Rusija vs. Ukrajina aka. "Putin - še sladkih 16 let na oblasti?"

fur80 je 18. sep 2023 ob 16:56 izjavil:

Če mi rusofili upravičijo to reklamiranje najbolj zaplankanega in izkoriščevalnega sistema na svetu kot je S Koreja, potem pa res vsaka čast!

Ima da dajo USA ATACMSE, da uničijo to leglo starega železja, ko samo povohajo z vlakom ukrajinsko mejo!

Zmajc je 18. sep 2023 ob 17:50 izjavil:

Jaz imam občutek, da bo Severna Koreja samo postaja, kjer bodo Rusi prevzeli vojaško pomoč, ki jo bo za njih tja poslala Kitajska.

Tako bodo imeli Kitajci uradno čiste roke. Rusi pa vojaško pomoč.

Mogoče se motim.

We could not imagine what the people in Ukrainian city Mariupol are going through… Mariupol has been occupied by russian army and has been under the constant fire from the russian aircraft since the beginning of March, 2022. People of Mariupol are left without any communication services. This became the idea of the documentary film "Mariupol... out of range".

Putin and the Presidents

FRONTLINE investigates Russian President Vladimir Putin’s clashes with multiple American presidents as he’s tried to rebuild the Russian empire. Veteran filmmaker Michael Kirk (Putin’s Revenge, Putin’s Road to War) and his team trace the miscalculations and missteps of U.S. presidents over five administrations, culminating in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Once Upon a Time in Iraq: Fallujah

The enduring story of the battle of Fallujah, told by the people who lived through it. In this documentary from filmmaker James Bluemel (Once Upon A Time In Iraq, Exodus), U.S. Marines, journalists and ordinary Iraqis recount one of the defining episodes of the Iraq War twenty years after the invasion.

Pac-Man je 18. sep 2023 ob 21:02 izjavil:

to, video

https://twitter.com/yarotrof/status/170...

Bonkers Russian Army recruitment commercial, in which soldiers under fire in a trench discuss Ukrainian real estate investments. (One wants to buy an apartment in Kyiv’s tony Pechersk neighborhood once it is conquered, the other says he prefers Odesa because of the sea…)

When won’t it be too soon to render a judgment on the counteroffensive in your view?

I appreciate this question & will endeavor to answer briefly here as a start. This is a worthy conversation.

Evaluating the ultimate success or failure of a major military operation requires multiple lenses.

Most critically, we must consider the battlefield effects achieved & weigh them against the desired outcome (or “objective” in military terms).

We must also understand some things about the design of the operation itself.

In this case, the bottom line is it’s still too soon to call victory but certainly premature to call defeat. The fight is on.

Here’s how to understand where we are:

First you’ll have to indulge me in some war studies foundations.

Operations like the one Ukraine is conducting occur at what we call the operational level of war - in between the tactical level (think troops in contact) & strategic level (think ultimate war aims).

Analyzing the operational level of war is a fascinating, challenging discipline. Especially when a military has operational leaders who can design & prosecute operations & string them together into campaigns with an artistry that surpasses the hard science of men & materiel.

Yes, artistry. It’s a weird word to hear in a military context but it applies.

While there’s much we don’t know publicly about how things are being designed, commanded, & waged, Ukraine’s war effort has had signs of artistry.

Russia’s has not.

So what are Ukraine’s objectives & how do we evaluate whether they’re being met (with or without artistry)?

The specifics of course are tightly guarded by Ukraine’s leadership. But we can discern a lot from public statements & by stitching together an understanding of the design & prosecution of the war effort from events on the ground. Thats what we @TheStudyofWar spend our lives doing.

First let’s frame what an objective looks like at the operational level of war & what it doesn’t.

Operations string together tactical engagements (think: attack position Y or breach the trench line at location Z) to create an effect that supports larger strategic objectives.

Rarely does a single operation achieve those strategic objectives outright unless we’re at the very end of a campaign.

While this war has already gone on for far too long from a human perspective, Ukraine is still in the opening stages of its deliberate counteroffensive campaign. That’s because the Russians had ample time to dig in deep, layered defenses.

So this operation isn’t the endgame, which is itself a tragedy for Ukraine which faces many more months of this.

Ultimately (strategically), Ukraine’s core stated aim is to liberate all of its territory & population.

Given the battlefield situation at the time Ukraine launched its current offensive, achieving that aim in one go was not possible - even with artistry.

Therefore, those who evaluate Ukraine’s recent progress against its strategic aim rather than a nested / supporting operational objective make an error in military analysis.

It’s an understandable error for those not trained in the discipline. And it’s indeed very important not to lose sight of the intended endgame.

