Rusija vs. Ukrajina aka. "Putin - še sladkih 16 let na oblasti?"

Stane2 je 10. jun 2026 ob 14:02:38 izjavil:

bm1973 je 10. jun 2026 ob 12:40:49 izjavil:

No ja, ukrajinski dron je priletel do Hrvaške, pa ga še zaznali niso... In top čez NATO države.
Ni to igrica, kjer imaš vse radarsko in satelistsko pokrito.

Ojoj kaka bebava primerjava. Letel je čez Madžarsko pod Orbanom. Pa to je bilo na začetku vojne. Poleg tega so ga zaznali, pa so menili, da gre za manjše potniško letalo. A ni blo to 1000x povedano? A si že spet dementen?



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bm1973 je včeraj ob 10:16:29 izjavil:

Poljaki blokirajo 6,6 milijard EU denarja za Ukrajino...

https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/ukraine...
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/insight/...

Ukraine appears to be scaling a coordinated "logistics lockdown" campaign against Russia

* Ukraine's long-range strike campaign looks like it is moving from occasional deep strikes into something more systematic. Zelenskyy says Ukraine is now using roughly **300-350 long-range drones daily**, while Russia is still launching large waves of drones and missiles against Ukrainian cities, power infrastructure, and civilian areas. The basic dynamic seems to be shifting: Russia is still trying to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses and energy grid, but Ukraine is increasingly trying to make Russia's own rear areas feel the pressure too.

* Over the past few days, Ukrainian strikes reportedly hit several categories of Russian military and infrastructure targets at once. These included oil storage sites, pumping stations, refineries, ammunition depots, command posts, UAV control sites, logistics hubs, substations, fuel tanks, radar equipment, and port infrastructure. That matters because these are not random symbolic targets; they are the kinds of nodes that keep an army supplied, fueled, coordinated, and able to launch attacks.

* One of the biggest themes is fuel. Ukraine reportedly hit oil storage tanks in Krasnodar Krai, Saratov Oblast, and Volgograd Oblast, followed by attacks on the Kuibyshev oil refinery in Samara and two oil pumping stations in Vladimir Oblast, around 700 km from Ukraine. These facilities are tied into Russia's ability to move diesel and petroleum products internally and for export. Even if individual strikes do not permanently destroy a facility, repeated fires, repairs, shutdowns, and rerouting can create cumulative strain.

* Ukraine also appears to be targeting Russia's weapons production chain. The reported Flamingo missile strike on VNIIR-Progress in Cheboksary is important because the facility is linked to electronics used in Shahed drones, guided bombs, Iskander missiles, and Kometa-type satellite navigation antennas. This is the kind of target that sits behind the front line but directly affects Russia's ability to keep producing precision or semi-precision strike systems.

* In occupied territory, Ukraine has been hitting infrastructure that supports Russian military logistics. Strikes around Mariupol reportedly damaged substations, radar equipment, repair infrastructure, a control tower, fuel storage facilities, and port-related assets. Mariupol is not just a city under occupation; it is also a useful logistics point for Russian forces in southern Ukraine. Disrupting power and port operations there can slow repair work, cargo handling, command functions, and fuel distribution.

* The attacks on bridges and crossings in the south may be part of the same pattern. Ukraine has repeatedly targeted the Chonhar bridge and the Henichesk-Arabat Spit crossing, both of which matter for movement between occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. The Chonhar strike reportedly stopped traffic without fully destroying the bridge, which is still useful from Ukraine's perspective: a bridge does not need to collapse into the water to become a logistics problem.

* What makes the Chonhar case especially interesting is the reported timing. Ukrainian sources claimed that Russia's 37th Motor Rifle Brigade was waiting for fuel via that route when the bridge was hit. If accurate, that suggests Ukraine is not only striking infrastructure because it is valuable in general, but because it knows when specific Russian units are depending on specific routes. That turns a bridge strike from a broad disruption into a targeted logistics ambush.

* Ukraine's attacks on Russian-linked cargo ships in the Sea of Azov also seem to fit the same logic. Ships can move far more cargo than trucks, especially along the occupied southern coastline. If Ukraine can make maritime logistics riskier, Russia may be forced to move more supplies by road. That creates more truck traffic, more congestion, more predictable routes, and more opportunities for Ukrainian drones to hit vehicles, fuel convoys, and depots.

* This is basically a bottleneck strategy. Hit the ships so Russia uses more trucks. Hit the bridges so those trucks have fewer routes. Hit the substations so ports and logistics hubs work less efficiently. Hit fuel depots and pumping stations so supply gets harder to move. Then use drones to attack the traffic that has been forced into narrower corridors. None of these actions has to be decisive alone; the point is to make the whole system slower, more expensive, and more fragile.

* Russia is still applying enormous pressure on Ukraine at the same time. It continues to launch drones and missiles at energy infrastructure, cities, and frontline regions. Reports also suggest Russia is upgrading its drones to use frequencies that many detectors may not reliably spot, while continuing to increase missile production. That means Ukraine's rear areas are still under major threat, especially heading into another winter.

* Russia's missile threat may also be getting more difficult to manage. Iskander ballistic missiles remain one of the hardest systems for Ukraine to intercept, especially because Patriot PAC-3 interceptors are limited and expensive. Russia is also reportedly using S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles in a surface-to-surface role, while Zircon missiles are creating very short warning windows when launched from closer positions. This puts constant pressure on Ukraine's air defense planning.

