 2021:
https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/...
https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/...
Najbolj brani članki lani, str. 9:
1. US Soldiers Expose Nuclear Weapons Secrets Via Flashcard Apps
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/05...
2. Woman Accused of Stealing Nancy Pelosi’s Laptop Appears in Video Making Nazi Salute
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/america...
3. The Journey of Ashli Babbitt
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/01...
Nizozemsko tožilstvo je naredilo interaktivno predstavitev dokaznega materiala:
https://criminalfilesmh17.prosecutionse...
off:
Pri Bellingcat so pripravili letno poročilo & revizijo za 2021:
https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/...
https://www.bellingcat.com/app/uploads/...
Najbolj brani članki lani, str. 9:
1. US Soldiers Expose Nuclear Weapons Secrets Via Flashcard Apps
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/05...
2. Woman Accused of Stealing Nancy Pelosi’s Laptop Appears in Video Making Nazi Salute
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/america...
3. The Journey of Ashli Babbitt
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/01...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Pac-Man ::
JIT je danes končal aktivnosti in objavil končno poročilo, na žalost (zaenkrat) samo v Nizozemščini
Zapis na strani pravosodnega ministrstva:
https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2023/0...
poročilo:
https://www.om.nl/binaries/om/documente...
So pa zaključili z bombico in na tiskovni konferenci zavrteli prisluh, ki nakazuje, da je moral pošiljanje Buka v Ukrajino odobriti Putin oz. nekdo iz njegovega spremstva.
Molly je tvitala s tiskovke, nit:
https://twitter.com/MollyQuell/status/1...
Zapis na strani pravosodnega ministrstva:
https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2023/0...
poročilo:
https://www.om.nl/binaries/om/documente...
So pa zaključili z bombico in na tiskovni konferenci zavrteli prisluh, ki nakazuje, da je moral pošiljanje Buka v Ukrajino odobriti Putin oz. nekdo iz njegovega spremstva.
Molly je tvitala s tiskovke, nit:
https://twitter.com/MollyQuell/status/1...
...
According to a press release by the Public Prosecution Service, there are "strong indications" Putin personally authorized the use of the Buk.
(Bit of a spoiler, we haven't gotten to this part in the press conference.)
In recordings, senior defense officials say the decision to provide material support to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine must be postponed because the only person who can make that decision is in France.
Putin was in France for commemoration of D-Day.
According to Andy Kraag, it's not clear if the decision to supply the Buk was made before or after the military convoy was dispatched to the border.
"Intercepted conversations reveal that the decision to supply military support lay with Putin," Kraag says.
He says it’s also clear that the request for heavier weapons was submitted to Putin and granted.
I appreciate the passive aggressive use of quotes around prime minster here.In this conversation, Putin himself offers to help facilitate a prisoner exchange with Ukraine "in word and deed."
It strikes me that, in classic Dutch fashion, we are not just hearing about what the JIT does know, but also what it doesn't know.
Downside: These people will tell you directly to your face your dress isn't flattering.
Upside: Clear about the limits of their investigation.
...
She notes combatant immunity for those uniformed service members. And that Putin has head-of-state immunity.
Under Dutch law, he cannot be prosecuted as long as he is in office, even for war crimes.
Van Boetzelaer is going step by step through all of the names that have been tossed around and why they couldn't be prosecuted - basically there just isn't enough evidence or the evidence doesn't show criminal responsibility.
...
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Mr.B ::
JIT je danes končal aktivnosti in objavil končno poročilo, na žalost (zaenkrat) samo v Nizozemščini
Zapis na strani pravosodnega ministrstva:
https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuws/2023/0...
poročilo:
https://www.om.nl/binaries/om/documente...
So pa zaključili z bombico in na tiskovni konferenci zavrteli prisluh, ki nakazuje, da je moral pošiljanje Buka v Ukrajino odobriti Putin oz. nekdo iz njegovega spremstva.
Molly je tvitala s tiskovke, nit:
https://twitter.com/MollyQuell/status/1...
...
According to a press release by the Public Prosecution Service, there are "strong indications" Putin personally authorized the use of the Buk.
(Bit of a spoiler, we haven't gotten to this part in the press conference.)
In recordings, senior defense officials say the decision to provide material support to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine must be postponed because the only person who can make that decision is in France.
Putin was in France for commemoration of D-Day.
According to Andy Kraag, it's not clear if the decision to supply the Buk was made before or after the military convoy was dispatched to the border.
"Intercepted conversations reveal that the decision to supply military support lay with Putin," Kraag says.
He says it’s also clear that the request for heavier weapons was submitted to Putin and granted.
I appreciate the passive aggressive use of quotes around prime minster here.In this conversation, Putin himself offers to help facilitate a prisoner exchange with Ukraine "in word and deed."
It strikes me that, in classic Dutch fashion, we are not just hearing about what the JIT does know, but also what it doesn't know.
Downside: These people will tell you directly to your face your dress isn't flattering.
Upside: Clear about the limits of their investigation.
...
She notes combatant immunity for those uniformed service members. And that Putin has head-of-state immunity.
Under Dutch law, he cannot be prosecuted as long as he is in office, even for war crimes.