However, one can end up with an opinion built on many layers of shaky assumptions if one skips a deep understanding of the operational realities.

Ukraine cannot win back all its territory in one operation. So judging it on that false basis has no analytic value.

Ukraine’s offensive must do something short of liberate all Ukrainian territory but in a way that makes the ultimate aim more achievable.

This Ukraine has an objective for this offensive which is short of achieving all strategic war aims. From public statements & the design of this operation, we can surmise that the objective is likely in broad strokes to sever Russia’s supply line to Crimea & achieve a penetration of the Russian defensive lines that allows a follow - on exploitation phase.

The actual (classified) objective will be more specific & also likely has branches & sequels that account for the inevitable requirement to evolve plans as the fighting unfolds.

To that end, Ukraine already made one clear adaptation after hard losses in the first few weeks of fighting taught Ukrainian forces those invaluable battlefield lessons that can only be learned by fighting. But this seems to have been an adaptation in approach rather than a revisit of the core operational aims of the offensive.

Ukraine’s current approach to achieving its objective, which the @TheStudyofWar team has covered magnificently, appears to boil down to to maintaining significant pressure across as much of the Russian line as possible & to be prepared to surge forward as soon as something “breaks.”

This is surely reductionist & there are many important supporting efforts including the multi-domain deep strikes underway in Russia & Crimea.

The sophistication of the operational approach makes evaluating the success or failure of the operation a bit difficult in real time, because the early signs of success or failure aren’t very observable on the front line (from public sources). But our team has pointed to a few good ones, perhaps the most important being lateral Russian deployments from one area of the front line to reinforce another.

Essentially what this means is Ukraine’s offensive is working if the Russians are forced to choose where to expose their front line to greater risk & to move their forces out of position in order to plug gaps elsewhere. That’s happening.

This churn creates important opportunity for Ukraine if Ukraine has the reserve forces & operational sophistication to exploit it. Their behavior to date tells us they likely do, as the @TheStudyofWar team has assessed.

Much fighting remains, but events so far indicate that the design of Ukraine’s offensive may prove to be one of those examples of artistry.

Ukraine has also simply made some risky but excellent calls. Their ferocious stand at Bakhmut not only imposed significant costs on the Russians & contributed to Wagner’s demise, but has also directly supported an ongoing breakthrough of Russian lines in southern ukraine by pinning down forces Russia essentially can’t spare

Our team’s new update on Bakhmut:
https://understandingwar.org/background...

So does that mean Ukraine’s offensive is a success? It is still too soon to give a final answer. But the signs right now indicate the offensive is working as designed & is gaining momentum which means it is certainly too soon to call it a failure.

Ukrainian forces have broken through the first few layers of Russian defenses on the Zaporizhia front & forced the Russians to make increasingly hard choices between Bakhmut & Zaporizhia in particular.

Can the Russians stabilize it? We’ll see. But the @TheStudyofWar has continued to assess that Russia lacks not only an uncommitted reserve but also the manpower in general to maintain the same level of manning of defensive lines multiple layers back. So maybe not.

Said differently, this may get easier for Ukraine the deeper they go.

Which means we cannot project linearly. If the Russians fail to halt the growing momentum, the Ukrainian breakthrough could become swift & wide.

It remains entirely possible that a full and deep Ukrainian breakthrough does occur, that it unhinges the Russian defense across the south, & that it enables Ukraine to sever the supply line to Crimea & take meaningful terrain in the process. This then can enable a new operational phase to do even more.

The fact that these outcomes are entirely possible means that pressuring Ukraine to make concessions and negotiate right now is premature.

In fact, it would directly benefit Russia which sorely needs time & space to regroup & try to muster more men & materiel to stabilize their defense.

Are these the only outcomes that are entirely possible? Of course not. It’s war.

Ukraine could stall. Russia could successfully regroup. Russia could sacrifice terrain elsewhere and try to take a smaller loss to free up forces to plug gaps in the south. Etc.

The point is, much fighting remains & it is too soon to tell how this round will end, much less the war.

We aren’t at endgame.

How do we know when to make the call of whether a given operation has succeeded or failed? Well, often there is art to military analysis, too.

We @TheStudyofWar take a very cautious & conservative approach.

A massive Ukrainian breakthrough that leads to an exploitation phase would be obvious.

Harder to assess would be the point at which the current, grinding advance starts to falter.

But for right now, it’s clear we aren’t there. Ukraine continues to take terrain & key positions. Slowly, methodically, painfully. But take it nonetheless.

If we see that stop or reverse, it’ll be time to reconsider.

Fungi88 je 19. sep 2023 ob 10:51 izjavil:

fur80 je 19. sep 2023 ob 10:47 izjavil:

Vse bolj se zdi, da je res ukrajinska raketa zalutala na tržnico, ki je pobila 15 ljudi.