* The Kalibr issue is another example of Russian adaptation. Reports suggest Russia has started using cluster warheads on some Kalibr cruise missiles and has returned to imported electronics in parts of the guidance systems. That implies Russia is still trying to improve the effectiveness of its missile strikes, despite sanctions and supply-chain pressure. It also suggests Russia's defense industry still has access to enough foreign components to keep upgrading certain weapons.

* So the picture is not one-sided. Ukraine is clearly expanding its ability to hit deeper and more often, but Russia is also improving its strike packages, drone tactics, and missile stockpiles. Ukraine is trying to degrade Russia's logistics and weapons production, while Russia is trying to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and damage the energy grid. Both sides are adapting, and both are trying to make the other side's rear area less safe.

* My read is that Ukraine's current campaign is less about single spectacular strikes and more about creating a long-term logistics crisis for Russia. The target set is too broad and too connected to be accidental: fuel, bridges, ports, substations, ships, depots, command posts, and weapons electronics. That looks like an attempt to make Russian operations harder before supplies even reach the front line.

* The key question is whether Ukraine can scale this campaign faster than Russia can repair, reroute, and defend. If Ukraine can keep launching hundreds of long-range drones and occasional missile strikes every day, Russia will have to spread air defenses across a huge territory while still protecting the front, Crimea, refineries, ports, factories, and logistics hubs. That is a difficult defensive problem.

* At the same time, Russia will likely keep escalating attacks on Ukraine's power grid and cities. The coming winter could be extremely hard if Russia combines mass drone waves, ballistic missiles, Zircons, modified Kalibrs, and attacks on energy infrastructure. Ukraine's ability to decentralize power generation, defend key nodes, and maintain repair capacity may be just as important as its ability to strike back.

* Overall, this looks like a war of systems rather than just a war of front lines. Ukraine is trying to break the systems that move Russian fuel, ammunition, electronics, and reinforcements. Russia is trying to break the systems that keep Ukrainian cities powered, defended, and supplied. The side that adapts faster may gain the bigger advantage, even if the map itself does not change dramatically right away.

fikus_ je včeraj ob 14:09:00 izjavil:

karafeka je včeraj ob 11:31:56 izjavil:

Če prav razumem, EU (predvsem Nemci) hoče poslat teh 6 milijard Ukrajini (spet v kombijih verjetno), Poljska pa hoče dobiti iz tega povračilo od Eu za orožje in pomoč v višini pol milijarde, ki so ju že poslali Ukrajincem.
Se pravi novice niso o tem, da Poljska noče več pomagati ukrajini.

Poljaki hočejo pomagati sebi in pristaviti piskrcek.
Vprasanje, kako je bilo dogovorjeno, ko so Poljaki dobavljali orozje UA, ali je bilo predvideno placilo za to.

JanBrezov je včeraj ob 14:14:25 izjavil:

Senior Putin general killed in car bombing in Moscow after son 'posted number plate on social media'

Windlass je včeraj ob 18:24:35 izjavil:

:))] Zdej ne vem a še računajo na slovenske spetzne: nesveto trojico Resni.ce, Mi, Socialisti in MMC korpus. Z Vasevom kot zastavonošo

Windlass je včeraj ob 15:55:44 izjavil:

https://www.rtvslo.si/svet/vojna-v-ukra...

Danes je pa komentariat nekam tiho in odsoten. Se takoj pozna kadar se ni nad ničemer za naslajat. Po mojem jih pečejo mostovi in bencinske

windigo je danes ob 09:23:12 izjavil:

strawman je včeraj ob 21:47:34 izjavil:

Pa še to počasi odpadajo, forumski tankiji so invazijo upravičevali z realpolitiko in "russia strong" argumenti.

Tipičen primer, kako izgleda, ko ljudje na socialnih omrežjih ne kupijo fabrikacij, ki nam jih na dnevni bazi servirajo mediji v obliki vojne propagande.
V svojih odzivih izrazijo posmeh ali izkažejo strinjanje s kakšnim od odgovorov, ki s svojo kritično ostjo stre prvotno (medijsko) objavo po celi črti.
Temu se v spletnem besednjaku reče "ratioed", ki zaenkrat še nima slovenskega ekvivalenta. Lahko bi bil povožen ali kaj podobnega. Morda kolektiviziran, hehe.
Vsekakor je lepo tu in tam opaziti, da ljudje še niso v celoti kupili zgodbe, ki nam jo tako intenzivno prodajajo. Ljudje zaenkrat še niso zapopadli vojnohujskaškega narativa, da Rusija ogroža Evropo. Zdrav razum še ni popolnoma strt.
Osebno mislim, da je ne ogroža. Je pa jasno, da si evropske elite želijo širšega konflikta z njo. Vprašanje je, a so glede te odločitve sploh suverene, a je to že novo poglavje. Zaradi tega delajo vse, kar je v njihovi moči, da bi do tega na neki točki tudi prišlo. Hegseth je lepo povedal, kakšna je dodeljena vloga EU v hegemoniji: delitev bremena. EU mora nastopiti proti Rusiji, da bi se lahko ZDA posvetile davljenju in podreditvi Kitajske. Vloge so razdeljene.
Upam, da se uredniki zavedajo svoje odgovornosti pri poobjavljanju čustveno usmerjenega hujskanja in kam nas kot slepce vodijo.

mtosev je danes ob 10:45:47 izjavil:

Ruska?

JohnyQ_ je danes ob 11:00:34 izjavil:

Pobiramo stave?
Je samo na bolniški ali na trajni "bolniški"?