Van Boetzelaer is going step by step through all of the names that have been tossed around and why they couldn't be prosecuted - basically there just isn't enough evidence or the evidence doesn't show criminal responsibility.
...
In na koncu, je zadeva zkjučena baje Putin oz. nekdo iz njegovega spremstva.
Zgleda da danes strokovnjaki na zahodu vse zakjučijo z baje.
France Rejects Genocide Accusations Against Israel in Gaza,
To accuse the Jewish state of genocide is to cross a moral threshold
To accuse the Jewish state of genocide is to cross a moral threshold
mertseger ::
Putin je bil tisti vojak ki je pritisnil na sporžilec, sigurno bo zahod to v današnjih razmerah z zagotovostjo trdil 
Pac-Man ::
In na koncu, je zadeva zkjučena baje Putin oz. nekdo iz njegovega spremstva.
Zgleda da danes strokovnjaki na zahodu vse zakjučijo z baje.
Pogojnik je bil moj, ker sem delal na bazi tvitov s tiskovke. Zdaj sem našel angleški prepis konference s prisluhi, bo kar Putin.
Aksjonov svetovalec reče, da lahko o dobavi odloči samo "številka ena, ki odgovarja ljudstvu, sploh veš kak nivo je to?" In par podobnih.
https://www.politie.nl/en/information/t...
...
In a conversation of 7 June, Aksyonov’s assistant mentioned that the decision to provide support had been postponed by a week because there was only one person who could make that decision: not a general or Minister of Defence, but the person who was directly accountable to the people and who was currently at a summit in France. We will now play a part of this conversation.
Sh…defence minister’ would appear to refer to Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defence.
The next day, Aksyonov’s aide took part in a similar conversation, in which he said that his bosses needed another week because there was only one person who could make that decision and who was responsible, and he was in France. We will now play a part of that conversation.
Med drugim so ujeli Putina, ki novembra 2017 s Plotnitskim debatira o "vojaški komponenti", "socioekonomski situaciji" in izmenjavi vojnih ujetnikov.
In Borodaja, ki je dan pred sestrelitvijo MH17 FSB generala spraševal, če je možno, da "naši" helikopterji izvajajo napade pri Marjinki. Državljanska vojna my ass.
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and
fiction and the distinction between true and false no longer exist.
Mr.B ::
In na koncu, je zadeva zkjučena baje Putin oz. nekdo iz njegovega spremstva.
Zgleda da danes strokovnjaki na zahodu vse zakjučijo z baje.
Pogojnik je bil moj, ker sem delal na bazi tvitov s tiskovke. Zdaj sem našel angleški prepis konference s prisluhi, bo kar Putin.
Aksjonov svetovalec reče, da lahko o dobavi odloči samo "številka ena, ki odgovarja ljudstvu, sploh veš kak nivo je to?" In par podobnih.
https://www.politie.nl/en/information/t...
...
In a conversation of 7 June, Aksyonov’s assistant mentioned that the decision to provide support had been postponed by a week because there was only one person who could make that decision: not a general or Minister of Defence, but the person who was directly accountable to the people and who was currently at a summit in France. We will now play a part of this conversation.
Sh…defence minister’ would appear to refer to Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Defence.
The next day, Aksyonov’s aide took part in a similar conversation, in which he said that his bosses needed another week because there was only one person who could make that decision and who was responsible, and he was in France. We will now play a part of that conversation.
Med drugim so ujeli Putina, ki novembra 2017 s Plotnitskim debatira o "vojaški komponenti", "socioekonomski situaciji" in izmenjavi vojnih ujetnikov.
In Borodaja, ki je dan pred sestrelitvijo MH17 FSB generala spraševal, če je možno, da "naši" helikopterji izvajajo napade pri Marjinki. Državljanska vojna my ass.
Baje, oziroma predhodnik, baje je pyutin drzal sprozilec na buku, in je kihnil, baje.
Zato pa JE genZ ameriska generacija racunalnisko nepismena za delovna mesta v letu 2023. In to ni baje, to je dejstvo.
France Rejects Genocide Accusations Against Israel in Gaza,
To accuse the Jewish state of genocide is to cross a moral threshold
To accuse the Jewish state of genocide is to cross a moral threshold
Zgodovina sprememb…
- predlagal izbris: nejcek74 ()
TESKAn ::
Zahod jih je prisilil, da so sestrelili civilno letalo 
.
. Uf! Uf! Je rekel Vinetou in se skril za skalo,
ki jo je prav v ta namen nosil s seboj.
ki jo je prav v ta namen nosil s seboj.
Vredno ogleda ...
| Tema | Ogledi | Zadnje sporočilo | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tema | Ogledi | Zadnje sporočilo | |
| ⊘ | Sodišče odločilo: Rusi krivi sestrelitve MH17Oddelek: Loža | 2509 (1842) | MrStein |
| ⊘ | Vojaška premoč na nebu-teoretični primer (strani: 1 2 3 4 5 )Oddelek: Loža | 27995 (24208) | fikus_ |
| » | Wikileaks: NSA vsaj dve desetletji prisluškovala nemškem vrhuOddelek: Novice / NWO | 19954 (17786) | Martin Krpan |