Treba se kdaj znati tudi opravičit ljudem, ki so to že takrat trdili. Tako da pardon vsem, ki so bili prizadeti! ;)

Vendar vseeno ne spremeni dejatva, da brez ruskega napada ne bi bilo teh žrtev.

Kaki novi konkretni dokazi?
Kar jaz vidim še vedno smetijo z photoshopano sliko kjer so dodali silhueto rakete na streho avta.

where he blames Russia for everything

sir_mha je 18. sep 2023 ob 17:53 izjavil:

Baje da Južnokorejci premišljujejo, ali bi Ukrajincem poslali še orožje kot pomoč, česar do sedaj še niso naredili. In baje ima Južna Koreja izjemen arzenal orožja.

AtaŠtumf je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:24 izjavil:

Ima pa Zelenski in Ukrajina odličen teden:

- njegov svetovalec Podolyak pravi, da imata Kitajska in Indija nizek intelektulni potencial
- sam pravi, če bodo stisnjeni v kot, bodo izseljeni Ukrajinci po Evropi začeli delati pizdarije
- toži Poljsko, Madžarsko in Slovaško zaradi svojega nizko kvalitetnega žita

ps: Pa še baje v ZDA mu ne bo dovoljeno spet v kongresu jamrati in fehtati za orožje, plus vsak obisk zadnje čase v Ukrajini nič ne prinese.

Bauc je 6. sep 2023 ob 20:34 izjavil:

Fangolin7 je 6. sep 2023 ob 20:24 izjavil:

AtaŠtumf je 6. sep 2023 ob 19:33 izjavil:

Zabavno je, kako še vedno ves čas verjamete, da so Ukrajinci vedno resnico govoreči angelčki!

Pa te analitki, ki jih objavljate, so pa še bolj smešni, 100x so že falili, pa še vedno jim slepo zaupate!

Osel gre enkrat na led, slo-techoca lahko nafukaš 100x, pa še vedno bo bee se drl!

Pravi se oglaša

Da ne omenjam tistega zgoraj od uporabnika jaruski, ki je pisal o napadu wagnerja iz Belorusije

Lmao.

AtaŠtumf je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:27 izjavil:

Verjetno na ukrajinski strani noben oklepnik ni gorel, niti ni noben Ukrajinec umrl ta teden, ali kaj hočeš povedati s tem?

Vojna je, izgube so na ruski strani, ali pa si sveto prepričan, da nikakor ne bo izgub na ruski ali ukrajinski strani?

ps: Pa še tole, koliko se tolčejo po morju, da je ta podmornica tako pomembna in je strateški ukrajinski cilj?

AtaŠtumf je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:33 izjavil:

A je že konec morda vsega, da si tako prepričan, da se split in half scenarij ne bo zgodil?

AtaŠtumf je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:27 izjavil:

ps: Pa še tole, koliko se tolčejo po morju, da je ta podmornica tako pomembna in je strateški ukrajinski cilj?

In July 2022 it was reported that work on an electrochemical generator to produce hydrogen from diesel fuel and oxygen was continuing and that the Rubin Central Design Bureau signed a new contract in 2019 to continue work. This was scheduled to be completed by the mid-2020s.[5] In 2023, the decision was taken to decommission and scrap the lead ship of the class, the Sankt Peterburg due to the very high costs of modernising the submarine. [6]

gozdar1 je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:44 izjavil:

Kako je lahko neuspeh ruske "posebne operacije" ukrajineki poraz?

AtaŠtumf je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:47 izjavil:

gozdar1 je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:44 izjavil:

Kako je lahko neuspeh ruske "posebne operacije" ukrajineki poraz?

O uspehu ali neuspehu se običajno sodi po koncu vojne.

Dokler se situacija na terenu spreminja vsak dan, težko govorimo o končnem uspehu ene, ali druge strani.

Lahko pa blejamo kot ovčke in ponavljamo Vlad-ove komentarje...

Border guards in the Omsk region claim to have confiscated 1,105 drones from a lorry "transiting through Russia" to an unnamed neighbouring country, where they "might be used" against RU forces. (Omsk has a border w Kazakhstan)

AtaŠtumf je 19. sep 2023 ob 11:27 izjavil:

Vojna je, izgube so na ruski strani, ali pa si sveto prepričan, da nikakor ne bo izgub na ruski ali ukrajinski strani?

MadMicka je 19. sep 2023 ob 12:40 izjavil:

Ali kdo ve, ali je tale d***l luckyss1 zaposlen na RTV, da mu rata vedno objaviti prvi komentar glede vojne v Ukrajini, ker tole res ni več normalno...